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This thesis analysed whether functional implicit learning differences existed in two areas 
that have produced promising, but equivocal, findings: individual differences in typical 
populations (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010) and group differences between Autism 
Spectrum Condition (ASC) and Typically Developing (TD) individuals (e.g., L. G. Klinger, 
Klinger, & Pohlig, 2007). Overall, the results from the four studies presented in this thesis 
emphasised a lack of functional differences in implicit learning between individuals. 
Study I investigated whether there were functional individual differences in implicit 
learning among a typical population by examining the inter-correlation between the 
performances of academic psychologists on three implicit learning tasks; the independence of 
those performances from IQ; the relationships between those performances, intuitive aspects of 
personality and occupational tacit knowledge; and, finally, whether the performances were 
related to occupational achievement. There was no evidence of inter-correlation between the 
implicit learning task performances, nor relationships between any of those performances, and 
occupational achievement, or personality. The study did replicate a finding that is important to 
the distinction between implicit and explicit learning: indices of explicit processing, but not 
performance on implicit learning tasks, were correlated with IQ (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 
2007). Additionally, the study found that Academic Psychology and Business Management Tacit 
Knowledge Inventories measured knowledge that predicted occupational achievement in 
academic psychology incrementally to IQ and personality, and was general to both occupations. 
However, tacit knowledge appeared to be acquired primarily as a function of practice and 
experience, rather than individual differences in implicit learning. Overall, I asserted that a 
consideration of the results from Study I with the wider literature currently leads to the 
conclusion that there are minimal individual differences in implicit learning, which signifies that 
there is no general implicit learning ability that is critical to how much is learnt implicitly. 
In the absence of a general ability that determines how much is learnt implicitly, it was 
argued that there could still be general, prerequisite processes, which are always necessary for 
implicit learning but without those processes determining the variation in how much was learnt 
implicitly. Such prerequisite processes would not constitute a psychometric ability but could be 
SUMMARY  vi   
 
   
 
conceptualised as general implicit learning processes. This conceptualisation of implicit learning 
would be supported by the existence of an atypical population who consistently demonstrated 
profound deficits on all implicit learning tasks and skills associated with an implicit acquisition. 
There is no convincing evidence of such a patient group, although the ASC population is a 
plausible candidate (e.g., L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007).  
Therefore, Study II compared IQ-matched ASC and TD individuals on a range of implicit 
learning tasks. The study, taken together with other recent reports (e.g., Barnes, et al., 2008), 
provided convincing evidence that implicit learning is actually intact in ASC and it was argued 
that deficits reported in previous studies must have resulted from differences in task procedures 
(e.g., L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007). In particular, the earlier studies used procedures that 
encouraged explicit strategies, which disadvantaged the ASC groups who had not been matched 
for IQ. A further analysis supported that interpretation: TD and ASC groups who were not 
matched for IQ exhibited differences on an explicit learning task, but not on the implicit learning 
tasks. 
In order to determine whether those previously identified implicit learning deficits in 
ASC resulted just from differences in IQ, or whether there was also a contribution from an ASC 
difficulty in explicit learning, Study III compared ASC individuals with IQ-matched TD 
individuals on an implicit learning task, the Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task, with a procedure 
that encouraged explicit strategies. The SRT procedure was combined with a contextual cueing 
task that provided an indirect, ongoing index of the extent to which sequence learning was 
explicit (Jiménez & Vázquez, in press). Study III indicated a difference in initial explicit 
sequence learning in ASC, which was independent of IQ. 
Study IV replicated the difficulty and by using a pre-task manipulation the study was also 
able to elaborate the nature of that difficulty: ASC individuals were able to learn sequence 
information explicitly, but they had a specific difficulty with learning to apply that explicit 
information. Thus, there was good evidence that implicit learning is intact in ASC and that 
instead ASC individuals have more difficulties with aspects of explicit learning. These findings 
refute the idea that ASC individuals successfully compensate for implicit deficits with explicit 
compensatory strategies. Instead, together with the ASC propensity for using explicit strategies, 
an ASC difficulty with explicit processing might explain some ASC deficits in a range of learnt 
skills, although I acknowledge that there are also plausible alternatives. More generally, these 
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findings and ideas accord with ASC literature concerning impairments in executive functions, 
which require flexible and intentional processing (e.g., Russell, 1997a) and emphasise that future 
research is focused on how explicit, executive differences emerge and affect behaviour. 
In conclusion, the thesis provided no evidence for the proposal that there are functional 
differences between individuals in implicit learning. I propose that, taken together with the 
equivocal evidence discussed in my reviews of the wider literature, it is parsimonious to 
conclude that there is neither a general implicit learning ability, nor general, prerequisite implicit 
learning processes. However, in line with previous literature, the thesis did support functional 
distinctions between implicit and explicit learning: explicit, but not implicit, learning was related 
to IQ; and ASC individuals have difficulties with explicit but not implicit learning. Therefore, I 
assert that a descriptive distinction between explicit and implicit learning remains both useful 
and valid. This is true even though implicit learning seems to be defined by the absence, or 
minimal influence, of explicit processing rather than the general presence of an implicit learning 
ability or processes. Beyond the issue of functional differences, I argue that these findings and 
conclusions make modest, but not decisive, contributions to some of the other fierce debates in 
the wider implicit learning literature. Finally, I propose some recommendations, and directions, 
for future research. 
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““What are you talking about?” “I can’t remember. The Ukrainians. My birth. Candles. I 
know there was a point. Where did I begin?” And so it was when anyone tried to speak: 
their minds would become tangled in remembrance. Words became floods of thought 
with no beginning or end, and would drown the speaker before he could reach the life 
raft of the point he was trying to make. It was impossible to remember what one meant, 
what, after all of the words, was intended”” (Safran Foer, 2002, p. 261).
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I. General Introduction 
“The subject is intrinsically of great interest. Man‟s power to change himself, that is, to 
learn, is perhaps the most impressive thing about him” (Thorndike, 1931, p. 3). 
 
Learning is a critical part of our everyday lives. It affords us the flexibility to change our 
behaviour over time, and to use past experience to improve our responses to old and new 
environmental challenges. Consequently, philosophers and scientists have been motivated for 
centuries to understand and characterise the basic nature of learning (e.g., Aristotle, 2007; James, 
2009; Plato, 1997). Yet many fundamental issues remain unresolved. One important, unresolved 
issue is whether there are differences between individuals in implicit learning that are related to 
meaningful differences between them in their everyday behaviour. In fact, the importance of 
individual differences in implicit learning has rarely been subject to empirical study. This lack of 
research is almost certainly a consequence of the fierce debate within the field on other issues, 
one of which could be interpreted as being about whether implicit learning even exists. 
In this introduction, evidence is reviewed that leads to the conclusion that implicit 
learning certainly exists, providing it is conservatively defined. Specifically, implicit learning 
exists insofar that people can learn when they are not primarily engaged in trying to learn, and 
that consequently they are unable to report verbally on how or what they learnt. Implicit 
learning, defined as such, is not substantially contested, nor is the fact that implicit learning tasks 
provide operational, if impure, measures of this capacity (e.g., D. C. Berry & Dienes, 1993; 
Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008; Shanks, 2005). Instead, the fierce debate has been focused around 
surrounding questions including: How does evidence of implicit learning elucidate the role of 
awareness, attention and automaticity in learning, and in particular, does this evidence 
definitively demonstrate learning without consciousness? What can such results reveal about the 
nature of consciousness and mental representation? Does the existence of implicit learning entail 
the existence of two distinct learning systems, and if so, what are the natures of and differences 
between the two systems? Or, if it does not, is there other evidence of implicit learning with 
further characteristics that would demonstrate the existence of two learning systems (e.g., 
Shanks, 2005)? Such issues remain of utmost importance to the fundamental nature of learning 
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and cognition. However, it is also important to realise that such debate is separate to the 
undisputed existence of conservative conceptions of implicit learning. This realisation is 
important because it legitimises the investigation of whether there are important consequences 
that relate to the capacity of people to learn without express intention, and without being able to 
report verbally on the process or the resultant knowledge, as measured by implicit learning tasks. 
Indeed, the question is not just legitimate but it is extremely important when considering 
how critical learning is to people, and that individual differences in the capacity for explicit, 
intentional learning are well understood and demonstrably important to a number of life 
outcomes (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Kaufman, et al., 2009; Mackintosh, 1998). Consequently, 
differences in implicit learning have recently received investigation. For example, differences in 
implicit learning have been explored in terms of the differences between individuals in a typical 
population (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press), and the 
differences between groups, such as typically developing (TD) and Autism Spectrum Condition 
(ASC) individuals (e.g., L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, Goldberg, Landa, & Denckla, 
2000; Romero-Mungu a, 2008). Without providing conclusive evidence, initial results have 
supported functional differences in both these areas. Specifically, there is evidence that 
individual differences in implicit learning can be measured and are related to second-language 
acquisition; there is also evidence of an ASC deficit in implicit learning, which contributes to 
diagnostic social, communicative and motor impairment. These particular avenues of 
investigations are clearly of intrinsic interest and importance. Additionally, it is hoped that such 
functional investigation of implicit learning will contribute, albeit indirectly, to the fierce and 
important debates surrounding the implicit and explicit learning literature, and will thereby 
complement the more direct approaches to resolving those debates. Thus, this thesis aimed to 
provide further empirical examination of both the validity of individual differences in implicit 
learning, in the new context of occupational achievement, and of the group difference between 
ASC and typically developing individuals. 
1. Implicit Learning 
Everyone knows that you can learn implicitly or explicitly. Most people might not call it 
that, but with a little explanation, they would readily concur that sometimes they have learnt 
about something intentionally, with effort and ongoing awareness, and yet at other times they 
CHAPTER I  3   
 
 
seemed to have learnt about something regardless of intention, and with little awareness of both 
the learning process and what exactly has been learnt. Everyday examples are easy to identify: 
compare an infant learning language for the first time with an older child studying for a second-
language exam. Or remember learning to catch a ball, and then call to mind a physics class 
explaining trajectories, air resistance, and angles. Any sports people (golfers and cricketers in 
particular) find the experience of changing their technique using a few explicit instructions from 
their coach highly dissimilar to when they first picked up the sport during childhood summers in 
their back garden. 
These innocuous and apparently obvious observations belie the questions they raise and 
the extraordinary amount of corresponding debate and research they have inspired (for some 
illustrative reviews see: D. C. Berry, 1997; D. C. Berry & Dienes, 1993; Cleeremans, 
Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008; Dienes & Berry, 1997; French & 
Cleeremans, 2002; Jiménez, 2003; Perruchet, 2008; A. S. Reber, 1993; Seger, 1994; Shanks, 
2005; Stadler & Frensch, 1998; G. Underwood, 1996). Debate has raged on definitions, 
semantics, methodologies, implications for cognitive architecture, and even on the central issue 
of veracity: can learning actually occur without awareness and intention, or is it a matter of 
degree and a trick of everyday experience? There is now substantial evidence and consensus to 
support the existence of implicit learning, to the extent that people are able to learn when they 
are not primarily engaged in trying to learn explicitly and deliberately, and are consequently 
unable to report verbally on how or what they learnt. This evidence has been provided primarily 
by performance patterns on various ‘implicit learning’ tasks. 
2. Implicit Learning Tasks 
Arthur S. Reber was the first to utilise a learning task for the study of implicit learning, 
and is credited with igniting interest in the field. There had been earlier interest in a distinction 
between automatic and cognitive learning; a major catalyst was Thorndike’s law of effect 
(Shanks, 2009; Thorndike, 1931). However, prior to A. S. Reber, research and ideas appeared to 
have been rooted upon explicit hypothesis-testing in learning (e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 
1956; Shanks, 2005). In his thesis, A. S. Reber coined the term ‘implicit learning’ and adapted an 
Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task (Chomsky & Miller, 1958; Miller, 1958), which he 
claimed demonstrated implicit learning (A. S. Reber, 1965, 1967). A. S. Reber has later reported 
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that his thesis “was not well received” and that “a long editorial battle ensued before the work 
was published” (A. S. Reber, 2002, p. xi); difficulties that were somewhat prescient of the 
definitional disagreement and debate that would subsequently characterise the field. Nonetheless, 
AGL tasks became one of the most common and important procedures for studying implicit 
learning. During AGL tasks, participants are typically exposed to a series of letter strings that 
have been created according to an artificial grammar. However, participants are only told about 
the rules once the initial exposure is finished. Further, they are then instructed that they will see 
some new strings and will have to decide whether or not strings conform to the rules. Usually, 
participants are able to make these decisions with better-than-chance accuracy but have little 
ability to describe the rules. This dissociation has led many researchers to cite performance on 
the AGL task as a demonstration of implicit learning (for a recent review, see Pothos, 2007). 
It was another two decades before there was an explosion in the volume of empirical 
implicit learning research. Shanks (2005) reported that in the 1980s there were only 15 articles 
with the term ‘implicit learning’ in their title, while in the 1990s there were 253. When the 
equivalent search of the combined Science and Social Sciences Citation Indexes is conducted on 
the 2000s, it is clear that the upsurge in research has continued: 430 articles have been published 
in the past ten years. The development of the Serial Reaction Time (SRT) procedure in the late 
1980s (Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot, 1988; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) played no small part in this 
increase. Together with the AGL, the SRT is the paradigmatic method for studying implicit 
learning (Shanks, 2005). In a typical SRT procedure, participants are instructed to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible to the location of a stimulus that is presented at one of several 
different possible locations from one trial to the next. Unknown to the participants, the locations 
in which the stimuli appear follow a regular sequence, and participants typically become faster to 
respond to locations predicted by the sequence. Learning is described as implicit because 
participants are generally unable to verbalize the details of the sequence, with only fragmentary 
knowledge present which is unable to account for performance (Jiménez, Mendez, & 
Cleeremans, 1996; Jiménez, Vaquero, & Lupiáñez, 2006). 
While the SRT and the AGL have been the most frequently used tasks for studying 
implicit learning, there are several other implicit learning tasks that demonstrate conceptually 
similar results. For example, there are probability learning tasks (e.g., Millward & Reber, 1968), 
which have been commonly studied as Probabilistic Classification Learning (PCL) tasks (Gluck 
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& Bower, 1988). In a typical PCL task, participants have to classify, or make decisions, about 
stimuli. Following each decision, the participant receives feedback. However, the feedback is 
probabilistic: thus, for a given stimulus there is no definitively correct answer; instead each 
stimulus-outcome is associated with a probability greater than zero but less than one. 
Nonetheless, participants are able to classify stimuli with greater accuracy than chance would 
predict. Yet, because participants have very little, if any, insight into the relationship between the 
stimuli and outcomes, the learning is described as implicit (e.g., Gluck, Shohamy, & Myers, 
2002). 
The Contextual Cueing (CC) task (Chun & Jiang, 1998) is a visual search task in which 
participants are shown displays of stimuli and are required to detect a target stimulus (e.g., a 
rotated T) within a subset of distractor stimuli (e.g., rotated Ls). On half of all the displays, the 
arrangement of the distractors is highly predictive of the location of the target. Participants are 
typically faster to respond on these trials in comparison to trials in which displays do not reliably 
predict the location of the target. Learning is implicit because participants rarely notice that 
contexts are repeated. Moreover, when they are given a test of their explicit knowledge – for 
example, having to recognise the predictive contexts (Chun & Jiang, 1998), or to generate the 
location of the missing target when presented with predictive displays in which the target has 
been replaced by another distractor (Chun & Jiang, 2003; Jiménez & Vázquez, in press) – then 
participants usually perform no better than chance. 
Another variety of procedures are Invariant Feature Learning (IFL) tasks (McGeorge & 
Burton, 1990). The critical feature of IFL tasks is that participants are incidentally exposed to a 
set of stimuli, which have an attribute that is common to them all; they have an invariant feature. 
In a subsequent phase, participants are presented with pairs of novel stimuli, and only one of 
each pair has the invariant feature, and participants are asked to select which of the two they 
have already seen. Even though both stimuli are novel, participants select the stimulus with the 
invariant feature more often than the stimulus without. Learning is implicit because participants 
are also usually unable to report that there was an invariant feature (e.g., McGeorge & Burton, 
1990). 
In order to address the question of whether differences in implicit learning have 
functional implications for everyday life, this thesis has used particular versions of all these five 
categories of task (AGL, CC, IFL, PCL and SRT; more details are provided in the Methods for 
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each experiment). These tasks are often introduced as principal categories of implicit learning 
tasks (e.g., Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008). However, there are several other implicit learning 
tasks. Probably the best known is the Process, or Dynamic Systems, Control task (e.g., D. C. 
Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Broadbent, 1977). On these tasks, participants have to learn how to 
control a simulated system (e.g., a ‘factory’) in order to achieve a certain goal (‘output’ for a set 
period). The equations determining the complex relationships between input and output are 
withheld. Yet, typically, performance is satisfactory and independent of verbalizable knowledge 
about the principles of the input-output relationships. Instead, performance is only dependent on 
practice. Explicit instructions of the input-output principles selectively improve verbal 
explanations and not performance. Further examples of implicit learning tasks include 
Covariation Learning (e.g., Lewicki, 1986); the Number Reduction Task (e.g., Haider & Frensch, 
2009; Woltz, Bell, Kyllonen, & Gardner, 1996); and Word Segmentation (e.g., Saffran, Johnson, 
Aslin, & Newport, 1999); while Shanks (2005) has reviewed some other, infrequently cited, 
demonstrations of implicit learning. 
3. Consensus on Implicit Learning 
Altogether the above descriptions of implicit learning tasks make it clear that implicit 
learning tasks share common conceptual features and reliably produce similar conceptual results. 
Moreover, those results demonstrate that a conservative conception of implicit learning exists: 
people learn when they are not primarily engaged in trying to learn explicitly and deliberately, 
and are consequently unable to report verbally on how or what they learnt, as operationally 
measured by implicit learning tasks. Additionally, given the intensity of debate that is associated 
with the literature, it is important to emphasise that this interpretation of evidence would achieve 
a large consensus. For example, Shanks, typically depicted as the fiercest critic in the field, has 
concluded:  
“it cannot be disputed that the examples described at the beginning of the chapter all 
possess a common „essence‟ that marks them out from the more traditional varieties of (explicit) 
learning studied by psychologists” (Shanks, 2005, p. 216). 
The examples of implicit learning tasks provided by Shanks (2005) did not include all the 
tasks described in this chapter. However, there was no claim that the examples were exhaustive, 
and no tasks were actively excluded. More important to this demonstration of consensus, the 
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‘common essence’ is described in more detail and is patently true of other implicit learning tasks, 
such as those described in this thesis: 
 “First, they all involve situations in which the primary task the person engages in is 
something other than deliberately, explicitly, trying to learn about the contingencies 
programmed by the experimenter. For instance, in Reber‟s artificial grammar learning (AGL) 
task, all that participants are told in the learning phase is that they should try to memorize a 
series of letter strings. They are not told to try to work out the rules governing the structure of 
these strings. Hence any evidence that they have indeed learned these rules would suggest that 
learning was incidental or unintentional....Secondly, the examples have in common the 
implication that learning can be dissociated from awareness. Participants were shown in these 
situations to have learned something – to have their behaviour controlled by a variable – of 
which they were apparently unaware. In most of the cases awareness is assumed to be 
synonymous with „verbally reportable‟” (Shanks, 2005, p. 204). 
4. Disagreements on Implicit Learning 
To reaffirm, researchers tacitly agree that implicit learning exists, if defined 
conservatively as the capability of people to learn when they are not primarily engaged in trying 
to learn, and that consequently they are unable to report verbally on how or what they learnt 
(e.g., D. C. Berry & Dienes, 1993; Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008; Shanks, 2005). However, many 
do not define implicit learning as such because they are justifiably interested in implicit learning 
to the extent that it can definitively elucidate the role of awareness, attention and automaticity in 
learning; the modularity of learning system; and the nature of consciousness and mental 
representation. Consequently, many researchers instead invoke aspects of A. S. Reber’s original 
claim that implicit learning is learning without awareness, or unconscious learning. In order to 
provide empirical support of such a definition, researchers insist upon exhaustive, objective 
attempts that fail to evidence awareness. There is undoubtedly weaker evidence and consensus 
that implicit learning tasks have documented learning characterised by the objective absence of 
awareness and consciousness (e.g., Perruchet, 2008; Shanks, 2005), not least because of the 
resultant difficulties in defining learning without awareness or consciousness. Notoriously, 
consciousness itself is a ‘mongrel concept’ (Block, 1995). Indicative of such difficulty, Frensch 
(1998) listed eleven different definitions provided by contributors to a book he edited with 
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Stadler (Stadler & Frensch, 1998). More recently, Perruchet asserted that this is still a problem: 
“what defines implicitness in IL is far from being agreed upon” (Perruchet, 2008, p. 609). 
Moreover, even once a more global definition of implicit is accepted, there is a 
considerable methodological challenge of demonstrating the objective absence of consciousness 
and awareness. In order to demonstrate implicit learning with the ‘objective absence of 
awareness’, tests of awareness must satisfy at least three criteria: (i) the information criterion, 
which states that the assessments must concern the information that is actually governing 
behaviour; (ii) the sensitivity (exhaustiveness) criterion, which states tests must be sensitive to 
the extent participants are conscious of the relevant information; (iii) the forgetting criteria, 
which dictates that attempts should rule out the possibility of awareness that is subsequently 
forgotten (e.g., Perruchet, 2008; Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Shanks & St. John, 1994). Indeed, in 
almost all implicit learning tasks, when tests of awareness have met these criteria, participants 
have been shown to be conscious of the relevant regularities, in the sense that they were able to 
identify or generate examples of relevant information (Perruchet, 2008; Shanks, 2005). For 
example, in the AGL, awareness tests adjusted according to the information criterion 
demonstrated that AGL knowledge can be fragmentary: in addition to whole strings, participants 
discriminated between letter pairs (bigrams) that were legal and illegal according to the grammar 
(e.g., Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). In the CC, a generation task enhanced according to the 
sensitivity criterion demonstrated that participants could generate contexts above chance if a 
sufficient number of trials were used (Smyth & Shanks, 2008). In the SRT, a recognition test 
enhanced by concurrent sampling demonstrated that participants could recognise sequence 
fragments from probabilistic sequences presented in rapid succession (Shanks, Wilkinson, & 
Channon, 2003). 
However, direct measures of awareness, like generation and recognition tasks, rely on the 
logic that they exclusively index conscious processes (Reingold & Merikle, 1988). This dubious 
logic brings the definitional problem back into contrast. Generation and recognition 
performance, and similar examples, establish that participants are in some sense ‘conscious’ of 
the relevant regularities, but it does not necessarily establish that the participants are any more 
conscious than a blindsight patient who is able to discriminate between an object moving up and 
down (e.g., Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008; Dienes, 2008; Weiskrantz, 1986). That is, they do not 
evidence another, or for some ‘the’, critical dimension of consciousness: whether participants are 
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conscious that they are ‘conscious’ of the regularities; or, whether participants are in possession 
of a conscious mental state that they are sensitive to the regularities. Yet, such an 
acknowledgment does not solve the definitional problem. There are then at least three different 
approaches to what being conscious of a mental state constitutes, all of which demand differing 
methodological approaches (Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008). 
One conception asserts that the significance of a conscious mental state is its 
accessibility; it is defined by its “availability for use in reasoning and for rationally guiding 
speech and action” (Block, 1995, p. 227). In order to demonstrate implicit learning in this sense, 
it would be necessary to show that all the knowledge underpinning performance was available 
for use in another context. Recognition and generation tests are clearly a demonstration of the 
availability of knowledge on implicit learning tasks. Yet, using detailed correlational analyses, 
Jiménez, Mendez, and Cleeremans (1996) have demonstrated that in SRT, the knowledge is 
fragmentary and unable to account for all RT performance. However, it is clearly possible to 
make the argument that a larger number of generation and recognition tests might reveal more 
knowledge that is available and able to account for all RT performance. 
The second type of approach identified by Cleeremans and Dienes (2008) was made 
popular by Jacoby (1991), and claims that a critical aspect of consciousness is whether the 
content of the mental state can be used according to one’s intentions. Jacoby also introduced the 
Process Dissociation Procedure as a means of discriminating whether the learnt knowledge could 
be used according to intentions. This involves asking participants to behave in a fashion that is 
consistent or inconsistent with what they had learnt implicitly. Subsequently, the extent to which 
participants evidence implicit learning when they were asked not to do so is compared with when 
they were intending to do so. For example, Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001) applied this 
logic to a generation task following an SRT experiment; in an inclusion condition participants 
had to generate examples of the sequence they had seen, while in the exclusion condition, they 
had to avoid producing such examples. These authors found that performance was above chance 
even in the exclusion phase while finding no evidence that performance was worse than in the 
inclusion phase, and concluded that the knowledge was unconscious insofar that it could not be 
used in line with intentions. However, subsequent research has been less conclusive. Wilkinson 
and Shanks (2004) still found no evidence that participants could actively exclude (participants 
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were not able to generate fewer examples than chance), yet they did find generation was 
significantly reduced in exclusion as compared with inclusion. 
A second methodology focuses on determining whether the process of learning, rather 
than the resultant knowledge, can be manipulated according to intentions. Specifically, the 
methodology investigates whether learning is possible on implicit learning tasks when attention 
is diverted from the primary task by the introduction of a concurrent secondary task. For 
example, Shanks and Johnstone (1999) asked participants to complete a SRT task and 
concurrently count the number of high tones when high and low tones were being presented 
randomly after each correct response. Participants still learnt about the sequence, which implies 
learning without attention. However, Shanks (2005) has argued that it is only evidence of 
learning with reduced attention because other experiments have shown the manipulation is 
detrimental to learning even though it does not abolish it (e.g., Shanks & Channon, 2002). 
The final approach described  by Cleeremans and Dienes (2008) is centred around the 
idea that “conscious mental states are states we are conscious of being in” (Rosenthal, 2002, p. 
233). That is, the emphasis is put on subjectively knowing that one knows something (e.g., 
Dienes, 2008). In order to investigate this idea of consciousness researchers have asked 
participants to provide concurrent reports about the mental states underpinning their answers. For 
example, they are asked to provide descriptions (e.g., ‘guess’, ‘intuition’, ‘knew’) and/or 
confidence ratings. Researchers commonly interpret responses according to two criteria. The 
‘guessing criterion’ argues learning was unconscious if performance remained above chance 
when considering only the responses on which participants claimed they were guessing. The 
‘zero correlation criterion’ claims learning was unconscious if improvements in performance 
were not accompanied by increases in confidence (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995). 
Dienes (2008) recommended a number of studies that provide evidence of participants who were 
sensitive to regularities from an implicit learning task even though they reported themselves to 
be guessing (the guessing criterion, e.g., Dienes, et al., 1995; Tunney & Shanks, 2003b; Ziori & 
Dienes, 2008). Similarly, he advised on several studies that had demonstrated that there was no 
relationship between confidence and performance; participants were equally confident about 
correct and incorrect judgments (the confidence criterion, e.g., Dienes, et al., 1995; Channon, et 
al., 2002; Dienes, 2008). However, in the case of zero correlation some researchers have argued 
that the failure to find a relationship results from the use of a continuous scale, and that scales 
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asking for binary confidence judgments do reveal a relationship (Tunney, 2005; Tunney & 
Shanks, 2003b; cf. Dienes, 2010). 
In all these approaches to establish learning without consciousness or awareness, it is 
possible to focus on different aspects of the results to one’s own purpose. For example, in 
process dissociation, it is possible to focus on either the evidence that a participant can generate 
fewer examples in exclusion than inclusion; or the evidence that those participants are still 
unable to exclude below chance (Tunney & Shanks, 2003a). In subjective measures, it is possible 
to focus on either the fact that participants seem to have some subjective idea about their 
performance insofar that they perform better when describing high as opposed to low confidence 
judgments (e.g., Tunney & Shanks, 2003a), or that when participants report themselves to be 
guessing they can still perform at a greater than chance level (e.g, Dienes, et al., 1995). How a 
researcher interprets the evidence will probably depend upon the kind of research question they 
are asking. Where absolute answers are required, the problem might be intractable until the field 
has a better idea and understanding of consciousness; although a great deal of enduring 
knowledge has been, and will likely continue to be, learnt in the pursuit (e.g., Shanks, 2005). 
Nonetheless, it seems indisputable that all the counter-evidence for each of the methodologies is 
indicative of something less than the definition of consciousness that first inspired each of those 
methodologies. In addition to this, there are reasons for retaining the idea of implicit learning 
because of functional differences between implicit and explicit learning. 
5. Differences between Implicit and Explicit Learning 
There are a variety of functional reasons for distinguishing between implicit and explicit 
learning. For example, there are considerable literatures in many areas of psychology that 
usefully employ a similar conceptual distinction between the implicit and explicit, including 
attitude (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), creativity (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006), 
decision-making (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & 
van Baaren, 2006), emotion (Damasio, 1996), memory (Schacter, 1987), motivation (King, 1995; 
McClelland, 1980), orienting and perception (MacLeod, 1998; Risko & Stolz, 2010), personality 
(Asendorpf, 2007), reasoning (Sloman, 1996), and ‘thought’ (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). 
However, there is debate about the similarity of the distinctions across these different areas, 
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beyond all being dichotomous, and also about whether the various applications have proved 
particularly useful (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009). 
The distinction can be fitted into a plausible evolutionary and comparative psychological 
framework (e.g., A. S. Reber, 1993). The idea is centred on two observations: the relatively 
recent evolution of consciousness in humans; and the existence of learning as a fundamental 
process central to all other complex organisms. Parsimony insists that humans and all other 
organisms would have once shared the same basic learning capacities and that by definition it 
would have been a learning capacity independent of human awareness. Since consciousness 
evolved after a basic learning capacity, it is suggested that there must be two mechanisms for 
human learning: the basic, ancestrally-shared, learning capacity and a second means bestowed by 
the evolution of consciousness; explicit learning guided by awareness. There are two reasons for 
arguing that the basic learning capacity must have persisted. First, since consciousness evolved 
from a psychology incorporating a basic learning capacity, it is likely that they are intimately 
linked. Second, it is unlikely that an adaptive capacity, such as a reliable mechanism for learning, 
would be subsequently selected against. However, the evolution of psychology is far more 
uncertain than morphology, and both arguments are surmised as likelihoods rather than logical 
consequences. This is pertinent when considering consciousness, which is characterised by a 
pervasive and mysterious nature. For example, an alternative and plausible argument could be 
made that the very presence of consciousness fundamentally changed the psychological nature of 
all other brain processes and rendered all processes as ‘one system’. 
 “Explicit representations are a pervasive and central feature of creative and flexible 
human cognition” (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993, p. 504), which are capable of explaining 
much about human learning (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). 
Yet, incredibly rich explanations of many learning phenomena have also been achieved using 
‘automatic link machinery’ (or connectionist-type) models. For an illustrative review of the 
successes of these models in explaining associative learning data see Schmajuk and Kutlu 
(2009), for implicit learning performances see Cleeremans and Dienes (2008), and for 
reinforcement learning results see Dayan and Abbott (2001). Indeed, authors have argued that 
the explanatory power of connectionist models provides sufficient reason to abandon a purely 
propositional account of learning (e.g., Shanks, 2009). Yet, reconciling the propositional and 
connectionist accounts into one mode of learning is difficult for two reasons. First, without 
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external intervention, connectionist-type models are unable to analyse, or symbolically represent, 
their own activity. Yet, people are proficient at this kind of symbolic self-introspection (Clark & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1993, p. 504; e.g., Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008). Second, connectionist 
architectures function to represent how the world actually exists, to track reality, yet people are 
also clearly capable of representing and entertaining counterfactual possibilities and models 
(Scott & Dienes, in press). Therefore in order to retain two fairly vast and useful modelling 
literatures, the indication is that some kind of distinction between two types of learning would be 
sensible and meaningful. 
Potentially, the connectionist and propositional traditions can be somewhat reconciled: 
perhaps with an explanation that abstract propositions emerge from the basic operations of 
connectionist networks (e.g., Shanks, 2009), or in a hybrid connectionist model (for a review of 
possibilities see Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008). Yet, even within such reconciliations there still 
clearly remains some kind of distinction that is at least worthy of further investigation. This 
remnant of a distinction might not convince a researcher of the need for absolutely dissociable 
systems, if they were concerned with cognitive architecture (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009), but it is 
worth noting that such researchers disagree about whether the one system should be conceived as 
predominantly propositional (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, et al., 2009), or connectionist 
(e.g., Shanks, 2009). 
There appear to be different neural substrates for different modes of learning. For 
example, participants learning either implicitly or explicitly have displayed distinct coding 
patterns in their recorded event-related brain potentials (e.g., Rüsseler & Rösler, 2000). 
Neuroimaging suggests that different sites tend to show greater activation depending on whether 
a learning task was more implicit or explicit (e.g., Dolan & Fletcher, 1999; Lieberman, Chang, 
Chiao, Bookheimer, & Knowlton, 2004; Skosnik, et al., 2002). Explicit performance tends to be 
more associated with the medial temporal lobe and hippocampal circuits; implicit performance 
with the basal ganglia and striatal circuits; with evidence of interaction and competition between 
the two of them (for illustrative reviews see Poldrack, et al., 2001; Poldrack & Rodriguez, 2004). 
These interpretations are supported by the classic single dissociation presented in amnesia, a 
condition in which the limbic region, including the hippocampus and related structures, is 
characteristically damaged. Amnesic patients can typically learn information implicitly and yet 
show severely impaired declarative memory for the learning episode (e.g., Knowlton, Mangels, 
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& Squire, 1996; Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993; cf, Speekenbrink, Channon, & Shanks, 2008). 
Further, double dissociations between different neuropsychological patients suggest that some 
neural substrates distinct to different types of learning can operate relatively independently of 
one another (e.g., Bechara, et al., 1995; Knowlton, Mangels, et al., 1996; Knowlton, Squire, 
Paulsen, Swerdlow, & Swenson, 1996). For example, Bechara and colleagues (1995) reported 
that a patient with selective damage to the amygdala showed no autonomic conditioning yet 
declaratively acquired the contingency pairings between the stimuli. By contrast, a patient with 
selective hippocampal damage showed conditioning but no declarative contingency learning. 
Additionally, a patient with selective damage to both areas demonstrated no learning of either. In 
a review by Poldrack and colleagues (2001) the dissociation of neural sites was argued to be 
supported by neural lesion dissociations in the animal literature (e.g., Packard, Hirsh, & White, 
1989; Packard & McGaugh, 1992). While these results again point to functional reasons for 
distinguishing between modes of learning, some theorists have pointed out that double-crossed, 
functional dissociations can be produced within single system architectures (e.g., C. J. Berry, 
Shanks, & Henson, 2008; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Plaut, 1995). 
It is a widely held view that implicit memory is much more durable than explicit 
memory. However, while differences in decay patterns are characteristic of implicit and explicit 
memory measures, it is not always the implicit that is more durable than the explicit (Schacter, 
1987). Moreover, the implicit memory and learning fields have quite different methodologies 
(e.g., Scott & Dienes, 2010), in spite of a good deal of empirical and theoretical overlap (D. C. 
Berry & Dienes, 1991). Thus, although it is a fairly common assumption that implicit learning 
and explicit learning result in knowledge with different patterns of decay, there is actually 
relatively little research. The research that exists suggests implicit learning results in knowledge 
that is relatively resilient to decay (R. Allen & Reber, 1980; Higham, Vokey, & Pritchard, 2000; 
Lee & Vakoch, 1996; Tamayo & Frensch, 2007; Tunney, 2003). 
There is evidence that the relationship of age with implicit and explicit learning is quite 
different. Explicit learning has a fairly steep developmental trajectory; for example, older 
children learn and recall far more words than younger children (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Cole, 
Frankel, & Sharp, 1971). By contrast, implicit learning seems to be developed from a very early 
age. For example, Gomez and Gerken found across four separate experiments that children of 
just twelve months learnt about an artificial grammar (1999; for a follow-up review of infant 
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learning see Gomez & Gerken, 2000). Further, several studies have reported no correlations 
between performance and age within children of varying ages (López-Ramón, 2007; Vicari, 
Verucci, & Carlesimo, 2007; Vinter & Perruchet, 2000), while other studies have reported no 
evidence of group differences between younger and older children (Vinter & Detable, 2003), or 
children and adults (Meulemans, Van der Linden, & Perruchet, 1998; cf Thomas, et al., 2004). In 
terms of normal aging, explicit learning appears to decline in old age. For instance, explicit 
acquisition and subsequent recall is impaired in list learning, paired-associate learning, and prose 
learning (e.g., Verhaeghen, Marcoen, & Goossens, 1993). Yet, implicit learning has been found 
to be relatively stable (for a review see Rieckmann & Bäckman, 2009). Rieckmann and Bäckman 
(2009) suggest that aging differences have only emerged on implicit learning tasks due to either 
intereference from explicit processing, or the complexity of the learning task exceeding the 
working memory capacity for chunking of the older participants. Rieckmann and Bäckman 
(2009) noted that this stability of implicit learning was in spite of the fact that striatal areas 
typically degrade in old age and suggested that the stability reflected neural reorganisation. 
Finally, there is a different relationship between IQ and implicit learning compared with 
IQ and explicit learning. Explicit learning is closely related to IQ (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Gebauer & 
Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press; A. S. Reber, Walkenfeld, & Hernstadt, 1991), 
and appears to predict IQ above and beyond working memory and processing speed (Kaufman, 
et al., 2009). In contrast, implicit learning appears to be largely invariant of IQ (Feldman, Kerr, 
& Streissguth, 1995; López-Ramón, Introzzi, & Richard's, 2009; Maybery, Taylor, & O'Brien-
Malone, 1995; Myers & Conner, 1992; A. S. Reber, et al., 1991; Vinter & Detable, 2003; cf 
Fletcher, Maybery, & Bennett, 2000; McGeorge, Crawford, & Kelly, 1997; Salthouse, 
McGuthry, & Hambrick, 1999). Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) have provided the most 
compelling evidence of IQ dissociating implicit and explicit learning. In their study, one group of 
participants completed implicit learning tasks according to typical implicit instructions, while 
another group were given instructions to use explicit strategies to aid their performance. 
Although this instruction manipulation did not change the overall performance across the 
learning tasks, a relationship with IQ was consistently observed only under the explicit 
instructions. Most importantly, the dissociation could not have been caused by a difference in the 
sensitivity of the implicit and explicit learning tasks: the learning tasks were exactly the same, 
only the instructions varied. 
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In summary, there is a consensus that people learn when they are not primarily engaged 
in trying to learn explicitly and deliberately, and are consequently unable to report verbally on 
how or what they learnt. In spite of this consensus, researchers do not agree whether learning can 
occur without awareness or consciousness since it seems possible to focus on different aspects of 
the results from the methodologies for investigating the absolute involvement of consciousness. 
Nonetheless, it seems indisputable that all the counter-evidence for each of those methodologies 
is indicative of something less than the definition of consciousness that first inspired each of 
those methodologies. Further, there are reasons for retaining the concept of implicit learning 
because of functional differences between implicit and explicit learning including: the existence 
of plausible comparative and evolutionary frameworks; the differences in computational models 
that explain much of the different types of learning; different neural sites associated with the 
different modes of learning; and contrasting relationships of implicit and explicit learning with 
durability, age and IQ. Taken altogether, this demonstrates that it is a legitimate, empirical 
question as to whether there are important differences in implicit learning, as measured 
operationally by implicit learning tasks. It is hoped this question can exist in parallel and 
complement research that requires more absolute evidence and methodologies, such as efforts to 
understand how evidence from learning tasks can elaborate the role of awareness, attention and 
automaticity in learning, and what that evidence can reveal about consciousness, mental 
representation and the modularity of learning systems. 
6. Differences in Implicit Learning 
The issue of differences in implicit learning is not only legitimate but potentially 
extremely important: learning is central to everyday life, and differences in explicit, IQ based 
processing are extensively researched and have been usefully related to many life outcomes (e.g., 
Mackintosh, 1998). To this end, some encouraging recent research has begun investigating the 
possible impact of differences in implicit learning. For example, there has been some success in 
measuring individual differences in implicit learning in a typical population (e.g., Gebauer & 
Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press) in spite of the hypothesis by A. S. Reber that 
such individual differences would be minimal (1993). However, it has been noted that further 
research and replication would be necessary to make the modest evidence base more convincing 
(Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press). 
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In a second type of approach, group differences between typical and atypical populations 
have been investigated. A. S. Reber (1993) had hypothesised that implicit learning would be 
relatively robust in the face of psychological disorders. There is much evidence to support this 
view: intact implicit learning on particular tasks has been reported in Alzheimer’s disease (e.g., 
Eldridge, Masterman, & Knowlton, 2002 ); amnesia (e.g., Chun & Phelps, 1999; Knowlton, 
Mangels, et al., 1996); OCD (Rauch, et al., 2007); Down Syndrome (e.g., Vicari, et al., 2007); 
dyslexia (e.g., Folia, et al.); Huntington’s disease (Knowlton, Squire, et al., 1996); intellectual 
disability (Vinter & Detable, 2003); Parkinson’s disease (e.g., P. J. Reber & Squire, 1999); 
psychosis and ADHD (Karatekin, White, & Bingham, 2009); and schizophrenia (e.g., Keri, et al., 
2000). However, in some of these disorders, there is evidence that there are deficits on other 
implicit learning tasks: dyslexia (e.g., Folia, et al.); Huntington’s disease (e.g., Knowlton, Squire, 
et al., 1996); Parkinson’s disease (e.g., Knowlton, Mangels, et al., 1996); and schizophrenia 
(Horan, et al., 2008). In the two disorders where only deficits have been reported, it has never 
been on more than one task: a deficit on the SRT task in Williams Syndrome (e.g., Vicari, et al., 
2007); and a deficit on the PCL task in Tourette Syndrome (Kéri, Szlobodnyik, Benedek, Janka, 
& Gádoros, 2002). Thus, there is clearly an implication that deficits on particular implicit 
learning tasks do not necessarily provide evidence of general deficits but are instead related to 
the particular demands of different aspects of the learning tasks.  
In contrast, an argument has been made that the deficit is more general in Autism 
Spectrum Condition (e.g., L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000; Romero-Mungu a, 
2008), and initial results supported that view (Gordon & Stark, 2007; L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 
2001; L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000). Nonetheless, the issue is not yet fully 
resolved and would benefit from an investigation of the same individuals on a wider range of 
implicit learning tasks. 
Thus, there is not yet entirely convincing, and certainly not extensive, evidence of 
functional differences in implicit learning. Instead, the field is at stage where it would benefit 
from further investigation into the possible functional differences. To this end, a dual-approach 
was applied in this thesis. The first approach was to seek further evidence as to whether there are 
meaningful individual differences in implicit learning among the typical population. Specifically, 
Study I investigated the inter-correlation between three implicit learning tasks; the independence 
of those tasks from IQ; the relationships between those tasks, intuitive aspects of personality and 
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occupational tacit knowledge; and finally whether performance on implicit learning tasks was 
related to occupational achievement. The second approach was adopted concurrently and 
examined whether there were group differences in implicit learning between a typically 
developing and an Autism Spectrum Condition population. Specifically, Studies II, III and IV 
examined whether there is an ASC deficit in implicit learning, which contributes to diagnostic 
social, communicative and motor impairment. 
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II. Individual Differences in Implicit Learning: Study I 
1. Introduction 
The possibility of individual differences in implicit learning has received little empirical 
attention. In Chapter I it was asserted that this lack of research is at least partly a result of the 
complex debate on the validity and details of a distinction between implicit and explicit learning. 
Another reason is that A. S. Reber has actively theorised that individual differences in implicit 
learning are likely to be minimal (e.g., A. S. Reber, 1993; A. S. Reber & Allen, 2000). 
Specifically, A. S. Reber’s theory is primarily based on the evolutionary argument that adaptive 
learning must have existed prior to the relatively recent evolution of conscious, explicit learning, 
and that old, adaptive structures are relatively stable and invariant between individuals. Although 
this argument is plausible, the issue is an empirical one and can be tested within a psychometric 
framework. In order to establish meaningful individual differences in implicit learning, it would 
be necessary to demonstrate inter-relationships between implicit learning tests; independence 
from explicit, IQ-mediated cognition; the nature of the relationships with other existing 
characteristics; and correlation with real-life behaviours assumed to be implicitly acquired (e.g., 
Carroll, 1993; Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010). Although such empirical investigation using an 
individual differences approach has been relatively scant, the research that exists has provided 
encouraging results (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press). 
Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) dissociated implicit, in contrast with explicit, learning 
from a general factor of intelligence. Kaufman and colleagues (in press) also dissociated implicit 
learning from a general factor of intelligence, and, further, established its independence from 
explicit associative learning and working memory while providing evidence of a relationship 
between implicit learning and both educational achievement in second language acquisition, and 
intuitive aspects of personality. However, there was no evidence of an inter-relationship between 
several different measures of implicit learning in either of those studies (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 
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2007; Kaufman, 2009).1 A further study by Gebauer and Mackintosh (2010) replicated the 
finding of a correlation between implicit learning and educational achievement in a second 
language, and importantly, did find some positive relationships among different measures of 
implicit learning. However, the modesty of that overlap led the authors to encourage further 
replication and investigation of the relationship.  
Thus, one aim of Study I was to provide such replication of the inter-relationships of 
implicit learning tasks. Additionally, rather than further investigate the relationship of implicit 
learning to language acquisition, the study investigated the relationship between implicit learning 
and another domain of everyday behaviour that is popularly associated with an implicit 
acquisition, this being occupational achievement.  
In order to successfully recruit expert participants and thereby allow an interesting 
investigation of implicit learning and occupational achievement, it was judged unrealistic to 
include more than three implicit learning tasks in the study; a probabilistic Serial Reaction Time 
(SRT) task, an Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task, and an Invariant Feature Learning 
(IFL) task. The SRT and AGL tasks were suitable for inclusion since they have been described 
as paradigmatic methods for studying implicit learning, and are thoroughly researched (Shanks, 
2005). Further, the two tasks contrast substantially in their approach to measuring implicit 
learning. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that any shared variance would not result 
from some other, superficial factor. Lastly, these two tasks have been utilised successfully in the 
promising initial investigation of individual differences in implicit learning (Gebauer & 
Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press). IFL has also been used to study implicit 
learning. Unusually for the implicit learning literature, IFL has been demonstrated with both 
abstract (McGeorge & Burton, 1990) and real-world stimuli (Kelly, Burton, Kato, & Akamatsu, 
2001). It was the successful demonstration of IFL with real-world stimuli that suggested its 
relevance to this study. 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that Kaufman (2009) and Kaufman and colleagues (in press) are not separate studies. 
Kaufman and colleagues (in press) published an article that was based on some of the data from Kaufman’s (2009) 
thesis. The details of the additional implicit learning tasks and their inter-correlations are only provided in 
Kaufman’s (2009) thesis, thus I reference Kaufman (2009) when referring to that detail of the study reported in 
Kaufman and colleagues’ (in press). 
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In addition to investigating the inter-relationships between these implicit learning tasks 
and occupational achievement, the study also sought to clarify further the relationship between 
implicit learning and some other characteristics, namely practice, explicit IQ-mediated 
processing, personality, and occupational tacit knowledge. Explicit IQ-mediated processing was 
assessed, in an attempt to further establish its independence from implicit learning. This 
assessment was achieved by including both abstract and verbal reasoning IQ subtests, and 
deriving two further measures of explicit processing, one from the AGL task and the other from 
the SRT task. There were two reasons for choosing to investigate further the relationship 
between implicit learning and personality. The first was to replicate the interesting relationships 
between intuitive aspects of personality and implicit learning that were identified by Kaufman 
and colleagues (in press). Second, personality is particularly implicated in occupational 
achievement, and could plausibly interact or mediate the influence of implicit learning on 
performance. Thus, in order to make a strong case for implicit learning as an independent ability, 
it was necessary to clarify any possible relationship. An index of practice was included in order 
to establish whether implicit learning was able to predict occupational achievement 
independently of practice. This result would help distinguish between the relative importance of 
individual differences in implicit learning as compared with time. 
1.1. Tacit Knowledge 
The desire to understand the relationship of implicit learning to occupational tacit 
knowledge stems from the suggestion that tacit knowledge may be acquired by an implicit 
learning system (Mackintosh, 1998, pp. 363-367). One reason that such a relationship is 
plausible stems simply from the description of tacit knowledge: tacit knowledge is “generally 
unspoken knowledge gained from experience, as opposed to explicit instruction” (R. K. Wagner 
& Sternberg, 1986, p. 52). R. K. Wagner and Sternberg were not responsible for the concept of 
tacit knowledge; tacit knowledge had been previously invoked in the philosophy of science 
(Polanyi, 1958), ecological psychology (Neisser, 1976), and organisational behaviour (Schön, 
1983). The unique contribution by R. K. Wagner and Sternberg was the development of a tool to 
assess such knowledge, the Tacit Knowledge Inventory. Over the course of several studies, the 
authors achieved modest validation of their inventories (e.g., Hedlund, et al., 2003; Sternberg, et 
al., 2000; R. K. Wagner, 1985, 1987; R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Importantly, from these 
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studies there is good evidence that (i) tacit knowledge predicts occupational achievement, and 
modest evidence that (ii) tacit knowledge does not correlate with IQ and (iii) tacit knowledge 
does not wholly depend on practice. Insofar that these findings are true, then this suggests that 
there is some system for acquiring information, specifically tacit knowledge, that is not simply a 
function of time and yet predicts important differences in performance, and is seemingly not 
mediated by explicit, IQ-dominated, processing. Since it might plausibly be an individual’s 
implicit learning ability that is primarily responsible for the acquisition of tacit knowledge, then 
it is critical that any relationship between them is elucidated. Further, if tacit knowledge is the 
intermediary between an individual’s implicit learning ability and its behavioural manifestation 
in performance differences, then the study is actually far more likely to find evidence to support 
the role of implicit learning in individual performance differences by also measuring that 
relevant intermediary. 
It is important to note that while Sternberg and colleagues (e.g., Sternberg, et al., 2000) 
strongly believe in the validity of tacit knowledge, other authors are considerably less convinced 
(e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a; McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005). Therefore, Study I also provided an 
opportunity to resolve some of the outstanding issues concerning tacit knowledge, which shall 
now be described.  
R. K. Wagner (1985, 1987) and R. K. Wagner and Sternberg (1985, 1986) devised 
measures of tacit knowledge concerning specific occupational fields. This was achieved by 
asking experienced and highly successful individuals in the fields of academic psychology and 
business management to describe typical work-related situations and possible responses to them. 
Their descriptions and a tentative theoretical framework were used to assemble, in questionnaire 
format, two sets of work-related situations requiring judgments about the quality of response 
alternatives; one for academic psychology, and one for business management. In untimed 
conditions, the questionnaires ask individuals to indicate the appropriateness of multiple 
response strategies for a problem situation using a rating scale of 1 (extremely bad or extremely 
unimportant) to 7 (extremely good or extremely important). Tacit knowledge is quantified using 
either an ‘item-discrimination method’ or ‘expert-prototype method’ (R. K. Wagner, 1985, 1987; 
R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 1985 see Method 2.3.4 of this chapter for more details). Since that 
initial investigation, tacit knowledge has been examined in several other occupations by 
Sternberg and colleagues including bank management, sales, primary education, clerical work, 
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policing and military leadership (Grigorenko, Sternberg, & Strauss, 2006; Hedlund, et al., 2003; 
Hedlund, Wilt, Nebel, Ashford, & Sternberg, 2006; Matthew & Sternberg, 2009; Mueller & 
Bradley, 2009; Sternberg, et al., 2000; Sternberg & Wagner, 1993; Sternberg, Wagner, & 
Okagaki, 1993; Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, & Horvath, 1995; R. K. Wagner, Sujan, Sujan, 
Rashotte, & Sternberg, 1999). 
An important issue concerning tacit knowledge is its true relationship with IQ, practice 
and personality. These relationships are clearly instrumental to the interpretation of the role that 
tacit knowledge, and thus possibly implicit learning, has in determining performance differences. 
Sternberg and colleagues certainly believe tacit knowledge has been empirically demonstrated to 
be largely independent of IQ and personality (e.g., Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg, et al., 2000), and 
not to be solely a function of practice (e.g., R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 1986). Further, those 
authors believe that important individual differences in tacit knowledge acquisition remain 
independent of IQ, personality and practice, and play a role in differences in practical 
intelligence between individuals. However, other authors interpret their evidence and theories 
differently (e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a; McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005). 
Gottfredson (e.g., 2003a) has made many strong criticisms of the research but it appears 
her primary objection is that the extent of Sternberg’s theorising is not justified by the data. For 
example, she states that Sternberg makes “an implausible claim, namely, that tacit knowledge 
reflects a general factor of intelligence that equals or exceeds IQ in its generality and everyday 
utility” (Gottfredson, 2003a, p. 391). Brody has similar complaints of Sternberg’s broader 
theorising on practical intelligence (e.g., Brody, 2003). However, for current purposes, if tacit 
knowledge could predict meaningful differences independently of IQ, personality and practice, 
regardless of how relatively restricted that prediction was, then it would still offer significant 
theoretical support of an additional, albeit less dominant, system with meaningful individual 
differences.  
McDaniel and colleagues have argued that the general format of Tacit Knowledge 
Inventories can be described as a Situational Judgment Test, insofar that it features a set of 
common problem situations, which have long been used in personnel selection (e.g., as long ago 
as 1947, McDaniel, Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion, & Braverman, 2001; McDaniel & Whetzel, 
2005). Taken alone, this fact supports the validity of Tacit Knowledge Inventories, and their 
ability to improve the prediction of performance. However, McDaniel and colleagues also 
CHAPTER II  24   
 
 
reported meta-analyses that demonstrated situational judgement tests do tend to relate to IQ, 
personality and practice. McDaniel and colleagues therefore argued that tacit knowledge was 
acquired according to differences in explicit-IQ mediated cognition and personality over time, 
and as such that there was no reason to invoke another system to explain the acquisition of tacit 
knowledge, such as practical intelligence or implicit learning. Thus, if McDaniel and colleagues 
are correct in identifying R. K. Wagner and Sternberg’s (1985) Tacit Knowledge Inventories as 
Situational Judgment Tests, then it seems unlikely that R. K. Wagner and Sternberg’s findings 
will be replicable. However, given it is at least possible that there is something particular about 
the inventories R. K. Wagner and Sternberg (1985) have developed, however similar they might 
appear to situational judgement tests, an empirical replication and investigation using those 
particular inventories should provide the most convincing resolution to the debate. 
However, Gottfredson (2003) argued that even Sternberg’s research concerning his own 
specific Tacit Knowledge Inventories has not always shown such convincing independence from 
IQ (e.g., p. 377). In reply, Sternberg (2003) contended that, on balance, there was more evidence 
towards the conclusion of independence from IQ (p. 407-408). Unconvinced, Gottfredson (2003) 
maintained such strong assertions were only possible by “reporting evidence selectively and 
inaccurately” (p. 415). Rather than debating the evidence that Sternberg and colleagues have 
provided, selectively, inaccurately or otherwise, a more useful approach is to conduct 
independent empirical research in order to resolve the issues. 
Therefore, Study I analysed the relationship between the Academic Psychology-Tacit 
Knowledge Inventory (AP-TKI, R. K. Wagner and Sternberg, 1985), and IQ, practice and 
personality. There were three reasons for using the Academic Psychology-Tacit Knowledge 
Inventory. The primary reason was that research into the Academic Psychology Inventory has 
contributed to the pattern of results I have identified as important to the validity of tacit 
knowledge. Specifically, performance on the Inventory has shown moderate independence from 
practice (e.g., faculty outperformed postgraduates, who outperformed undergraduates, but there 
was no evidence of a correlation between tacit knowledge and the year of Ph.D among faculty, r 
= .04); moderate independence from IQ (e.g., there was evidence of a small correlation between 
IQ and tacit knowledge in one study, r = .30, but in another study there was no evidence of 
correlation, r = -.09); and a relationship with real world performance (e.g., tacit knowledge 
correlated with the number of publications among the faculty, r = .28, R. K. Wagner & 
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Sternberg, 1986). Second, these results are frequently cited in support of tacit knowledge (e.g., 
Cianciolo, et al., 2006; Hedlund, et al., 2003; Hedlund, et al., 2006; Sternberg, et al., 2000), and 
yet these results have not been replicated. Clearly, the Inventory warrants further investigation. 
The final reason was the practical availability of academic psychologists as participants. 
The final important tacit knowledge issue that this study addressed was domain 
generality. The questions used on Tacit Knowledge Inventories are ostensibly quite specific to 
the relevant occupation, and suggest that the knowledge would be domain specific. Certainly, 
Gottfredson (2003) interpreted Tacit Knowledge Inventories as assessments of domain specific 
job knowledge, and McDaniel and colleagues (2005) argued performance on Situational 
Judgment Tests, and by extension Tacit Knowledge Inventories, is not underpinned by a general 
factor. However, Sternberg (2003) and colleagues (1986, 2000) have argued to the contrary, 
claiming, for example, that tacit knowledge is domain general across all practical, occupational, 
tasks. R. K. Wagner and Sternberg (1986) justified this claim based on the “the moderately 
strong correlation (r = .60) found...between performance on the tacit knowledge measures for 
Academic Psychology and Business Management” (Wagner and Sternberg, 1986, p. 77), which 
remained the only empirical evidence offered in the ‘Tacit Knowledge as a General Construct’ 
section of Sternberg and colleagues’ (2000) book. However, only their undergraduate group were 
given both of the two different tests of tacit knowledge. Therefore, the correlation could have 
resulted from the low range of scores achieved by the inexpert undergraduates on both 
inventories. Thus, perhaps it is the case that only undergraduates use domain general tacit 
knowledge precisely because they lack requisite expertise in their chosen field. Thus, the 
correlation of undergraduates’ scores on different tests of tacit knowledge was insufficient 
evidence on which to conclude that scores would correlate with one another across the full range 
of expertise. In order to address this unsatisfactory assessment of Tacit Knowledge in Sternberg 
and colleagues’ study, Study I assessed the relationship between performance on two types of 
Tacit Knowledge Inventory, Academic Psychology and Business Management (BM-TKI), across 
a full range of expertise, from undergraduates to professors. 
More recently, researchers, in collaboration with Sternberg, have begun investigating 
overtly generic forms of tacit knowledge (e.g., the College Life Questionnaire, the Common 
Sense Questionnaire, and the Everyday Situational Judgment Inventory), which ask questions 
clearly non-specific to occupation. The existence of a positive relationship between generic Tacit 
CHAPTER II  26   
 
 
Knowledge Inventories and IQ (Cianciolo, et al., 2006) contrasts with Sternberg’s claims about 
the independence of IQ and occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories (e.g., Sternberg, 2003), 
and therefore also contrast with the argument that tacit knowledge is completely general. Instead, 
this finding of different relationships with IQ is suggestive that, at the very least, generic and 
occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories assess different constructs. In order to examine this 
possibility, participants in Study I also completed a Common Sense Questionnaire (CSQ), in 
order that the relationship between occupationally-specific Tacit Knowledge Inventories and 
generic Tacit Knowledge Inventories could be directly assessed. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that it was interesting for Study I to clarify the 
generality of tacit knowledge, in order to understand the relationship between tacit knowledge, 
implicit learning and everyday performance. However, it is clearly not critical to theories of 
implicit learning as a general ability that all types of tacit knowledge are strongly related to one 
another. Only one tacit knowledge inventory, which meaningfully predicted differences 
independently of IQ, personality and practice, would need to be related to implicit learning, in 
order to offer theoretical support to the existence of an additional system with meaningful 
individual differences. The resultant implication of the independence of different Tacit 
Knowledge Inventories would be that such a system does not ubiquitously influence individual 
differences in performance. 
In summary, the central aim of this study was to provide a further test of the theory of 
meaningful individual differences in implicit learning. In achieving this aim, Study I was first 
interested in whether the overlap between implicit learning tests identified by Gebauer and 
Mackintosh (2010) was replicable. Similarly, it was necessary to re-examine the independence of 
implicit learning from IQ-mediated explicit processing (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 
2010; Kaufman, et al., in press; A. S. Reber, et al., 1991), and replicate possible relationships 
between implicit learning and intuitive aspects of personality (Kaufman, et al., in press). In order 
to establish whether implicit learning was related to meaningful differences in everyday 
performance in addition to second language acquisition (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010; 
Kaufman, et al., in press), Study I uniquely investigated whether implicit learning was related to 
occupational achievement. Lastly, since tacit knowledge has been plausibly postulated as an 
intermediary construct that might mediate the influence of implicit learning influence on 
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behaviour (Mackintosh, 1998), Study I also uniquely examined the relationship between tacit 
knowledge and implicit learning.  
Furthermore, in order to understand fully the implications of a tacit knowledge and 
implicit learning relationship, the study also took the opportunity to resolve outstanding issues 
relating to tacit knowledge. In particular, the interpretation of the relationships between tacit 
knowledge, IQ and personality, have been subject to fierce debate (e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a, 
2003b; McDaniel & Nguyen, 2001; McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005; Sternberg, 2003). It has been 
claimed this is, in part, a consequence of a failure to acknowledge the similarities of Tacit 
Knowledge Inventories to Situational Judgment Tests, which are better researched (e.g., 
McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005), and a selective reporting of the data on Tacit Knowledge 
Inventories (e.g., Gottfredson, 2003b). While such arguments are sensible and plausible, it is 
hoped that the debate would be resolved by an independent, empirical investigation of those 
relationships using precisely the same inventories as those devised by Sternberg and colleagues 
(e.g., R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 1986).  
Finally, the issue of domain generality in tacit knowledge has not received a thorough test 
to date. Therefore, Study I analysed the relationship between performance on two different 
occupational inventories by one occupational group that displayed a broad range of expertise, 
together with performance on an inventory which assesses overtly generic, non-occupational-
specific knowledge.  
To achieve these aims, 103 academic psychologists completed three implicit learning 
tasks (SRT, AGL, IFL task), two IQ sub-tests (DAT verbal and analogical reasoning tests), one 
personality questionnaire (Big Five Inventory), three Tacit Knowledge Inventories (Academic 
Psychology, Business Management and CSQ) and one General Questionnaire primarily 
pertaining to their educational and occupational histories. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
The data obtained from 103 academic psychologists were included in the study (61 
females). Participants were aged between 18 to 78 years old (M = 31.97, SD = 12.72). In the 
investigation of occupational achievement with implicit learning and tacit knowledge, the 
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participants were split into three groups depending upon their level of academic expertise (e.g., 
R. K. Wagner and Sternberg, 1986). There was an undergraduate group (Undergraduates, N = 
34), a ‘junior’ academics group (Junior-Academics, N =39) and a ‘senior’ academics group 
(Senior-Academics, N = 30). Junior and senior academics were arbitrarily distinguished 
depending upon whether their position required them to lead research projects beyond the 
doctoral level, and/or lecture. Relevant descriptive statistics of these groups of participants are 
provided in Table 1. Participants were recruited by emailing UK psychology departments and 
organisations with a request that they invited their members’ participation. In return for 
participation, £1,000, £500 each, was donated to two charities. Participants were excluded if they 
were not academic psychologists, not ‘native English-speakers’, or demonstrated evidence of 
substantial business management experience (to allow comparison with performance on the 
Business Management Tacit Knowledge Inventory). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics indicating Participants‟ Expertise in Academic Psychology 
Measure M SD Range  
Senior-Academics (N = 30)     
# Publications 28.73 39.01 0 – 160  
# Conference papers 14.66 15.94 0 – 60  
Job Title Rating a 3.23 1.22 1 – 5  
Dept.’s RAE Outcome b  47.17 28.58 0 – 85  
% Time spent researching c 56.61 30.14 0 – 100  
Salary (£1000s; N = 29)d 41.64 12.11 22.50 – 67.50  
Years since Ph. D was acquired 10.80 13.63 0 – 45  
Years in academic psychology 17.79 12.28 4.27 – 51.14  
Age (years) 41.95 13.80 23.83 - 77.54  
Junior-Academics (N = 39)     
# Publications 1.18 2.42 0 – 11  
# Conference papers 1.00 1.81 0 – 8  
Dept.’s RAE outcome 46.79 20.37 10 – 85  
Years in academic psychology 5.09 2.45 0.55 – 11.15  
Age (years) 31.74 9.20 22.53 – 54.30  
Undergraduates (N = 34)     
Dept.’s RAE outcome 43.24 24.18 10 – 85  
Years in academic psychology 1.83 1.24 0.35 – 4.63  
Age (years) 23.44 8.35 18.41 – 55.24  
 
   
 
Notes: a Job titles rated between 1 to 5: 1 = Associate Research Fellow; 2 = Research Fellow; 3 
= Lecturer; 4 = Senior or Principal Lecturer; 5 = Professor or Reader. b The Department with 
which the participant was associated. The variable is the percentage of the Department‟s RAE 
submitted research judged to be above 3*. Thus, the quality of that percentage of research is 
equal or better than “internationally excellent in terms of originality, significance and rigour but 
which nonetheless falls short of the highest standards of excellence” (Research Assessment 
Exercise, 2008, p. 8). c Percentage of time that participants spent researching relative to time 
spent on administration and teaching. d Salary means are based on the midpoint of the £5,000 
bands that participants selected. 
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2.2. General Procedure and Apparatus 
All data collection occurred remotely. Participants who replied to the recruitment emails 
were first directed to the online General Questionnaire, which requested general, demographic 
details and information pertaining to their academic expertise (see Appendix A for details of the 
questionnaire, which provides screenshots of the questionnaire as presented in Study I). 
Participants were screened according to exclusion criteria, and the remaining individuals were 
invited to participate in the entire study. Those participants were sent a download link, user-name 
and password. All tasks were programmed within Delosis Psytools software. Participants were 
unable to complete any of the tasks without first downloading and installing the software. This 
ensured that when a participant was running a task it was safeguarded from interruption from 
internet problems and other programmes on the computer, and thus all participants received a 
uniform experience of each task and questionnaire. Additionally, installing software onto 
participants’ machines allowed the utilisation of a battery of three different clocks on Windows 
and the system timer on Macs to provide millisecond timing accuracy. 
All participants were instructed to complete the tasks in one of two of the following 
orders with the following names (parenthesis information added here for clarity): 1) Personality 
Questionnaire (BFI); 2) Task C (DAT Verbal IQ subtest); 3) Task F (DAT Abstract IQ subtest); 
4) Common Sense Questionnaire (CSQ); 5) Task I (IFL); 6a) Business Management 
Questionnaire (BM-TKI) or 6b) Academic Psychology Questionnaire (AP-TKI); 7) Task A 
(AGL); 8a) Business Management Questionnaire or 8b) Academic Psychology Questionnaire; 9) 
SRT. Fixed orders allow the most accurate comparison between individuals, and for this reason, 
trial and item order were also fixed. However, it was necessary to use the two different overall 
task orders to permit a valid within-subject comparison of performance on AP-TKI and BM-TKI. 
The task order was chosen to maximise variety, and thus the interest of the participants, 
in the hope of minimising participant withdrawal. This consideration was particularly relevant to 
Study I given that participation was remote and that many participants were experts with busy 
schedules. Participants were instructed, and the software dictated, that they had to finish each 
task and questionnaire once it had begun, and that they should do so in a quiet and distraction-
free environment. Participants were also instructed that they could complete the nine different 
tasks using as many as breaks as their schedules required; again, this freedom was necessary in 
order to minimise participant withdrawal. Participants were routinely reminded by email about 
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both the study and their right to withdraw but were sent an exclusion notification after an 
extended period of inactivity (approximately three months). The mean time to complete all the 
tasks was 46.54 days (SD = 59.53 days). Once a participant completed a task, results were 
securely transmitted back to the server when an internet connection was available. Each 
participant’s dataset was identified by their user-name and password, which they had to enter 
prior to completing any of the tasks. Finally, upon completing all nine tasks, participants were 
sent a questionnaire about the implicit learning tasks, and were asked to complete and return the 
questionnaire by email. 
2.3. Tasks 
2.3.1. General Questionnaire 
This General Questionnaire asked participants to provide, where they were happy to do 
so, demographic information and, more importantly, detailed educational and occupational 
achievement (see Appendix A for more details). The answers to these questions were used to 
screen potential participants, assign selected participants to one of three groups (Undergraduates, 
Junior- or Senior-Academics) and compile quantitative indices of expertise (Publications, 
Conference Papers, Job Title Rating, Dept.’s RAE Outcome, Relative Percentage of Time Spent 
Researching, Salary), opportunity for practice (time spent in academic psychology and time since 
Ph. D was acquired) and educational achievement (at both sixteen and eighteen). Some questions 
were asked in the General Questionnaire that were not used to create these listed indices (see 
Appendix A for details of questions not used). Those questions were included with the intention 
of using them to compute more indices of expertise; however, either too few participants 
responded or data was too non-normally distributed to analyse. 
2.3.2. Implicit Learning 
 Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task 
Participants in Study I were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to a 
large blue dot appearing in one of four locations by pressing corresponding keys on their 
keyboard (‘V’, ‘B’, ‘N’, ‘M’). They were instructed that upon pressing the correct corresponding 
button, the blue dot would move to another location and that they should continue the task in this 
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fashion. The location of the dot location followed a 12-digit second-order conditional sequence 
(312143241342), such that the subsequent location of the dot was perfectly predicted by the 
previous two locations (e.g., after the series 3 followed by 1, location 2 is expected). However, 
the sequence was probabilistic, so that occasionally the dot appeared in locations unpredicted by 
this sequence. These improbable trials were generated randomly on 15 % of trials, by following 
the constraints of an alternative second-order sequence (132341243142). Thus, in those trials, the 
series 3, 1 would not be followed by 2, but rather by 4, as stipulated in this alternative series 
(Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998). The utilisation of this probabilistic second-order sequence, and 
the fact that the response-to-stimulus interval was programmed at 0 ms, should have minimised 
the use of explicit strategies during learning (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). There were 9 
blocks of trials: the first was a baseline block, consisting of 48 trials during which both 
sequences were equally likely; the remainder consisted of 120 trials each with 15 % of 
improbable trials, as described above. Between each block, the experimenter provided the 
participant with feedback about their accuracy. Sequence learning was assessed by comparing 
participants’ RT between trials that were generated according to the frequent sequence (i.e. 
probable trials) and those that were generated by the alternative sequence (i.e. improbable trials). 
 Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task 
During a learning phase, participants in Study I were told that they would be presented 
with a series of nonsense letter strings, which they should memorise because, after each letter 
string disappeared, they would need to reproduce it using the keyboard. Each string was 
presented for four seconds. When reproducing the strings, upon typing an incorrect letter, 
participants were instructed “Incorrect. Please try again”. Participants were then presented with 
the string for another four seconds before trying again to reproduce it. In total, twenty different 
strings were presented during this learning phase; each was presented twice, once in each of two 
blocks, which were separated by a short interval. Crucially, all the learning strings conformed to 
an artificial, semantic-free, finite-state grammar (see Figure 1). To elaborate, grammatical strings 
are created by following the direction of an arrow and a letter is added to the string whenever a 
node is passed (e.g., PTTTVPS or TSXXTTVV). These learning strings were replicated exactly 
from the stimuli reported in A. S. Reber, Walkenfeld, and Hernstadt (1991) and A. S. Reber 
(1993). Thus, letter strings were between 3-8 letters long and strings were selected so that all the 
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variations of the grammar, the three loops, and all possible beginnings and endings were 
displayed (A. S. Reber, et al., 1991 and see Appendix A for the complete list of learning phase 
letter strings used). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the artificial, finite-state grammar used to produced stimuli for 
the AGL task (reproduced from A. S. Reber, et al., 1991). 
Instructions up to the end of the learning phase described a memory experiment and the 
fact that the strings had been produced according to a grammar was unknown to the participants. 
Upon beginning the test phase, participants were told that the strings had followed rules. 
Participants were further instructed that they would now see letter strings, some of which 
followed the rules and some of which did not, and that they would have to judge, according to 
their first feeling, whether they followed the rules. Test strings were presented one at a time, for 
a maximum of 6 seconds, with no feedback and a response-stimulus interval of 500 ms. 
Participants pressed ‘Y’ to indicate that a string followed the rules and pressed ‘N’ to indicate 
that it did not. Test stimuli were also replicated exactly from the stimuli reported in A. S. Reber, 
Walkenfeld, and Hernstadt (1991) and A. S. Reber (1993). Thus, test stimuli consisted of 25 
grammatical letter strings (7 of which were old strings from the learning set and the remaining 
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were novel grammatical strings) and 25 non-grammatical letter strings, which were formed by 
introducing one or more violations into otherwise grammatical letter strings (A. S. Reber, et al., 
1991 and see Appendix A for the complete list of test phase letter strings used). Overall, 
grammar learning was assessed by comparing classification performance against the chance level 
of performance. 
 Invariant Feature Learning (IFL) task 
In a learning phase, participants were presented with a series of four digit number strings, 
and were instructed that they had to press a key to indicate whether the two left-hand digits (by 
pressing ‘Z’), or two right-hand digits (by pressing ‘M’), summed to give the greater number. 
Each string was presented until a valid response was provided, after which correct and incorrect 
feedback were appropriately given. In total, twenty different strings were presented during this 
learning phase; each was presented twice, once each in two blocks, which were separated by a 
short interval. Critically, and unknown to participants, all these four-digit number strings 
included the numeral ‘3’. In the subsequent test phase, participants were shown pairs of four-
digit number strings and instructed to indicate which member of the pair had already appeared in 
the first phase. In fact, all strings presented were new, but only one member of each of the pairs 
contained the invariant feature, 3. In total, thirty unique pairs of strings were presented during the 
test phase, during which there was no feedback and no response-stimulus interval. All of the 
numbers used in the strings, other than the invariant feature 3, were generated randomly with two 
constraints. First, none of the numbers included a zero to ensure that participants always had to 
sum both sides of the four-digit number during the learning phase. Second, two adjacent numbers 
were never the same because this would have made a string more unique and memorable, and 
may thereby have compromised the cover story for the test phase that one of the pair was 
repeated from the learning phase (see Appendix A for the complete list of number strings used). 
Overall, IFL learning was assessed by comparing the selection of test-items containing the 
invariant feature 3 against the chance level of selection. 
2.3.3. Explicit Processing 
Two indices of explicit learning were derived, one from the AGL task and one from the 
SRT task. During the learning phase of the AGL, the mean number of errors that participants 
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made before correctly reproducing each letter string was taken as an index of explicit processing. 
These errors are indicative of a participant’s ability to explicitly remember and reproduce letter 
strings in the short-term, and have been used previously as a measure of explicit processing that 
is related to IQ (e.g., A. S. Reber, et al., 1991). During the SRT, mean RTs to improbable trials 
were used as another index of explicit processing. Such RTs are not the most obvious index of 
explicit processing. However, ‘perceptual speed’ (Gs) has been specified within the Horn-Cattell 
theory of intelligence (Horn & Cattell, 1966) and ‘general speediness’ has been evoked in 
Carroll’s three-stratum theory of intelligence (Carroll, 1993). Moreover, ‘processing speed’ has 
been found to correlate with IQ; for example, higher-IQ participants respond more quickly to 
simple and four-choice RTs procedures (Deary, Der, & Ford, 2001).2 Thus, RTs to improbable 
trials on the SRT provided another index of explicit processing. 
2.3.4. Tacit Knowledge 
 Academic Psychology and Business Management Inventories 
The Academic Psychology and Business Management Tacit Knowledge Inventories were 
reproduced from R. K. Wagner (1985; see Appendix A for screenshots of the inventories as 
presented in Study I). Both inventories consisted of 12 work-related situations, each of which 
was associated with 9 to 11 response items for Academic Psychology; and 10 to 11 response 
items for Business Management. In untimed conditions, participants read a work-related 
situation and rated the appropriateness of possible response strategies on a 7-point scale by either 
its quality (1 = extremely bad, 4 = neither good nor bad, and 7 = extremely good) or its 
importance (1 = extremely unimportant, 4 = somewhat important, and 7 = extremely important). 
The work-related situations were presented one at a time, and participants had to rate all the 
responses before irreversibly advancing to the next situation. Prior to advancing from each 
situation, participants were able to change their ratings freely to all of the response alternatives. 
Participants rated both the ‘actual’ and ‘ideal’ quality, or importance, of each response item. The 
                                                 
2 It is not clear exactly why RTs provide an index of explicit IQ-mediated processing. Some authors have 
argued the link between them is individual differences in overall efficiency and speed of the nervous system 
(Anderson, 1992; Jensen, 1998). However, it is possible that the relationship actually results from the influence of 
vigilance or ability to avoid distraction on the RT tasks, rather than mere neural efficiency (Mackintosh, 1998). 
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actual and ideal ratings were originally included to measure relative pragmatic and idealistic 
orientations. Study I was not interested in this analysis, and only included ideal ratings in case 
the presence of those alternatives was important to the actual ratings’ ability to index expertise. 
Tacit knowledge was quantified using the item discrimination method. This method 
specifies that only a subset of the response alternatives be retained. R. K. Wagner and Sternberg 
(1985) identified the subset as the items that were differentially rated by experts and novices. It 
was necessary to retain the remaining items on the scale as the expertise lies in the identification 
of items as important, or good, relative to one another. Items which experts rated differentially 
from novices as unimportant or bad (rather than important or good) were reflected such that all 
ratings were summed into a single score that reflected the total ‘correct’ high-scoring of all the 
discriminatory items. 
Later, the authors specified a second scoring method, in order to provide corroboration 
and validation of their first method (R. K. Wagner, 1985, 1987; R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 
1986). In that instance, each individual’s response rating was compared with the mean ratings of 
a highly expert group. The score was represented by the sum of the squared deviations from the 
expert profile. High levels of tacit knowledge were indicated by close agreement between an 
individual’s ratings and the prototype. The expert group had been identified by high performance 
on external criteria. Cut-off points for the criteria to identify experts were relatively arbitrary, but 
the expert cut-off points were varied slightly, and all such variation yielded similar evaluative 
results. More importantly, analyses using the item-discrimination method and the expert-group 
comparison produced the same pattern of results. Since the item-discrimination method 
identified which items caused differences, and then used those items to establish the magnitude 
of the differences, without the corroboration from the expert-group method, such item 
discrimination is suspect. Specifically, although there is no reason to explain why the magnitude 
of the discriminated items correlated with the external criteria among the experts, group 
comparisons between experts and non-experts would have been invalid. However, the cost of 
using an expert group is that those participants cannot be validly included in the main analysis. 
Therefore, Study I used the item-discrimination method, but critically by using the items that R. 
K. Wagner (1985) reported as discriminative of the groups in his study. Therefore, group 
comparisons in Study I were perfectly valid, because the discriminative items were not identified 
using the current groups, and there was no need to exclude any experts. It was preferable to use 
CHAPTER II  37   
 
 
the discriminative items identified by R. K. Wagner (1985), rather than the exact mean ratings of 
the expert profile R. K. Wagner reported: which items are discriminative are less likely to change 
over time than the exact mean rating of a particular strategy by a group of experts. 
 Common Sense Questionnaire 
This questionnaire was reproduced from Cianciolo and colleagues (2006; see Appendix 
A for screenshots of the questionnaire as presented in Study I). The questionnaire consisted of 15 
everyday situations for individuals who are employed, or seeking employment, in low- to mid-
level entry jobs. Each situation was associated with 8 response items. In untimed conditions, 
participants read a situation and rated the appropriateness of possible response strategies on a 7-
point scale according to its quality (1 = “extremely bad”, 4 = “neither good nor bad”, and 7 = 
“extremely good”). The situations were presented one at a time, and participants had to rate all 
the responses before irreversibly advancing to the next situation. Prior to advancing from each 
situation, participants were able to change their ratings freely to all of the responses alternatives. 
Cianciolo and colleagues’ (2006) method for deriving a CSQ score was employed. For 
each of the 15 situations, the deviation of an individual’s response profile to all of the solutions 
from the consensus response profile of the whole sample was taken to index Common Sense 
Tacit Knowledge. In particular, profiles that adhered closely to the consensus profile represented 
tacit knowledge about ‘Common Sense’. The deviation was quantified by calculating the 
standardized Euclidean distance (Mahalanobis D2) of an individual’s vector of solution-ratings 
from the centroid of the sample. The squared Mahalanobis distance provided a useful 
standardisation by accounting for the different variances and covariances of the different 
solutions within each situation. In particular, less weight was given to deviation from consensus 
on a given solution if that solution had a relatively large variance and weak correlation with other 
solutions in the situation (Rencher, 1995). All the scores were averaged across the 15 situations. 
This average squared Mahalanobis distance was square-rooted to provide an overall CSQ score. 
Lastly, the scores were reflected such that a larger CSQ score was indicative of ‘better’ Common 
Sense Tacit Knowledge. 
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2.3.5. IQ: DAT Verbal and Abstract Reasoning 
Participants completed both the verbal and abstract reasoning sections of the Differential 
Aptitudes Test (DAT-V and DAT-A, The Psychological Corporation, 1995). The tests were 
administered in accordance with the standard guidelines, with the exception that the tasks were 
completed electronically rather than with pen and pencil. After examples, participants had 25 
minutes to complete 40 questions on the DAT-V, and 20 minutes to complete 40 questions on 
the DAT-A. At the beginning of each question, participants were told how long, and how many 
questions, remained. In the DAT-V, each participant was presented with an analogy that was 
missing two words. The participant’s task was to select which of the five possible solutions was 
analogically consistent. In the DAT-A, each participant was presented with a series of four 
geometric shapes. The series varied according to abstract rules, and participants had to reason 
which of five possibilities completed the series correctly. Performance was quantified using the 
raw scores from the two sub-tests. The scores were not transformed into IQ scores; a whole 
battery of IQ tests was not administered and so no norm tables were available. Moreover, when 
the sample is so large, and made up of adults, who thus have relatively stable IQs, IQ can be 
accurately related to other variables in the study by estimating an IQ factor. This was achieved 
by extracting a general factor from the two sets of raw DAT scores (as standard within the field, 
e.g., Cianciolo, et al., 2006; Kaufman, et al., 2009). 
 
2.3.6. Personality: BFI 
The inventory was reproduced from and administered according to Benet-Martinez and 
John (1998) and John and Srivastava (1999, see either reference for a full listing of the BFI used 
in this study). Participants were presented with 44 statements pertaining to characteristics that 
might apply to them. In untimed conditions, for each statement, participants indicated the extent 
to which they agreed with the statement using a 5-point scale (disagree strongly to agree 
strongly). Five scale scores were computed that related to Extraversion (8 items), Agreeableness 
(9 items), Conscientiousness (9 items), Neuroticism (8 items) and Openness (10 items). These 
scores were computed as the mean ratings of the items on each scale (after reversing the false-
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keyed items) such that the prominence of the traits was reflected in the magnitude of the mean 
ratings. 
3. Results 
For all analyses, the alpha level was set at .05, two-tailed and extreme outliers (values 
either less than three times the interquartile range below the lower quartile, or greater than three 
times the interquartile range above the upper quartile) were excluded. Where relevant, the 
appropriate epsilon correction was used when sphericity was violated. Šidák corrections were 
used to control for familywise error rates during multiple comparisons (Cardinal & Aitken, 2006, 
pp. 87-90). Where significant interactions were found in mixed analyses of variance, separate 
ANOVAs on the levels of interest were conducted to establish simple effects. When conducting 
independent sample t-tests, equal sample variances were assumed unless Levene’s test for the 
equality of variances was significant. Cohen’s d is reported as a measure of effect size except 
where relative measures of effect size are more appropriate, and then partial eta-squared (η2p) is 
reported. 
3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
3.1.1. Implicit Learning 
 SRT 
RTs on error trials were discarded. First trial data were excluded, since meaningful 
assessment can only occur when the stimuli have been presented sequentially. Figure 2 
represents the mean RT (ms) difference between trial-types across blocks. A difference score 
greater than zero indicates that participants responded faster to the probable trials. Clearly, there 
was learning: difference scores were above zero and, on average, difference scores after the first 
block tended to be greater than those on the first block. A within-subject analysis of variance 
conducted on mean RTs, with two within-subjects factors, Trial Type (Probable vs. Improbable) 
and Block (1-9), supported this interpretation: there was a main effect of Trial-Type (F(1, 102) = 
134.07, p < .001, η2p = .57), Block (F(3, 334) = 21.63, p < .001, η
2
p = .18), and an interaction 
between Trial-Type x Block (F(6, 655) = 42.11, p < .001, η2p = .29). A linear contrast confirmed 
that the differences between trial-type increased across blocks (F(1, 100) = 146.99, p < .001, η2p 
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= .60). The overall SRT-RT learning score was derived by calculating the difference between 
mean RT to probable trials and mean RT to improbable trials, excluding the first practice block 
(M = 19.86 ms, Standard Error of Mean (SEM) = 1.38 ms). 
 
Figure 2. There was learning on the SRT task; participants were quicker on the probable than 
improbable trials. Depicted are mean RTs on probable and improbable trials on the SRT across 
training. The error bars show twice the standard error of differences between trial-type means at 
different levels of block. 
There were few errors on the task (M = 3.12 %, SD = 2.16 %). Song, Howard and 
Howard (2007) argued that accuracy on the SRT index learning in the same way as do RTs: 
fewer errors on the probable compared to the improbable trials indicate participants must have 
learnt about the sequence. A within-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the SRT error data, 
using the same factors as the RT analysis. Consistent with the RT analyses there was evidence of 
learning (Trial-Type (F(1, 102) = 84.90, p < .001, η2p = .45; Block, F(7, 716) = 18.44, p < .001, 
η2p = .15; Trial-Type x Block (F(8, 768) = 9.53, p < .001, η
2
p = .09). A linear contrast confirmed 
that the interaction was indicative of an increase in the differences between trial-type across 
blocks (F(1, 100) = 40.96, p < .001, η2p = .29). The overall SRT-Errors learning score was 
derived by calculating the difference between mean accuracy to probable trials and mean 

























The dependent variable was the percentage of test phase letter strings that had been 
correctly identified above the 50 % chance level. An answer that accurately classified a string 
(‘Yes’ to grammatical strings and ‘No’ to ungrammatical strings) was deemed correct. One-
sample t-tests demonstrated the basic learning effect (M = 10.60 %, SEM = 0.76 %, t(102) = 
13.87, p < .001, d = 1.42).  
 IFL 
Learning was measured using the percentage of test phase number strings that had been 
correctly selected above the 50 % chance level. A selection was correct if the number string with 
the invariant feature was selected. One-sample t-tests demonstrated the basic learning effect (M = 
6.28 %, SEM = 1.01 %, t(102) = 6.20, p < .001, d = 0.61).  
3.1.2. IQ 
The mean score on the Abstract Reasoning task was 27.97 (SD =7.21, and on the Verbal 
Reasoning task was 33.33 (SD = 5.86). Using the DAT norm conversion tables as an 
approximate index, it was estimated that these raw scores suggested a mean IQ in the range of 
105 to 117. However, given the sample was made up of adults, and who thus have relatively 
stable IQs, and was large in size, the variables in the study were more accurately related to one 
another by estimating an IQ factor through the extraction of a general factor from the raw scores 
(e.g., Cianciolo, et al., 2006; Kaufman, et al., 2009). Performance on the two subtests correlated 
(r = .52, p < .001, r2 = .27), and the general factor was extracted by a principal component 
analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity showed that the correlation matrix differed significantly 
from zero (χ2 = 31.40, p < .001). The general factor accounted for 75.86 % of the variance, as a 
consequence of correlating strongly with each of the original variables (r = .87). 
3.1.3. Explicit processing 
The mean number of errors that participants made in order to correctly reproduce all forty 
strings during the learning phase of the AGL task was 14.12 (SD = 9.99). The mean RT to 
improbable trials on the SRT task was 489.73 ms (SD = 81.74 ms). On both AGL memorisation 
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errors and SRT improbable RTs, better explicit processing was indicated by smaller scores, 
fewer errors and smaller (quicker) RTs respectively. Therefore, both indices were reflected for 
ease of interpretation in subsequent sections. 
3.1.4. Personality 
The scores on the different dimensions of the BFI (Extraversion: M = 3.37, SD = 0.77; 
Agreeableness: M = 3.81, SD = 0.66; Conscientiousness: M = 3.66, SD = 0.77; Neuroticism: M = 
2.84, SD = 0.95; Openness: M = 3.95, SD = 0.59), and the inter-correlations between these 
dimensions presented in Table 2, were similar to other large-scale studies (e.g., see Table 1 and 2 
in Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of the Dimensions of the Big Five Inventory 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.  
1. Extraversion -      
2. Agreeableness .09 -     
3. Conscientiousness .01 .34* -    
4. Neuroticism -.33* -.33* -.19 -   
5. Openness .23 -.01 .00 -.22 -  
* p < .05       
3.1.5. Tacit Knowledge: Academic Psychology Inventory 
Senior-Academics scored higher than Junior-Academics, who in turn scored higher than 
Undergraduates (Undergraduates: M = 225.21, SEM = 3.92; Junior-Academics: M = 228.28, 
SEM = 2.72; Senior-Academics: M = 243.20, SEM = 4.46). A one-way ANOVA showed that 
there was indeed an effect of group (F(2, 100) = 6.44, p < .01, η2p = .13); further, a planned 
contrast confirmed that Undergraduates differed from Senior-Academics (F(1, 100) = 11.35, p < 
.001, η2p = .10). This replicated R. K. Wagner (1985, 1987) and R. K. Wagner and Sternberg’s 
(1985, 1986) work and added to the evidence that their scale measured expertise in academic 
psychology. Further validation and replication was provided by correlations within the Senior-
Academics group between some external criteria of success in academic psychology and 
performance on the inventory, see Table 3. 
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Table 3. Relationship of Tacit Knowledge Indices with Occupational Achievement in Academic 










(SqRt) Publications .46* .40* -.02 -.27  
(SqRt) Conf. Papers .53* .42* -.03 -.26  
Job Title Rating .38 .31 .19 -.13  
Dept.’s RAE Outcome -.02 -.02 .03 -.02  
Time Spent Researching .00 -.07 .18 .05  
(SqRt) Salary (N = 29) .17 .09 -.06 -.29  
* p < .05      
3.2. Outstanding Issues in Tacit Knowledge 
3.2.1. Tacit Knowledge and Domain Generality 
The assessment of the relationship between performances on Tacit Knowledge 
Inventories for two different occupations across a whole range of expertise was performed in 
order to allow conclusions about the generality of tacit knowledge. 
 Business Management Inventory 
Senior-Academics scored higher than Undergraduates and Junior-Academics, while the 
Undergraduates and Junior-Academics performed similarly (Undergraduates: M = 269.06, SEM 
= 4.31; Junior-Academics: M = 263.85, SEM = 4.35; Senior-Academics: M = 277.50, SEM = 
4.07). A one-way ANOVA showed that there was indeed no evidence for an overall effect of 
group (F(2, 100) = 2.39, p = .10, η2p = .05). However, a contrast confirmed that the performance 
of Senior-Academics was superior to the combined performance of Junior-Academics and 
Undergraduates (F(1, 100) = 4.09, p = .05, η2p = .04). Therefore, expert academic psychologists 
had outperformed non expert-academic psychologists on both an Academic Psychology and 
Business Management Tacit Knowledge Inventory. This supported the claim that the tacit 
knowledge measured on these inventories is domain general. Moreover, expertise scores on the 
Academic Psychology-Tacit Knowledge Inventory correlated with the Business Knowledge 
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Inventory (r = .58, N = 103, p < .001, r2 = .34), and critically, this correlation remained even 
within just the expert group (r = .71, N = 30, p < .001, r2 = .51). This was particularly convincing 
evidence of domain generality because it replicated and extended the correlation found in 
undergraduates (R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 1986) across the whole range of expertise. 
In order to further test this generality, a principal component analysis was performed on 
the correlation between AP-TKI and BM-TKI. Bartlett’s test of sphericity showed that the 
correlation matrix differed significantly from zero (χ2 = 41.75, p < .001). The general factor 
accounted for 79.15 % of the variance, as a consequence of correlating strongly with each of the 
original variables (r = .89). Since there were only two variables and one extracted component, 
obviously the solution could not be rotated. This ‘General Occupational Tacit Knowledge’ 
factor, which was general to the AP- and BM-TKIs, also correlated with external criteria of 
success in academic psychology (see Table 3). Altogether, this suggested that there was a large 
proportion of variance that was common to both inventories, and moreover, what was common 
to both was also important in achieving success in academic psychology. 
 Common Sense Questionnaire 
There was no evidence of a correlation between the factor of General Occupational Tacit 
Knowledge and Common Sense Tacit Knowledge (r = .00, p > .99, r2 < .01). This was also true 
when the inventories were correlated with the CSQ separately (AP: r = .03, p = .76, r2 < .01; BM: 
r = -.03, p = .76, r2 < .01). The lack of correlation between the CSQ and occupational tacit 
knowledge suggested that the domain generality of occupational tacit knowledge was limited. 
Since the CSQ asks genuinely generic questions unrelated to any specific occupations, the 
implication was that the generality of occupational tacit knowledge did not extend to knowledge 
unrelated to occupational performance. Therefore, the remaining issues were examined 
separately in occupational tacit knowledge and the CSQ. 
3.2.2. Occupational Tacit Knowledge and Practice 
In Study I, as reported above, there were differences in performance between groups 
selected for their experience in academic psychology. There were also correlations within the 
Senior-Academics between performance and (i) (SqRt) Years since Ph. D was acquired (r(30) = 
.52, p < .01, r2 = .27), (ii) Years in academic psychology (r (30) = .39, p = .04, r2 = .15). Further, 
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performance across all participants was correlated with Years in academic psychology (r = .40, p 
< .001, r2 = .16). A highly similar relationship emerged between practice and the General 
Occupational Tacit Knowledge factor. This general factor also correlated with (SqRt) Years 
since Ph. D was acquired (r = .39, p = .03, r2 = .16) and Years in academic psychology across all 
participants (r = .33, p < .01, r2 = .11). 
An important aspect of R. K. Wagner and Sternberg’s theorising and evidence on tacit 
knowledge was that tacit knowledge is at least moderately independent of practice (R. K. 
Wagner, 1985, 1987; R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 1985, 1986). That is, although R. K. Wagner 
and Sternberg identified between-group differences in performance related to experience, there 
was independence within the groups (e.g., R. K. Wagner, 1985; R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 
1986). Study I used more sensitive measures to test that claim, and did not replicate that finding. 
Instead, the results clearly implied that tacit knowledge is strongly related to practice.  
3.2.3. Occupational Tacit Knowledge and IQ 
The raw scores on the Abstract Reasoning task were similar between the groups (Senior-
Academics: M = 26.97, SD = 8.265; Junior-Academics: M = 29.26, SD = 6.315; Undergraduates: 
M = 27.38, SD =7.161; F(2, 100) = 1.03, p = .36, η2p = .02). However, there was a group 
difference in the raw scores on the Verbal Reasoning task (Senior-Academics: M = 35.43 SD = 
3.92; Junior-Academics: M = 34.74 SD = 4.18; Undergraduates: M = 29.85 SD = 7.33; F(2, 100) 
= 10.79, p < .001, η2p = .18). Specifically, a contrast demonstrated that the Senior-Academics and 
Junior-Academics scored higher than Undergraduates (F(1, 100) = 21.55, p < .001, η2p = .18). 
The groups also differed on the IQ factor (F(2, 100) = 4.16, p = .02, η2p = .08) with the IQ factor 
greater for Senior-Academics and Junior-Academics than Undergraduates (F(2, 100) = 7.83, p = 
.01, η2p = .07). However, it seemed unlikely that the difference between the groups in the IQ 
factor underpinned the differences in tacit knowledge: as in R. K. Wagner’s studies (e.g., 1985, 
1987) there was no evidence that the IQ factor was related to Academic Tacit Knowledge (r = -
.11, p = .26, r2 = .01) or the factor of General Occupational Tacit Knowledge (r = -.14, p = .16, r2 
= .02) and this was the case in all three groups separately (rs = -.39 to .06, ps > .05, r2 < .16). 
Moreover, the addition of the IQ factor as a covariate did not remove the effect of Group on 
Academic Tacit Knowledge (F(2, 99) = 7.59, p < .01, η2p = .13) or the factor of General 
Occupational Tacit Knowledge (F(2, 99) = 5.36, p = .01, η2p = .10). 
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Also, the IQ factor did not correlate with indices of expertise in academic psychology 
(see Table 3). IQ is usually an excellent predictor of success, and the lack of evidence of its 
relationship with success stood in stark contrast with tacit knowledge. As discussed above, tacit 
knowledge correlated with some indices of expertise (see Table 3), and thereby demonstrated 
that the lack of correlation between the IQ factor and expertise was not simply an issue of range 
restriction. Further, this pattern of results was not simply a consequence of particularly unusual 
sample of participants with non-predictive IQs: the IQ factor correlated with educational 
achievement at sixteen (r = .30, N = 91, p < .01, r2 = .09) and eighteen years of age (r = .26, N = 
95, p = .01, r2 = .07), and thereby corroborated the extensive literature on the external validity of 
IQ.3 In contrast, there was no evidence of a correlation between the factor of General 
Occupational Tacit Knowledge and educational achievements at sixteen (r = -.13, N = 91, p = 
.21, r2 = .02) or eighteen years of age (r = .00, N = 95, p = .97, r2 < .01). This suggested that 
General Occupational Tacit Knowledge was particularly useful, relative to IQ, at predicting 
intelligent behaviour specifically in occupational domains. 
3.2.4. Occupational Tacit Knowledge and Personality 
 Personality differences between the groups varied according to the dimension, see Table 
4. Scores on Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Extraversion were very similar between the 
groups (F < 2). There were, however, group differences on Neuroticism (F(2, 100) = 4.42, p = 
.02, η2p = .08) and Openness (F(2, 100) = 3.63, p = .03, η
2
p = .07). The Undergraduates and 
Junior-Academics scored more highly than Senior-Academics on Neuroticism (F(1, 100) = 8.83, 
p < .01, η2p = .28), while the Undergraduates scored lowest on Openness, with scores increasing 
up to Senior-Academics (F(1, 100) = 7.23, p = .01, η2p = .21). However, there was no reason to 
believe that these group differences in personality underpinned the differences in tacit 
knowledge. First, as in previous studies of tacit knowledge (Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg, et al., 
2000), there was no evidence that personality was related to Academic Tacit Knowledge or the 
factor of General Occupational Tacit Knowledge, see Table 5. Second, even when Neuroticism 
                                                 
3 Educational achievement was quantified by converting the grades that participants provided in the 
General Questionnaire; grades at sixteen were converted using the General Certificate of Secondary Education 
(GCSE) points system; and grades at eighteen were converted using the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service (UCAS) Tariffs. 
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and Openness were added as covariates, the effect of Group remained on both Academic Tacit 
Knowledge (F(2, 98) = 5.07, p = .01, η2p = .09) and the factor of General Occupational Tacit 
Knowledge (F(2, 98) = 4.30, p = .02, η2p = .08).Third, there was no evidence of correlation 
between personality and indices of expertise in academic psychology, see Table 6.  
Table 4. Scores on Big Five Inventory between Groups 
 Undergraduates Junior-Academics Senior-Academics  
 M SD M SD M SD  
Extraversion 3.27 0.88 3.39 0.67 3.45 0.78  
Agreeableness 3.89 0.71 3.71 0.61 3.84 0.66  
Conscientiousness 3.61 0.62 3.56 0.81 3.87 0.86  
Neuroticism 3.02 0.92 3.01 0.88 2.42 0.97  
Openness 3.76 0.62 3.96 0.58 4.15 0.53  
 
Table 5. Relationships between Tacit Knowledge and Personality 
 Academic Psychology General Occupational  
Extraversion .00 .08  
Agreeableness -.04 -.01  
Conscientiousness .04 .02  
Neuroticism -.17 -.15  
Openness .07 -.01  
* p < .05    
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Table 6. Correlations between Personality and Occupational Achievement in Academic 
Psychology 
 Extraver. Agreeable. Conscien. Neurotic. Openness  
(SqRt) Publications -.14 .03 -.25 .02 -.05  
(SqRt) Conf. Papers .15 .18 .15 -.26 .25  
Job Title Rating -.25 -.03 -.17 .10 -.13  
Dept.’s RAE Outcome .00 .19 .04 .02 -.06  
Time Spent Researching .24 .00 -.04 -.13 .24  
(SqRt) Salary (N = 29) -.21 .14 -.33 .20 .07  
* p < .05       
3.2.5. Occupational Tacit Knowledge Discussion 
The study replicated the finding that Tacit Knowledge Inventories measure occupational 
achievement. Moreover, the study also suggested a degree of domain generality: performance on 
Business Management and Academic Psychology Inventories were highly correlated across a 
range of expertise. This replicated and extended the correlation found in undergraduates by R. K. 
Wagner and Sternberg (1986), but here across the whole range of expertise. By considering only 
undergraduates, the correlation reported by R. K. Wagner and Sternberg (1986) may have arisen 
not as a consequence of domain generality but alternatively as a consequence of the inexpert 
undergraduates using domain general knowledge precisely because they lack expertise. This 
argument cannot be made about Study I which demonstrated that this correlation remained 
across both the whole range of expertise, and even in the expert group alone. Further to the 
evidence of domain generality, the General Occupational Tacit Knowledge factor was correlated 
with occupational achievement. However, there was a limit to this generality: the occupational 
Tacit Knowledge Inventories were not related to the Common Sense Questionnaire, which asked 
genuinely generic questions. 
More importantly, tacit knowledge appeared to be critically related to practice. As a 
consequence of a close relationship between tacit knowledge and practice, the Tacit Knowledge 
Inventories do not provide compelling evidence of individual differences in an ability, such as 
implicit learning or practical intelligence. This fact remained, even though the study did not find 
evidence of a relationship between tacit knowledge and IQ, or tacit knowledge and personality. 
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Instead, this latter finding reinforces the idea that Tacit Knowledge Inventories could be useful 
measures for predicting occupational achievement (e.g., McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005; Sternberg, 
et al., 2000). Even though relationships between tacit knowledge and both IQ and personality 
might emerge in larger studies (as in SJTs, e.g., McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005), the fact that Study 
I found relationships between tacit knowledge and occupational achievement, when IQ and 
personality did not, suggests that some of the prediction of occupational achievement by tacit 
knowledge would remain incremental to the prediction by IQ and personality. This also 
replicates research about Situational Judgment Tests, which has demonstrated Situational 
Judgment Tests provide incremental prediction over IQ and personality (McDaniel & Whetzel, 
2005). 
Finding measurement tools, such as occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories and 
Situational Judgment Tests that predict occupational achievement incremental to IQ clearly does 
not devalue IQ as a measurement tool or construct. First, as established, it is likely that IQ would 
still be related to achievement in larger samples. Second, it is possible that when considering 
achievement within occupations the IQ-occupational achievement relationship is relatively 
modest and that other factors are relatively more important because IQ has already performed its 
role: it was a necessary cog in achieving the requisite educational qualifications (e.g, 
Mackintosh, 1998). 
3.2.6. Common Sense Questionnaire: Occupational Achievement, Practice, IQ and 
Personality 
Consistent with having found no evidence of a correlation between the CSQ and 
occupational tacit knowledge, there was no evidence of a correlation between performance on 
the CSQ and occupational achievement (see Table 2). In the case of Common Sense, the 
appropriate index of practice is ‘life experience’, or age. There was support of the questionnaire 
as a measurement of ability independent of practice: there was no evidence that performance on 
the CSQ was correlated with age (r = .11, p = .27, r2 = .01). Performance on the CSQ correlated 
with the IQ factor (r = .26, p = .01, r2 = .07). This was a similar magnitude of correlation as 
found by Cianciolo and colleagues (r = .17 to .19; 2006), and therefore provided further evidence 
that ‘practical intelligence’ as measured by the CSQ was not wholly independent of IQ. Finding 
a correlation between CSQ and the IQ factor, but not CSQ and indices of expertise were 
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consistent with one another, given that the study also failed to find a relationship between the IQ 
factor and indices of expertise. Finally, there was no evidence to suggest CSQ was a surrogate 
measure of personality (rs -.09 to .13, ps > .05, r2 < .02). 
3.2.7. Common Sense Questionnaire Discussion 
In addition to finding no evidence of a correlation between performance on the CSQ and 
Tacit Knowledge Inventories, there was no evidence of correlation with indices of expertise. 
This contrasted with one of the original studies that endorsed the CSQ (Cianciolo, et al., 2006). 
There are several possible reasons for the discrepancy between that study and the current one. 
First, the effect, when it is apparent, may not be very strong, and in line with this possibility, the 
original authors only found evidence of a correlation in one of their two studies. Thus, it may be 
that opportunity to observe such a weak effect was limited in Study I by the relatively smaller 
sample size. However, it should be noted, that in addition to the lack of correlations here, they 
were also not even all in the right direction (see Table 3). 
Second, the failure to replicate a correlation may be a consequence of the considerable 
expertise of the current sample. The relatively extensive expertise of the current sample stood in 
contrast with the fact that the participants in Cianciolo and colleagues’ (2006) study had spent 
just 1.3 years on average in their current position. It seemed plausible that the type of common 
sense measured in the questionnaire was more important in determining occupational 
achievement when expertise was low. Consistent with this, in the study in which Cianciolo and 
colleagues (2006) failed to find a correlation between the CSQ and occupational achievement, 
the sample had been in their positions for additional 2.7 years than in the sample in which that 
CSQ-occupational achievement correlation was found. 
Thirdly, although in Cianciolo and colleagues’ (2006) studies the participant IQs were 
not measured for the relevant sample, it was assumed that IQs for such a large sample (N = 228) 
of such a diverse population (the sample was recruited through newspaper flyers and included 
participants with a wide range of occupations see Cianciolo and colleagues, 2006) was close to 
100. This stood in contrast with the estimate of the current sample’s mean IQ, which was above 
average. This discrepancy in sample IQs may also explain the different findings; namely, such 
common sense would add more value for individuals with lower IQs. 
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While there was no evidence of a relationship between CSQ and personality, 
performance on the CSQ correlated with the IQ factor. That CSQ-IQ correlation (r = .26) was of 
a similar magnitude to that found by Cianciolo and colleagues (r = .17 to .19; 2006). In this 
study, the Common Sense Questionnaire was the only index of ‘practical intelligence’ as 
measured by these Common Sense/Everyday type inventories. However, when the general factor 
underpinning the inventories was extracted, the correlation with the IQ factor was found to be 
much stronger (r = 0.48, Cianciolo, et al., 2006). Given that the first-order correlations were of 
equivalent magnitude, it seemed likely that Study I would also have replicated this stronger 
correlation with a general factor. Regardless of this further assumption, the correlation between 
CSQ and IQ was replicated, and therefore provided further evidence that ‘practical intelligence’ 
as measured by ‘Common Sense’ and ‘Everyday’ inventories was not wholly independent of IQ. 
In Study I, there was support of the questionnaire as a measurement of ability 
independent of practice, insofar that there was no correlation of CSQ performance with age. This 
was not identified as important and thus not reported in the original study by Cianciolo and 
colleagues (2006), yet it is essential to the validity of the CSQ to have established whether or not 
CSQ performance was related to age. Without investigating the relationship, it was possible that 
the inventories were measuring a fund of ‘life’ knowledge acquired simply as a function of time. 
Yet, given the close relationship of the CSQ with IQ, this evidence of individual differences 
independent of time could plausibly be a consequence of IQ. 
In summary, as with the occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories, the CSQ does not 
provide compelling evidence of individual differences in an ability, such as implicit learning or 
practical intelligence. Specifically, there is little evidence of its external validity, and little reason 
to suppose that differences in CSQ performance do not result from differences in IQ. However, 
the CSQ and occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories measure different constructs. The CSQ 
appears to be related to IQ, and unable to predict occupational achievement once sufficient 
expertise and knowledge has been acquired. This stands in contrast with occupational Tacit 
Knowledge Inventories that appear to measure knowledge, acquired as a function of time, and 
predict occupational achievement incrementally to IQ and personality. 
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3.3. Individual Differences in Implicit Learning 
3.3.1. Inter-Relationships between Implicit Learning, IQ and Explicit Processes 
Table 7 showed that there was no evidence of significant correlations between implicit 
learning (SRT-RT; SRT-Errors; SRT factor; IFL; AGL) and the IQ factor. This finding stood in 
contrast with the evidence of correlations between the IQ factor and the indices of explicit 
processing (RT to improbable trials on SRT and Memorisation errors on AGL, see Table 7). 
Table 7. Correlation Matrix of Learning on Implicit Learning Tasks, IQ and Explicit Processes 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. IQ factor –        
2. Implicit SRT-RT .18 –       
3. Implicit SRT-Errors .11 .36* –      
4. Implicit SRT factor .18 .83* .83* –     
5. Implicit IFL .04 -.02 .00 -.01 –    
6. Implicit AGL .22 -.07 -.10 -.11 .04 –   
7. Explicit Improbable RTs .32* .05 .31* .22 -.09 .06 –  
8. Explicit Memorisation Errors .41* .17 .11 .17 .03 .23 .32* – 
* p < .05         
There were two indices of SRT learning, which correlated (r = .36, p < .001, r2 = .13). 
Therefore, in order to ensure that all the different implicit learning tasks were fairly represented, 
prior to analysing the inter-relationships between IQ, implicit and explicit processes, a general 
SRT factor was extracted by a principal component analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity showed 
that the correlation matrix differed significantly from zero (χ2 = 14.07, p < .001). The general 
factor accounted for 68.06 % of the variance, as a consequence of correlating strongly with each 
of the original variables (r = .83). 
Principal component analysis was performed on the correlation matrix for the measures 
of the IQ factor, implicit (SRT factor; IFL and AGL) and explicit processes (AGL memorisation 
errors and SRT RTs to improbable trials). Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) were conducted to ensure that the present data 
were suited to a principal component analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity showed that the 
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correlation matrix differed significantly from zero (χ2 = 52.27, p < .001) and the overall KMO 
value was satisfactory at 0.66 (this should be 0.5 or greater). The Kaiser-Guttman rule (which 
states that components with eigenvalues greater than one should be retained, Kaiser, 1960) 
suggested a 2-component solution that accounted for 51.05 % of the variance. Underlying factors 
were not assumed to be uncorrelated with one another, therefore oblique (direct oblimin) and not 
orthogonal rotation was performed. Table 8 shows the pattern matrix with the salient loadings 
displayed in bold. Measures of the IQ factor and explicit processing displayed their salient 
loading on component I, whereas the measures of implicit learning all displayed their salient 
loading on component II. This further reinforced the finding that measures of implicit learning 
were independent of IQ and explicit processes. 
Table 8. Principal Component Analysis of the Measures of IQ, Implicit Learning and Explicit 
Processes 
Measure I II  
IQ factor .76 .13  
Implicit SRT factor .41 -.61  
Implicit IFL .01 .41  
Implicit AGL .37 .71  
Explicit Improbable RTs .66 -.30  
Explicit Memorisation Errors .76 .15  
 
There was one further key finding implied by two results from this correlation matrix and 
principal components analysis. First, there was no evidence of any significant first-order 
correlations between three different measures of implicit learning. Second, although all three of 
the implicit learning tasks exhibited their salient loadings onto the same component, the loadings 
of the SRT and AGL were in opposite directions. Together, these findings strongly imply that 
these three implicit learning tasks show little common variance. While this was in contrast with 
Gebauer and Mackintosh (2010), this did replicate other large scale studies of implicit learning 
tasks (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Kaufman, 2009). Therefore, this supported the theory that 
individual differences in a ‘general’ implicit learning ability would be minimal (A. S. Reber, 
1993). However, this was further examined by a consideration of the correlations of the 
individual implicit learning tasks and the other variables collected in this study. 
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Finally, in order to examine whether the lack of correlations between the implicit learning 
tasks and other measures might have been caused by unreliable tasks Spearman-Brown split-half 
reliability estimates were calculated. The estimates were all either satisfactory or acceptable 
(SRT-RT = .63, SRT-Errors = .72, AGL = .73, IFL = .41; i.e., similar magnitudes to Gebauer 
and Mackintosh, 2009). 
3.3.2. Implicit Learning and Occupational Achievement 
As reported above in Results 3.1.1 of this chapter there was an overall effect of sequence 
learning. In order to investigate the influence of SRT learning on occupational achievement, the 
magnitudes of the SRT factor were analysed between three groups divided according to 
academic expertise (Undergraduates, Junior-Academics and Senior-Academics). The mean 
magnitude of the SRT factor was similar between the groups (Undergraduates: M = 0.05, SEM = 
0.17; Junior-Academics: M = 0.04, SEM = 0.16; Senior-Academics: M = -0.10, SEM = 0.18), and 
consistent with this, a one-way ANOVA between these three groups provided no evidence of 
differences (F(2, 100) = 0.22, p = .80, η2p < .01). 
The SRT factor represented the variance that was general to the two different indices of 
SRT learning; the RTs and accuracy (see Results 3.1.1 of this chapter). However, there was a 
possibility that one of the two indices was actually a more accurate measure of the influence of 
the SRT on occupational achievement. If that were true, then the use of the general factor could 
have masked the relationship between occupational achievement and the more accurate, single 
index of SRT learning. Thus, further analyses were performed to consider the effect of 
occupational achievement on each of the two indices of SRT learning: a Group factor (3 levels, 
Undergraduates, Junior-Academics and Senior-Academics) was added to the ANOVAs on RTs 
and accuracy reported in Results 3.1.1 of this chapter. Only the additional results are reported 
here. In the RT analysis, the magnitudes of the difference scores were comparable between the 
three groups and therefore suggested that the sequence learning was similar between the groups. 
Consistent with such similarity, there was no evidence of an interaction between Trial-Type and 
Group (F(2, 100) = 0.34, p = .72, η2p = .01) nor a three-way interaction (F(13, 660) = 1.26, p = 
.23, η2p = .03). There was an interaction between Group x Block (F(7, 332) = 2.70, p = .01, η
2
p = 
.05). However, this overall RT reduction across block reflected improvement in performance due 
to practice effects, rather than learning about the sequence because the effect is independent of 
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trial type. This interaction appeared to be a consequence of post-graduates having benefitted the 
least from practice, i.e. the improvement in postgraduate RTs independent of Trial-Type was 
smaller than the other two groups. There was no evidence of differences between the groups in 
overall speed (Group: F(2, 100) = 0.27, p = .77, η2p = .01). 
This SRT-RT effect was also similar in the three groups as measured by the overall RT 
score (Undergraduates: M = 17.85 ms, SEM = 2.22 ms; Junior-Academics: M = 20.84 ms, SEM = 
2.17 ms; Senior-Academics: M = 20.87 ms, SEM = 15.76 ms). A one-way ANOVA between 
these three groups confirmed this interpretation: there was no evidence of a difference between 
them (F(2, 100) = 0.52, p = .60, η2p = .01). 
In the accuracy, like the RT, analysis, there was no evidence of differences between the 
groups in the magnitudes of the differences scores in accuracy between trial-types (Trial-Type x 
Group, F(2, 100) = 2.15, p = .12, η2p = .04; Trial-Type x Block x Group, F(15,771) = 1.07, p = 
.38, η2p = .02). There was no evidence of a Block and Group interaction (F(15, 730) = 1.66, p = 
.06, η2p = .03). Finally, there was evidence of group differences in overall accuracy (Group: F(2, 
100) = 3.47, p = .04, η2p = .07). Fisher’s LSD t-tests provided no evidence of a difference 
between Junior-Academics and Senior-Academics (t(67) = 0.53, p = .60, d = 0.13) but did reveal 
that the Undergraduate group made significantly more overall errors than both Junior-Academics 
(t(71) = 2.02, p = .04, d = 0.47) and Senior-Academics (t(62) = 2.34, p = .04, d = 0.59). 
The SRT accuracy effect was also similar in the three groups as measured by the overall 
SRT-Errors score (Undergraduates: M = 3.81 %, SEM = 0.57 %; Junior-Academics: M = 3.02 %, 
SEM = 0.58 %; Senior-Academics: M = 2.24 %, SEM = 0.51 %). Consistent with this, a one-way 
ANOVA between these three groups provided no evidence of a difference between them (F(2, 
100) = 1.76, p = .18, η2p = .03). 
There was an overall learning effect on the AGL task (see Results 3.1.2 of this chapter). 
This AGL effect was similar in the three groups (Undergraduates: M = 10.41 %, SEM = 1.47 %; 
Junior-Academics: M = 9.85 %, SEM = 1.16 %; Senior-Academics: M = 11.80 %, SEM = 1.37 
%). A one-way ANOVA between these three groups confirmed this interpretation: there was no 
evidence of a difference between the three groups (F(2, 100) = 0.55, p = .58, η2p = .01). 
There was also an overall learning effect on the IFL task (see Results 3.1.3 of this 
chapter). Numerically, the Junior-Academics displayed the largest IFL effect of the three groups 
(Undergraduates: M = 4.31 %, SEM = 1.66 %; Junior-Academics: M = 9.06 %, SEM = 1.80 %; 
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Senior-Academics: M = 4.89 %, SEM = 1.65 %). However, a one-way ANOVA between these 
three groups provided no evidence of a difference between the three groups (F(2, 100) = 2.39, p 
= .10, η2p = .05). 
Finally, it was possible that if implicit learning was related to occupational achievement, 
the relationship would only be revealed by more sensitive measures of achievement. Therefore, 
implicit learning performance was correlated with the occupational achievement measured in the 
Senior-Academics in the General Questionnaire (see Table 1). However, Table 9 demonstrated 
that there was still little evidence to relate implicit learning to occupational achievement, even 
using these more sensitive indices of achievement. The N for Senior-Academics was not huge; 
however, the N was not so small that indices of performance could not correlate with Academic 
Tacit Knowledge and General Occupational Tacit Knowledge. There were some negative, albeit 
non-significant, correlations between the measure of SRT learning and the different indices of 
expertise. However, these correlations were unlikely to have been a consequence of an inverse 
relationship between expertise and implicit learning ability. Instead, if there had been evidence 
of significant negative correlations, such correlations would have more likely reflected the 
influence of RTs (or ‘processing speed’, as indices of explicit processing and correlates of IQ) on 
this measure of implicit learning.  
Table 9. Relationship between Implicit Learning and Occupational Achievement in Academic 
Psychology (N = 30) 
 Implicit SRT Implicit IFL Implicit AGL  
(SqRt) Publications -.42 -.10 -.07  
(SqRt) Conf. papers .18 .03 -.10  
Job Title Rating -.23 -.12 .08  
Dept.’s RAE Outcome .05 .09 .16  
Time Spent Researching .12 .12 .05  
(SqRt) Salary (N = 29) -.41 -.13 -.08  
* p < .05     
Altogether, these analyses provided no evidence to relate implicit learning to 
occupational achievement. This was consistent with having already failed to find evidence of 
common variance between the implicit learning tasks.  
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3.3.3. Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge 
There was no evidence of correlations between tacit knowledge and indices of implicit 
learning (see Table 10). This failure was consistent with having already failed to find common 
variance between the implicit learning tasks, and also failing to demonstrate relationships 
between implicit learning tasks and occupational achievement.  
Table 10. Relationships between Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge 
 Academic Psychology General Occupational Common Sense  
Implicit SRT factor .08 .10 -.02  
Implicit IFL .04 -.02 -.01  
Implicit AGL -.12 -.05 .01  
* p < .05     
3.3.4. Implicit Learning and Personality 
The dimension of Openness has been related to intuitive aspects of personality in other 
theories of personality (e.g., John & Srivastava, 1999). Presented in Table 11, the correlations 
between implicit learning tasks and Openness provided no evidence of a relationship between 
implicit learning and intuitive aspects of personality. Indeed, there was no evidence that implicit 
learning was related to any aspects of personality (see Table 11). This was consistent with having 
already failed to find evidence of common variance between the implicit learning tasks, or any 
relationship between implicit learning tasks and occupational achievement. 
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Table 11. Relationships between Personality and Implicit Learning 
 Implicit SRT factor Implicit IFL Implicit AGL  
Extraversion -.13 -.04 -.09 
 
Agreeableness -.02 .01 .03 
 
Conscientiousness -.15 .15 .04 
 
Neuroticism .03 .02 -.05 
 
Openness .00 .03 .01 
 
* p < .05    
 
4. Chapter Discussion 
The main aim of the study was to provide a further test of the theory that there are 
meaningful individual differences in implicit learning. Critically, there was no evidence of 
common variance between the implicit learning tasks. Further, there was no evidence to relate 
performance on any of the implicit learning tasks to IQ, occupational achievement, personality or 
tacit knowledge. Altogether, this data supports the conclusion that there are not important 
individual differences in implicit learning, and instead supports the theory that individual 
differences in implicit learning are minimal (A. S. Reber, 1993). 
Consideration of these current findings along with the other three large-scale studies of 
individual differences in implicit learning discourages the conclusion that there are substantial 
individual differences in implicit learning. Three of the four studies, including the current one, 
have found no evidence for common variance between different implicit learning tasks (Gebauer 
& Mackintosh, 2007; Kaufman, 2009). Gebauer and Mackintosh (2010) found inter-relationships 
between several different learning tasks. However, the inter-relationships identified were 
sufficiently modest to prompt the authors to acknowledge that “further replications will be 
necessary in order to empirically establish the existence of above chance correlations between 
performance on different implicit learning tasks” (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010, p. 30). Perhaps, 
the critical aspect of Gebauer and Mackintosh’s (2010) study was the fact they used the largest 
number of implicit learning measures; fifteen different indices were inter-correlated. The 
identification of individual differences of implicit learning only when the number of implicit 
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learning tasks was large would be consistent with relatively minimal, rather than substantial, 
individual differences. 
Additionally, the evidence to relate implicit learning task performance to functional 
outcomes is limited. This study found no relationship between implicit learning and occupational 
achievement, personality, or tacit knowledge. Although Gebauer and Mackintosh (2010) and 
Kaufman and colleagues (in press) have been more successful than this, there are several ways to 
reconcile their findings with Study I. Kaufman and colleagues (in press) related SRT task 
performance, and not what was general to several implicit learning tasks, to second language 
acquisition and personality. Therefore, the relationships might stem from something that was 
more specifically measured by the SRT task than from general implicit learning. Gebauer and 
Mackintosh (2010) did relate the general component they identified to second language 
acquisition. However, as discussed the reliability of this general component is not clear and, 
more importantly, the relationship between that general component and second language 
acquisition was small (r = .15). A more general point is that second-language acquisition and 
personality are different to occupational achievement and tacit knowledge. It is possible that 
differences in implicit learning are uniquely critical in language acquisition, and related to 
intuitive aspects of personality that are independent of tacit knowledge. In the latter case, 
although Study I also measured personality, Kaufman and colleagues (in press) used different 
personality questionnaires that might have been more sensitive for the purposes of relating 
implicit learning and personality. Thus, altogether the literature on individual differences implies 
that individual differences in general implicit learning are minimal, and insofar that they do exist, 
they only have a modest effect on some aspects of behaviour. 
An additional aspect of the results of Study I was the replication of a feature of implicit 
learning that is critical to the retention of the implicit-explicit distinction. Specifically, 
performance on the implicit learning tasks was not correlated with IQ, which stood in contrast 
with the correlations between IQ and the indices of explicit processing taken from the same 
implicit learning tasks. This dissociation reinforces the idea that implicit and explicit-IQ 
mediated cognition are distinct. However, it is possible that this dissociation is a consequence of 
the explicit indices being more sensitive than the implicit ones. This remains a possibility even 
though the indices of explicit processing were taken from the same tasks as the implicit learning 
measures because all the indices are derived differently. However, given Gebauer and 
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Mackintosh’s (2007) previous dissociation, this possibility seems unlikely. Specifically, the 
identified dissociation was protected from the possibility of asymmetrically sensitive measures 
because the learning measures for implicit and explicit performance were derived using exactly 
the same measurement tools. Critically, participants performed exactly the same tasks in one of 
two conditions: either under typical implicit instructions or under explicit instruction to use 
explicit strategies to aid their performance. Although this instruction manipulation did not 
consistently change overall performance across the learning tasks, a relationship with IQ was 
consistently observed in the explicit condition. The contrasting relationships of IQ with implicit 
and explicit measures in Study I support, and are consistent with, Gebauer and Mackintosh’s 
(2007) compelling dissociation. 
In resolving outstanding issues relating to tacit knowledge, the study established that tacit 
knowledge was also unable to provide compelling evidence of individual differences in an ability 
that was independent of IQ, personality and practice (e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a; McDaniel & 
Whetzel, 2005; c.f., Sternberg, et al., 2000; R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 1986). It was possible 
that if tacit knowledge was the intermediary between an individual’s implicit learning ability and 
its behavioural manifestation in performance differences, then the study would have only been 
able to find evidence to support the role of implicit learning in individual performance 
differences by also measuring that relevant intermediary. Instead, Study I demonstrated that 
occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories, like Situational Judgment Tests (e.g., McDaniel & 
Whetzel, 2005), measure knowledge that is acquired primarily as a function of practice and 
experience, rather than individual differences in an ability (e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a; c.f., 
Sternberg, et al., 2000). The inventories, again like Situational Judgment Tests, remained 
practically useful because they appeared to measure knowledge that predicted occupational 
achievement incrementally to IQ and personality. Further, occupational Tacit Knowledge 
Inventories demonstrated some domain generality. However, importantly, sceptics of tacit 
knowledge as a measure of an ability were not necessarily sceptical of the importance and 
generality of experience-dependent occupational knowledge (e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a; McDaniel 
& Whetzel, 2005). The study also established a limit to the generality of tacit knowledge: the 
CSQ and occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories measured different constructs. The CSQ 
appeared to be strongly related to IQ, and unable to predict occupational achievement once 
sufficient expertise and knowledge has been acquired (c.f., Cianciolo, et al., 2006). 
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In summary, there was no evidence of variance common to all the implicit learning tasks, 
nor was there any evidence to relate performance on any of the implicit learning tasks to IQ, 
occupational achievement, personality or tacit knowledge. I assert that an overall consideration 
of this study with the other relevant literature currently leads to the conclusion that, consistent 
with A. S. Reber’s prediction, there are minimal individual differences in implicit learning. The 
study did replicate another finding that is important to the distinction between implicit and 
explicit learning: indices of explicit processing, but not performance on implicit learning tasks, 
were correlated with IQ. Additionally, the study provided independent, empirical investigation of 
issues in tacit knowledge that have been subject to fierce debate (e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a, 
2003b; McDaniel & Nguyen, 2001; McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005; Sternberg, 2003). The study 
established that tacit knowledge was unable to provide compelling evidence of individual 
differences in an ability that was independent of IQ, personality and practice (e.g., Gottfredson, 
2003a; McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005; c.f., Sternberg, et al., 2000; R. K. Wagner & Sternberg, 
1986). Academic Psychology and Business Management Tacit Knowledge Inventories measured 
knowledge that predicted occupational achievement incrementally to IQ and personality, and was 
general to both occupations. Critically, however, tacit knowledge appeared to be acquired 
primarily as a function of practice and experience, rather than individual differences in an ability 
(e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a; c.f., Sternberg, et al., 2000). Notably, sceptics of tacit knowledge as a 
measure of an ability are not necessarily sceptical of the generality, nor the prediction 
capabilities, of primarily experience-dependent occupational knowledge (e.g., Gottfredson, 
2003a; McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005). Indeed, McDaniel and Whetzel (2005) happily 
acknowledged occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories as a variety of Situational Judgment 
Test, which commonly exhibit these properties. Additionally, the study established a limit to the 
generality of tacit knowledge: the CSQ and occupational Tacit Knowledge Inventories measured 
different constructs. The CSQ was strongly related to IQ, and unable to predict occupational 
achievement once sufficient expertise and knowledge had been acquired (c.f., Cianciolo, et al., 
2006). 
Finally, the results from this study have an important implication for the direction of the 
functional analysis of differences in implicit learning pursued by this thesis. Specifically these 
results, in the context of the equivocal findings of previous studies (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 
2007, 2010; Kaufman, 2009; Kaufman, et al., in press), suggest that the idea of functional 
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individual differences in implicit learning is misplaced. There appears to be no general implicit 
learning ability that is critical to how much is learnt implicitly within a typical population. 
Instead, implicit learning might be better conceptualised as a description of the mode in which a 
variety of processes are marshalled, but how much is learnt is always dependent on differences in 
those processes rather than a central implicit learning capacity. There might be some general 
ability still, but its influence appears to be, at best, minimal (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010), and 
certainly not ubiquitously important to functional outcomes. 
However, an alternative framework to identifying functional differences in implicit 
learning still exists. Even in the absence of an overarching, general ability that determines how 
much is learnt implicitly, there might still be prerequisite processes that are always necessary for 
implicit learning. Insofar that those prerequisite processes are intact, the variance in how much is 
learnt implicitly is still dependent on a variety of other processes, such as selective attention, 
working memory, motor dexterity, perceptual processing. There is not yet empirical evidence for 
this theoretical position but it could be tested by considering relevant atypical populations. 
Specifically, if an atypical population consistently demonstrated profound deficits on all implicit 
learning tasks and skills associated with an implicit acquisition, then a case could be made for 
such prerequisite processes to implicit learning. Although, investigations into several atypical 
populations have not provided evidence to support this theory (see review at end of Chapter I), 
researchers have asserted that there is a general deficit in Autism Spectrum Condition, which 
contributes to diagnostic social, communicative and motor impairment (e.g., L. G. Klinger, et al., 
2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000; Romero-Mungu a, 2008). While initial results appear to have 
supported that view (Gordon & Stark, 2007; L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, et al., 
2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000), there are some reasons to believe that these demonstrations do 
not provide definitive evidence of a general implicit learning deficit. In order to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the possibility of a general implicit learning deficit in ASC, Study 
II examined whether ASC individuals have a deficit across a range of implicit learning tasks. 
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III. Implicit Learning in Autism Spectrum Conditions: Study II 
1. Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC) are characterized by social, communicative and 
motor impairments (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Implicit learning is believed to be 
one important mechanism for acquiring social, communicative and motor skills (e.g., Kaufman, 
et al., in press; McLeod & Dienes, 1993; Meltzoff, Kuhl, Movellan, & Sejnowski, 2009; 
Perruchet, 2008; A. S. Reber, 1993), raising the possibility that social, communicative and motor 
impairments in ASC may arise, in part, from a general deficit in implicit learning (L. G. Klinger, 
et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000; Romero-Mungu a, 2008). 
Testing the hypothesis that implicit learning is impaired in ASC requires a comparison of 
the performance of individuals with and without ASC on a range of implicit learning tasks. 
Several studies have claimed to find impairments in implicit learning in ASC, on some implicit 
learning tasks. For example, Mostofsky and colleagues (2000) and Gordon and Stark (2007) 
reported that individuals with ASC performed worse than typically developing (TD) individuals 
on one implicit learning procedure, the SRT task. However, there is some reason to question 
whether the procedure used by Gordon and Stark (2007) and Mostofsky and colleagues (2000) 
adequately assessed implicit learning. Subsequent research has shown that procedures involving 
slowly repeating, ‘deterministic’ sequences (i.e. sequences that follow a continually repeating 
sequence without interruption) are more likely to encourage the development and use of explicit 
strategies to solve the task (e.g., Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001, 2003; Jiménez, et al., 1996; 
Norman, Price, Duff, & Mentzoni, 2007; Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998). Since Gordon and 
Stark (2007) and Mostofsky and colleagues (2000) used slowly repeating deterministic 
sequences (the response-to-stimulus interval was 500 ms and 1500 ms respectively), it is 
therefore hard to disentangle to what extent the reported differences in performance between the 
two groups are due to differences in implicit or explicit learning.  
Furthermore, neither of these studies completely matched the two participating groups for 
IQ. The issue of IQ is highly important: while implicit learning performance has been shown to 
be unrelated to IQ, explicit learning is strongly correlated (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Gebauer & 
Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press; A. S. Reber, et al., 1991). Therefore if the 
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task procedures encouraged explicit learning, given the ASC-group had lower IQs, the ASC-
deficit would be expected and more likely attributable to explicit processes.4 This interpretation 
seems particularly feasible given that when researchers (Barnes, et al., 2008) compared an ASC 
group with a TD group well-matched for IQ and used a more complicated sequence with shorter 
response-to-stimulus intervals, then the conclusion was that sequence learning is intact in ASC 
individuals. In this study, Barnes and colleagues (2008) also found no evidence for differences 
between the groups on a CC task. 
There is also discrepancy between the findings of studies assessing the performance of 
individuals with ASC on another classic implicit learning procedure, the AGL task. While one 
study claimed to find ASC deficits (L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007), another found that individuals 
with ASC did no worse than controls on the task (reported in L. G. Klinger et al., 2007; L. G. 
Klinger, Lee, Bush, Klinger, & Crump, 2001, as cited in L. G. Klinger et al., 2007). It should be 
noted, however, that the tasks used in these studies were adapted versions of the classic AGL test 
(e.g., the tasks used shape rather than letter stimuli, and for the test phase required a two-
alternative forced-choice discrimination rather than a single-stimulus classification decision) 
raising the possibility that the adaptations allowed the use of explicit strategies to learn the task 
rather than providing stringent assessments of implicit processes. This interpretation was 
corroborated by the finding that the performances on those adapted AGL tasks correlated with IQ 
(L. G. Klinger et al., 2001, as cited in L. G. Klinger et al., 2007; L. G. Klinger et al., 2007). The 
difference in ASC performance between the two studies may therefore have arisen from 
differences in how the groups used explicit strategies. This possibility is particularly relevant in 
light of the fact that the study reporting the ASC deficit used an ASC group who had lower IQs 
than the TD group (L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007), and therefore would have been at a disadvantage 
on a more explicit task. Thus, if tasks used in studies of implicit learning in ASC lend themselves 
to explicit, IQ-related strategies, then it will be difficult to dissociate any performance deficit due 
                                                 
4 Also consistent with this interpretation, Müller, Cauich, Rubio, Mizuno, & Courchesne (2004) found 
differences between ASC and TD groups who were not matched for IQ on an SRT task that used slowly repeating 
deterministic sequences. Specifically, the authors found abnormal activity patterns in the premotor cortex in ASC. 
However, there was no statistical comparison of the ASC and TD performance data. It is probable that the data were 
not compared because such an analysis would have had very little power to detect any performance differences: 
there were only 48 learning trials and eight participants in each group. 
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to differences in a capacity to learn implicitly from differences in the IQ-mediated explicit 
contribution. 
Attempts have also been made to assess implicit learning on category learning tasks and 
some studies have claimed to show a deficit (e.g., L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, 
et al., 2007). However, all such studies used a deterministic, as opposed to a probabilistic, 
category learning task, which would be more likely to encourage the use of explicit strategies (L. 
G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Molesworth, Bowler, & Hampton, 
2005). This interpretation is corroborated by the correlation of deterministic category learning 
with IQ in the one study that reported this relationship (L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007). Further, 
although both the studies demonstrating a deficit matched the ASC and TD groups for verbal 
mental age, neither study matched the groups for IQ or chronological age (L. G. Klinger & 
Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007). In another study (Molesworth, et al., 2005) that did 
match for chronological age, mental age and IQ, the deficit was not replicated: ASC performance 
was found to be intact. Thus, it is not clear that there are ASC differences in performance on 
non-probabilistic category learning tasks. Even if differences are established on this version of 
the task, it seems likely that they could be due to differences in cognitive processes other than 
implicit learning.  
This review suggests that although there may be a deficit in implicit learning in ASC, it is 
possible that performance deficits observed so far may arise as a consequence of the recruitment 
of other, particularly explicit, cognitive processes. This is especially important given that the 
studies reporting an ASC-deficit did not stringently match ASC and control groups for IQ, and 
explicit, in contrast to implicit, processes correlate strongly with IQ. Furthermore, it is known 
that the use of explicit strategies usually changes performance on implicit learning procedures 
(e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007) and that differences between diagnostic groups on an 
ostensibly implicit task can be attributable to differences in the explicit rather than the implicit 
component of the task (Koenig, et al., 2008). Therefore, in order to identify more clearly whether 
the reviewed ASC differences relied on implicit or explicit learning processes, implicit learning 
procedures are needed that have not been specifically adapted for use with ASC children, and 
thus better avoid the use of explicit strategies. On such procedures, it is well established that the 
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underlying complexity of the information to be learned makes it much more difficult for explicit 
strategies to emerge. Study II used four such unadapted procedures (AGL, SRT, CC, and PCL).5 
The reason for using four, rather than just a single test as in many of the studies above, is 
that implicit learning tasks necessitate psychological processes in addition to learning, such as 
encoding and selective attention, and furthermore different implicit learning tasks make different 
demands of such processes (e.g., Seger, 1994; Squire, Knowlton, & Musen, 1993). Therefore, in 
order to control for variations in task demands and to allow conclusions about implicit learning 
in general, it is critical to compare the performance of the same individuals on a range of implicit 
learning procedures. To illustrate the point, there have been several disorders in which 
impairment has been reported on one implicit learning task, but has not been replicated on 
another, including dyslexia (e.g., Folia, et al., 2008); Huntington’s disease (e.g., Knowlton, 
Squire, et al., 1996); Parkinson’s disease (e.g., Knowlton, Mangels, et al., 1996; cf, P. J. Reber & 
Squire, 1999); and schizophrenia (Horan, et al., 2008; cf, Keri, et al., 2000). 
The two groups were also assessed on an explicit learning task, Paired-Associates 
Learning (PAL). It has been argued above that explicit learning was unintentionally measured in 
several previous attempts to assess implicit learning, and as a consequence of using groups that 
were unmatched for IQ it was the explicit processes that were responsible for an ASC 
performance deficit. The validity of this explanation can be explored by including an overtly 
explicit task, and then comparing the relative patterns of implicit and explicit learning 
performance in both matched and unmatched groups. Further, the inclusion of the PAL allowed 
the assessment of another feature in the theory of implicit learning deficits in ASC. Specifically, 
L. G. Klinger and colleagues (2007) have argued that children with ASC actually use explicit 
processes to compensate for deficits in implicit learning. Clearly this idea is predicated upon the 
relative preservation of the explicit over implicit learning, and is thereby tested through a 
comparison of the relative performances on implicit and explicit learning tasks. L. G. Klinger 
and colleagues (2007) have ostensibly made such a comparison. However, their measures of 
                                                 
5 A fifth task was also used – the IFL task. The specific procedure of this IFL task was the same as reported 
in Study I. However, the task appeared to be inappropriate for children - there was no evidence of learning. 
Consequently, the task was unable to address the question of whether there were implicit learning differences 
between ASC and TD children. Thus, for the sake of clarity, the task is not discussed further in this chapter (see 
Appendix B for the analysis of IFL task performance, which produced no evidence of learning). 
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explicit learning were actually IQ tests, which did not involve any learning during the course of 
their experiment. 
As discussed, the current literature on implicit learning in ASC highlights different 
findings between studies. Given this conflict, and in the context of preserved and enhanced 
abilities in ASC (Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert, & Burack, 2006), it is also necessary that 
analyses should properly consider the possibility that implicit learning is preserved in ASC. To 
this end, Study II employed equivalence analysis (Rogers, Howard, & Vessey, 1993; Stegner, 
Bostrom, & Greenfield, 1996) to consider all learning data, and consequently does not rely on a 
failure to reject a null hypothesis as a reason to suppose that performance is preserved in ASC. 
Finally, in order to conclude that implicit learning deficit plays a direct role in the social, 
language and motor deficits common to ASC, it would be necessary but not sufficient to 
demonstrate performance deficits on a variety of implicit learning tasks. Additionally, 
performance on implicit learning tasks would have to be related to an index of such diagnostic 
deficits (L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007). Therefore, in Study II the parents of participants were asked 
to complete the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ: Rutter, Bailey, Lord, & Berument, 
2003). The SCQ provided a reliable index of autistic symptomatology, which was related to 
implicit learning performance. 
The primary aim was to test the hypothesis that individuals with ASC would show 
performance deficits on a range of implicit learning tasks, which could not be attributed to other 
factors such as explicit strategies or task demands. In brief, the study found no support for this 
hypothesis; instead there was evidence of equivalence (Rogers, et al., 1993; Stegner, et al., 1996) 
between individuals with and without ASC on implicit learning procedures. This was not a 
consequence of compensation by explicit learning ability or IQ. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence to relate implicit learning to an index of ASC symptomatology. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
31 children with ASC (referred to as the ASC group) and 31 Typically-Developing 
children (referred to as the TD group) were included in the study. All children in the ASC group 
met established criteria for ASC, such as those specified in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
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Association, 1994) and had previously received a diagnosis for ASC by trained clinicians using 
instruments such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview (Le Couteur, Lord, & Rutter, 2003). Any 
other psychiatric diagnosis acted as an exclusion criterion for both the ASC and TD group. The 
two groups of children were matched for sex (3 females) and chronological age (t(55) = .28, p = 
.78, d = 0.07) but differed on Verbal IQ (t(50) = 1.83, p = .07, d = 0.47), Performance IQ (t(52) = 
1.83, p = .07, d = 0.47) and Full Scale IQ (t(49) = 2.04, p = .05, d = 0.52) of the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI: Wechsler, 1999), see Table 12. A subgroup from each 
group of children was selected who were matched for IQ. The sub groups comprised 26 children 
with ASC and 26 children with TD. These children were matched for sex (2 females), 
chronological age (t(50) = .88, p = .39, d = 0.24), Verbal IQ (t(50) = .61, p = .55, d = 0.17), 
Performance IQ (t(45) = .51, p = .61, d = 0.14) and Full Scale IQ (t(44) = .71, p = .48, d = 0.20) 
of the WASI, and all had IQs within the typical range (the lowest score was 83), see Table 12. 
The main analyses were conducted on the data from these subgroups. However, a final analysis 
was conducted using the entire sample, in order to examine the role of IQ in explicit and implicit 
learning. Table 12 presents the participant characteristics for both the entire groups and the 
subgroups matched for IQ. 
Informed parental consent and the assent of the children were obtained, and ethical 
permission to conduct the study received from the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee. 18 of the parents of children with ASC (15 of the ASC-subgroup) and 23 of the 
parents of TD children (19 of the TD-subgroup) completed the SCQ (Rutter, et al., 2003). The 
SCQ is a screening tool for autism, which comprises 40 items derived from the ADI-R. The raw 
scores on the SCQ were converted into percentage scores. All the children in the TD group had 
scores below the cut-off score of 38.46 % specified by Rutter and colleagues (M = 10.43 %, SD 
= 7.14 %, range = 2.56 – 33.33 %; for the TD-subgroup M = 10.87 %, SD = 7.71 %, range = 2.56 
– 33.33 %). Further, the highest score for the TD group was 5.49 standard deviations (5.11 
standard deviations for the subgroup) below the mean of the ASC group (M = 72.59 %, SD = 
15.82 %, range = 30.77 % – 92.31 %; for the ASC-subgroup M = 72.75 %, SD = 17.24 %, range 
= 30.77 % – 92.31 %). 
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Table 12. Mean Age (in years) and WASI IQ Scores for the ASC and TD Groups 
Measure Entire sample 
 TD (N = 31)  ASC (N = 31)  
 M SD R  M SD R  
Chronological age 11.7 1.5 8.9 – 14.3  11.6 1.1 8.7 – 14.4  
Verbal IQ 106.9 11.6 81 – 127  99.7 18.5 65 – 147  
Performance IQ 107.0 12.3 81 – 135  99.5 18.9 62 – 136  
Full-scale IQ 107.8 11.5 88 – 135  99.6 19.2 66 – 147  
 IQ-matched sub-groups 
 TD (N = 26)  ASC (N =26)  
 M SD R  M SD R  
Chronological age 11.8 1.6 8.9 – 14.3  11.5 1.2 8.7 – 14.4  
Verbal IQ 104.3 10.5 81 – 122  102.2 13.5 76 – 122  
Performance IQ 104.1 10.9 81 – 127  102.2 15.7 74 – 132  
Full-scale IQ 104.7 9.4 88 – 122  102.4 14.1 83 – 126  
2.2. Apparatus 
A fourteen-inch LCD notebook computer was used for all computerised testing. For the 
SRT and CC tasks, timing accuracy was of the utmost importance, therefore these tasks were 
presented using DMDX software and participants recorded their responses using a four-button 
PIO12 response box (Forster & Forster, 2003). Other tasks were presented using: SuperLab Pro 
for the AGL Task; RealBasic for the PCL; and Inquisit for the PAL. For all these tasks, 
responses were recorded using the notebook’s keyboard. 
2.3. Tasks and Procedure 
2.3.1. Implicit Learning Tasks 
 Contextual Cueing (CC) task 
A continuous version of the CC task was used, in which successive trials followed each 
other with minimal delay (50 ms) and were not preceded by a fixation point. Jiménez and 
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Vázquez (in press) have shown that this procedure results in levels of learning similar to the 
usual discrete version developed by Chun and Jiang (1998). In addition, Jiménez and Vázquez’s 
(in press) procedure was followed by using four different responses instead of the usual two-
alternative task. This procedure was chosen to make the motor requirements of this task more 
comparable to those required by the SRT task (see below). Therefore, should specific deficits 
have emerged, those deficits could have been more confidently attributed to differences in 
learning rather than motor capabilities. 
Instead of using rotated Ts and Ls for target and distractor stimuli respectively, the 
participants were required to detect and identify as quickly and accurately as possible an even 
number presented among distractors, which were odd numbers. The target numbers (2, 4, 6 or 8) 
were presented among seven distractor stimuli of the same numerical identity (1’s, 3’s, 5’s or 
7’s). Participants responded by pressing buttons corresponding to the target’s numerical identity 
(2, 4, 6 or 8) on a four-button response box. Jiménez and Vázquez (2009) have also shown that 
learning is unaffected by replacing letter-stimuli with number-stimuli. 
 
Figure 3. Examples of the stimuli presented to participants in the CC task. On the left, the target 
is 8 and the distractors are 1s; on the right, the target is 2 and the distractors are 5s. 
As depicted in Figure 3, on each trial there were two stimuli of each colour, with stimuli 
evenly distributed over the four quadrants of the display and filling 8 of 16 possible stimuli 
locations from a 4 x 4 invisible matrix. Within a trial, all the distractors had the same numerical 
identity, however, the precise combination of location, identity and colour of distractors created a 
context for the location of a target on each trial. 40 such combinations were generated and each 
context was always associated with the same target location but a changing target identity. 8 
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high-frequency contexts were repeated frequently (24 times within each session) and 32 low-
frequency contexts were repeated infrequently (on average 6 times per session). Each high-
frequency context was associated with a unique target location, while sets of 4 low-frequency 
contexts were each associated with a different one of the remaining 8 possible target locations. 
Of the sets of 4 low-frequency contexts associated with a given target location, each context was 
characterized by a different distractor identity, as well as by a different distribution of locations 
and colours. Similarly, of the 8 high-frequency contexts, two contexts contained 1’s, two 
contained 3’s, two contained 5’s and two contained 7’s and were each characterised by a 
different distribution of distractor locations and colours. Thus, all target locations were equally 
cued, and all distractor identities, colours and locations were equally present. However, the 
precise combination of distractor location, identity and colour in the high frequency contexts 
provided greater opportunity than the combinations in the low frequency contexts for participants 
to be cued to the location of the target in order for the participant to determine its numerical 
identity.  
Each experimental block consisted of 48 trials. Half of all trials within a block contained 
high-frequency contexts and the remaining half low frequency contexts. These different trial-
types (high frequency and low frequency contexts) were randomly intermixed for every 
experimental block (1-8). The session began with a short practice block, consisting of 8 low-
frequency context trials, after which it was ensured that the participant had understood the 
demands of the task. Between each block, the experimenter provided the participant with 
feedback about their accuracy and reaction times (RTs). Feedback was provided following any 
trial on which a participant made an error, by presenting the word “Error” at the top of the 
screen for 150 ms before the next trial was presented. At the start of each session, the solid lines 
creating the quadrant (see Figure 3) were presented and remained on the screen for the entire 
block. Each trial begun with the presentation of distractors and target and was terminated 
following a response. Trials were separated from one another by a 50 ms response-to-stimulus 
interval, intended to minimise the development of explicit strategies. Learning was measured by 
comparing each participant’s RT in response to the high-frequency trials and the low-frequency 
trials. 
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 Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task 
The same SRT task was used as detailed in Chapter II.2.3.2. The one difference between 
the two tasks was that in this study participants pressed buttons on a four-button response box 
rather than a keyboard.  
 Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task 
The same AGL task was used as detailed in Chapter II.2.3.2.  
 Probabilistic Classification Learning (PCL) task 
A version of the PCL task developed by Aczél (2006) and Shohamy and colleagues 
(2004) was used. During a learning phase, participants were told that they would be selling ice 
cream in an ice cream shop and that ‘customers’ would come in to buy vanilla or chocolate ice 
cream cones (see Figure 4). Each time a customer would visit, they would have to try to guess 
whether the customer would like vanilla or chocolate. After each guess of vanilla or chocolate, 
participants received feedback on which flavour the customers would have preferred (outcome); 
the word “correct” in white or “wrong” in red were displayed at the bottom of the screen for 
600 ms, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms. The customers (stimuli) were displayed for 500 
ms before participants could respond; participants responded by pressing the ‘Z’ key to guess 
chocolate and the ‘.’ key to guess vanilla. Participants were prompted to “please respond now” 
after 1500 ms and the trial timed out with the message “no response” after 5000 ms. When 
participants responded correctly, a coin was added to their ‘tip jar’ in the ice cream shop. 
 




Figure 4. Illustration of PCL task. Presented above are computer screengrabs from the moment 
after a participant had made their guess during the learning phase, either correctly (as depicted 
in the left screengrab) or incorrectly (as depicted in the right screengrab). The screengrabs show 
two different examples of stimuli (the stimulus on the left has Cue 1 and Cue 4 present, the 
stimulus on the right has Cue 2, Cue 3 and Cue 4 present – see Table 13). 
‘MrPotatoHead’ toy photographs (see Figure 4) were used as the stimuli that appeared on 
each trial. 14 different stimuli were created by changing the presence or absence of four discrete 
cues on the basic MrPotatoHead figure (e.g., moustache or glasses). The combination of cues 
used was identical to those used by Shohamy and colleagues (2004), and is shown in Table 13.  
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Table 13. The Stimuli and Probability Structure of the PCL Task 
Stimulus Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 P (stimulus) P (vanilla|stimulus) 
A 0 0 0 1 .136 .143 
B 0 0 1 0 .079 .375 
C 0 0 1 1 .089 .111 
D 0 1 0 0 .079 .625 
E 0 1 0 1 .061 .167 
F 0 1 1 0 .061 .667 
G 0 1 1 1 .042 .250 
H 1 0 0 0 .136 .857 
I 1 0 0 1 .061 .333 
J 1 0 1 0 .061 .833 
K 1 0 1 1 .033 .333 
L 1 1 0 0 .089 .889 
M 1 1 0 1 .033 .667 
N 1 1 1 0 .042 .750 
Note: Cue 1 = brown moustache, cue 2 = red hat, cue 3 = blue glasses, cue 4 = bow tie. Each 
cue could be present (1) or absent (0) for each stimulus. The all-present (1111) and all-absent 
(0000) stimuli were never used. On any trial during the learning phase, there was a given 
probability of each of the 14 stimuli appearing (P(stimulus)), and a dynamic stimulus-outcome 
probability for each of these 14 stimuli. During the test phase, when feedback is removed, the 
stimulus-outcome probability is static (P(vanilla|stimulus)). All stimuli appeared equally often 
during the test phase. The overall probability of the vanilla outcome across all stimuli is 50 %. 
 Using the 14 stimuli, 214 trials were constructed for the learning phase. As a 
consequence of the feedback, each stimulus became probabilistically associated with an 
outcome. Across the entire learning phase the two outcomes (preference for vanilla or chocolate) 
were equally probable across all stimuli. Once participants completed the learning phase, they 
undertook the test phase, which was identical to the learning phase with the exception that 
feedback was no longer provided. With the removal of feedback about the outcome, participants 
were required to rely on the probabilities between the stimuli and outcomes (stimulus-outcome 
probabilities) that they had experienced during the learning phase. The stimulus-outcome 
probabilities between the stimuli varied from near chance (62.5 %) to almost certain (88.9 %), as 
detailed in Table 13. The test phase consisted of 70 trials with each of the 14 stimuli being 
shown 5 times. Trials presenting the 14 different stimuli were randomly intermixed during both 
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learning and test phases. Both the percentage of correct guesses, according to which outcome 
was more likely (above 50 %), and the extent to which this percentage correct matched with the 
stimulus-outcome probabilities were taken as indices of learning. 
2.3.2. The Explicit Task 
 Paired-Associates Learning (PAL) task 
Participants were instructed that they should try to learn a series of 3-letter word-pairs 
(e.g., bun-cab). During this learning phase, they were shown the first word of a pair for 2500 ms 
and then the second word such that both words were on screen for a further 2500 ms. Participants 
were shown a total of 15 word pairs in this way, with a response-to-stimulus interval of 200 ms. 
In the following test phase, participants were sequentially presented with the first word from 
each of the pairs and were instructed to provide the word with which it was paired, or to skip the 
trial if they had not learnt the pair. If the response was correct, the message ‘Correct!’ 
immediately appeared on the screen and remained together with the correct word pair for 2500 
ms. An incorrect response yielded the message ‘Wrong!’ with the simultaneous replacement of 
the incorrect word with the correct answer, and together the message and pair remained for 2500 
ms. This whole process was repeated 4 times. Pairs appeared in the same order between 
equivalent learning and testing blocks, but pair order was randomised across blocks (e.g., pair 
order was the same for learning 1 and testing 1 but different between learning and testing 1 and 
learning and testing 2). Learning is indexed by the number of pairs correctly reproduced in each 
test phase (B. J. Underwood, Boruch, & Malmi, 1978). All words were one-syllable, three-
lettered, not infrequent (Thorndike & Lorge, 1944), and regularly spelt, concrete nouns. All 
words had an age-of-acquisition of less than 7 years according to either Morrison and colleagues’ 
(1997) norms or acquired teacher-ratings (which correlated well with Morrison and colleagues’ 
(1997) limited norms, r = .82, p = .01, r2 = .67). 
2.3.3. General procedure 
All testing was conducted at the participants’ schools and participants were tested 
individually in quiet, unused classrooms. Each session lasted approximately 50 minutes with 
participants taking as many sessions as necessary to complete the tasks, with the constraint that 
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no session would break-up a task. Most participants completed the tests within 3 or 4 sessions, 
and a minority (2 children) completed testing within 5 sessions. For all the computerised tasks, 
participants were seated approximately 50 cm away from the laptop. Prior to each task, they 
were provided with written and oral instructions. The WASI was administered according to the 
standardised testing procedure. Task and trial order were fixed across participants because the 
between-group comparison was most important and such fixing minimises the relevant noise and 
facilitates the most accurate comparison. Further, the order in which the tasks were completed 
was carefully selected in order to minimise the possibility of priming participants into an explicit 
mind-set, as it has been demonstrated that explicit instructions increase the contribution of 
explicit processes on implicit procedures (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007). Therefore, 
participants completed the tasks in the following order: PCL, CC, AGL, SRT, WASI IQ Test, 
PAL, and Explicit Interview. The Explicit Interview consisted of a post-task questionnaire about 
the incidental structures in each of the implicit learning tasks. 
3. Results 
For all analyses, the alpha level was set at .05, two-tailed and extreme outliers (values 
either less than three times the interquartile range below the lower quartile, or greater than three 
times the interquartile range above the upper quartile) were excluded. Where relevant, the 
appropriate epsilon correction was used when sphericity was violated. Šidák corrections were 
used to control for familywise error rates during multiple comparisons (Cardinal & Aitken, 2006, 
pp. 87-90). Where significant interactions were found in mixed analyses of variance, separate 
ANOVAs on the levels of interest were conducted to establish simple effects. When conducting 
independent sample t-tests, equal sample variances were assumed unless Levene’s test for the 
equality of variances was significant. Cohen’s d is reported as a measure of effect size except 
where relative measures of effect size are more appropriate, and then partial eta-squared (η2p) is 
reported. In all reported equivalence analyses (Rogers, et al., 1993; Stegner, et al., 1996), random 
within-subject variability in the TD group was used to determine the between-group equivalence 
threshold. 
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3.1. CC and SRT Analysis 
In the RT analyses for both SRT and CC, RTs on error trials were discarded. First trial 
data were excluded for the SRT, since meaningful assessment can only occur when the stimuli 
have been presented sequentially. Figure 5 represents the mean RT (ms) difference between trial-
types across blocks on CC (top panel) and SRT (bottom panel). A difference score greater than 
zero indicates that participants responded faster to the high-frequency contexts in CC and the 
probable trials in SRT. Clearly, there is evidence of learning: difference scores were above zero 
and, on average, difference scores after the first block tended to be greater than those on the first 
block. Mixed analyses of variance conducted on mean RTs supported this interpretation, each 
had one between-subject factor of Group (ASC vs. TD), and two within-subjects factors, Trial-
Type (High-frequency vs. Low-frequency in CC and Probable vs. Improbable in SRT) and Block 
(1-8 in CC and 1-9 in SRT). In both analyses, there was a main effect of Trial-Type (CC: F(1, 
50) = 27.74, p < .001, η2p = .36; SRT: F(1, 50) = 57.25, p < .001, η
2
p = .53), Block (CC: F(4, 219) 
= 18.24, p < .001, η2p = .27; SRT: F(4, 211) = 18.04, p < .001, η
2
p = .27), and an interaction 
between Trial-Type x Block (CC: F(7, 328) = 2.30, p = .03, η2p = .04; SRT: F(7, 350) = 11.32, p 
< .001, η2p = .19).  






Figure 5. TD and ASC groups displayed similar learning on the CC and SRT tasks. Depicted are 
the mean RT differences between high and low-frequency contexts on the CC (top panel) and 
probable and improbable trials on the SRT (bottom panel) across training for different groups. 
The error bars show twice the standard error of differences between group means at different 
levels of block. 
Figure 5 demonstrates that the RT difference scores for both tasks were very closely 
matched between the groups. Indeed, there was no evidence of group differences in learning in 
either analysis: on both tasks there was no Group x Trial-Type interaction (CC: F(1, 50) = 1.52, 
p = .22, η2p = .03; SRT: F(1, 50) = 0.12, p = .73, η
2
p < .01), or between Group x Trial-Type x 
Block (CC: F(7, 328) = 1.37, p = .25, η2p = .03; SRT: F(6, 298) = .50, p = .80, η
2
p = .01). This 




















































CHAPTER III  79   
 
 
= .25) on these relevant Group interactions for both SRT and CC (calculated using G*Power, 
Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). However, regardless of this sizeable power, in order 
that the study did not rely on a failure to reject a null hypothesis as a reason to suppose that 
performance is preserved in ASC, equivalence analyses were employed to determine the 
equivalence of the learning (e.g., Rogers, et al., 1993). Equivalence analyses were performed on 
average proportional increase in RT differences across blocks for both tests; this learning index 
was used because the analysis necessitates an overall score. The analyses rejected the hypotheses 
of non-equivalence for both tests (CC: t(50) = 4.47, p < .001; SRT: t(50) = 4.44, p < .001; see 
Appendix B for more details of these equivalence analyses) and allowed the conclusion that the 
groups are statistically equivalent in their overall learning on each task. 
On the CC, there was a main effect of Group (F(1, 50) = 8.03, p = .01, η2p = .14) with 
mean RTs slower in the ASC group, and no evidence of a Block x Group interaction (F(4, 219) = 
0.97, p = .43, η2p = .02). Given that CC learning was equivalent between the groups, this main 
effect reflected an ASC difference in baseline speed. On the SRT, the effect of Group was not 
significant (F(1, 50) = 3.13, p = .08, η2p = .06) but there was an interaction between Group x 
Block (F(4, 211) = 4.15, p < .01, η2p = .08). Given that SRT learning was equivalent between the 
groups, this interaction reflected a differential effect of general practice on baseline speed. 
Inspection of the RTs averaged across Trial-Type implied that the ASC group took longer to 
benefit from practice on the SRT: during the initial blocks the ASC group had slower baseline 
speeds than the TD group but during the later blocks, once there had been sufficient opportunity 
for practice, the groups responded equally quickly. Consistent with this interpretation, there was 
a significant linear contrast for the differences between groups to become smaller as blocks 
progressed (F(1, 50) = 6.34, p = .02, η2p = .11). 
The slowness in the baseline speed of the ASC group, throughout the CC and early in the 
SRT, is reflective of typical motor difficulties (e.g., G. Allen, Müller, & Courchesne, 2004; 
Dowell, Mahone, & Mostofsky, 2009). To examine whether such differences in baseline speed 
mask differences in learning, two transformations are possible: Barnes and colleagues (2008) 
have suggested transforming the dependent variable into a measure that expresses learning as a 
proportion of baseline speed (the difference in speed between trial-types/mean speed on low-
frequency or improbable trials); Jiménez and Vázquez (2008) have proposed a Z-score 
transformation as a means of better analysing group differences in learning on implicit RT tasks. 
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Analyses of both transformations provided exactly the same pattern of results, thereby 
reinforcing the conclusion that the groups were equivalent in their amount of overall learning on 
both the SRT and CC. 
There was a small percentage of errors on the SRT, and these errors were similar between 
the groups (TD: M = 8.42 %; ASC: M = 9.12 %; Standard Error of Difference (SED) = 1.03; 
t(50) = 0.67, p = .50, d = 0.17). Song, Howard and Howard (2007) have shown that errors on the 
SRT also index learning; fewer errors on the probable compared to the improbable trials indicate 
participants must have learnt about the sequence. Thus, a mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
SRT error data, using the same factors as the RT analysis. These were entirely consistent with 
the RT analyses presented above: errors were greater on improbable trials and this difference 
tended to increase across blocks (Trial-Type (F(1, 50 = 27.67, p < .001, η2p = .36; Block F(7, 
369) = 3.77, p < .001, η2p = .07; Trial-Type x Block (F(8, 400) = 4.16, p < .001, η
2
p = .08), while 
there was no evidence of any differences between the groups (Group x Trial-Type (F(1, 50) < 
0.01, p = .96, η2p < .01; Group x Block Group x Block: F(7, 369) = 0.52, p = .83, η
2
p = .01; 
Group x Trial-Type x Block (F(8, 400) = .63, p = .75, η2p = .01.). An inspection of the data, 
together with a simple effects analysis of the Trial-Type x Block interaction, investigating the 
effect of block at each of the two levels of Trial-Type, revealed that the learning (i.e., increase in 
the difference between trial-types across block) was reflected by participants making more 
mistakes on improbable trials (F(8, 400) = 4.52, p < .001, η2p = .08) rather than fewer mistakes 
on probable trials (F(6, 278) = 1.32, p = .25, η2p = .03). A failure to detect increased accuracy on 
probable trials, in spite of SRT learning and general practice, is common on SRT tasks (Song, et 
al., 2007) and can be attributed to a ceiling effect: accuracy is high from the beginning of the 
task. In the context of this ceiling effect and the resulting insensitivity, it was unsurprising that 
there was no evidence from this analysis of errors to support the finding from the RT analysis 
that the ASC group benefitted from general practice more than the TD group. 
There was also a small percentage of errors on the CC with the ASC group making 
significantly fewer errors than the TD group (TD: M = 6.93 %; ASC: M = 2.95 %; SED = 0.94 
%; U = 134.00, p < .001, d = 1.18). However, the difference in errors between trial-types has 
been found not to index learning on the CC task (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 1998; Chun & Jiang, 2003). 
This finding was replicated (Mean difference between trial-type = -0.13 %, SED = 0.28 %, t(51) 
= 0.47, p = .64, d = 0.06), and there was also no evidence of a group difference in this tendency 
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(TD: M = 0.08 %; ASC: M = 0.18 %; SED = 0.56 %; t(50) = 0.18, p = .86, d = 0.05). Therefore, 
the superior overall accuracy of the ASC group provided no evidence of differences in learning, 
and was instead probably a reflection of the finding that ASC individuals sometimes display 
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (Mottron, et al., 2006). 
3.2. AGL and PCL Analysis 
In both AGL and PCL, the dependent variable was the percentage of correct answers 
given above the 50 % chance level during their respective test phases. For the AGL, an answer 
that accurately classified a string (‘Yes’ to grammatical strings and ‘No’ to ungrammatical 
strings) was deemed correct. For the PCL, a guess that corresponded with the more likely 
outcome for that stimulus was judged correct. One-sample t-tests demonstrated the basic learning 
effect in both the PCL (M = 6.84 %, SEM = 1.36 %, t(51) = 5.05, p < .001, d = 0.70) and AGL 
(M = 3.28 %, SEM = 1.12 %, t(51) = 2.93, p = .01, d = 0.41). Independent sample t-tests on the 
group means provided no evidence of a difference between the groups for both the PCL (TD: M 
= 4.95 %; ASC: M = 8.74 %; SED = 2.68 %; t(41) = 1.41, p = .17, d = 0.39) and the AGL (TD: 
M = 3.35 %; ASC: M = 3.20 %; SED = 2.26 %; t(50) = 0.07, p = .94, d = 0.02). Furthermore, 
subsequent equivalence analyses (e.g., Rogers, et al., 1993) rejected the hypotheses of non-
equivalence (PCL: t(50) = 3.37, p < .01; AGL: t(50) = 4.49, p < .001; see Appendix B for more 
details of these equivalence analyses) and allowed the conclusion that the groups were 
statistically equivalent in their overall learning on each task. 
To consider the PCL performance in greater detail, percentage correct above chance was 
considered at different levels of stimulus-outcome probability. Figure 6 demonstrates that 
percentage correct increased with the stimulus-outcome probability, and that the two groups’ 
performance was closely matched. A mixed analysis of variance was conducted, with one 
between-subject factor of Group (ASC and TD) and one within-subject factor of Stimulus-
Outcome Probability (probabilities of .63, .67, .75, .83, .86 & .89). A main effect of Stimulus-
Outcome Probability (F(4, 185) = 3.72, p = .01, η2p = .07) together with a significant linear 
contrast for percentage correct to increase with probability (F(1, 50) = 10.35, p < .01, η2p = .17) 
established that participants learnt more about more likely outcomes, while there was no 
evidence of group differences (Group: F(1, 50) = 1.09, p = .30, η2p = .02; Group x Stimulus-
Outcome Probability: F(4, 185) = 0.77, p = .54, η2p = .02). The performance of participants 
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during the learning phase of the PCL was also considered, in order to investigate the 
development of the learning. Feedback was still provided during the learning phase, so stimulus-
outcome probability was not fixed and is not considered in this part of the analysis. However, for 
every trial included in this analysis, a stimulus was always more strongly associated with one 
outcome than the other, and therefore an assessment of performance during the learning phase is 
still meaningful. For this purpose, the learning phase was split into 4 blocks (excluding the first 
presentation of stimuli and any trial on which stimulus-outcome probability was 50 %): trials 1-
48, 49-96, 97-145, and 146-194. A mixed analysis of variance was conducted on the percentage 
correct above chance during the PCL learning phase, with one between-subject factor of Group 
(ASC and TD) and one within-subject factor of Block (Block 1-4). A main effect of Block (F(3, 
150) = 2.76, p = .04, η2p = .05), together with a linear trend for performance to increase, showed 
that learning emerged across training. Again there was no evidence of any differences between 
the groups (Group: F(1, 50) = 0.76, p = .39, η2p = .02; Group x Block: F(3, 150) = 0.02, p > .99, 
η2p < .01). Additionally, a strategy analysis (e.g., Gluck, et al., 2002) was performed on this data, 
and demonstrated that the equivalent overall performance was also underpinned by a similarity 
in the implicit learning ‘strategies’ used by the groups (see Appendix B for details of this 
strategy analysis). 




Figure 6. TD and ASC groups showed similar learning about more likely outcomes on the PCL 
task. Presented are mean percentage of correct guesses that were provided above chance by 
participants on the PCL test phase. This score is presented for the two groups at the different 
levels of stimulus-outcome probability. The error bars show twice the standard error of 
differences between group means at different levels of stimulus-outcome probability. 
3.3. PAL Analysis 
The dependent variable was the percentage of correct responses given during the test 
blocks. The provision of a word pair that corresponded with its cue constituted a correct 
response. Each test block was preceded by a learning block. Therefore, the increase in 
performance across test blocks represented an improvement in performance due to learning, see 
Figure 7. A mixed analysis of variance, with one between-subject factor of Group (ASC vs. TD) 
and one within-subject factor of Block (4 levels) supported this interpretation: a main effect of 
Block (F(2, 102) = 80.73, p < .001, η2p = .62), together with a significant linear contrast with 
performance increasing across blocks (F(1, 50) = 133.90, p < .001, η2p = .73), established that 
learning had occurred. While the TD group numerically outperformed the ASC group on every 
test block, see Figure 7, there was no evidence for an effect of Group, (F(1, 50) = 1.30, p = .26, 
η2p = .03) nor for an interaction of Group x Block (F(2, 102) = .62, p = .54, η
2
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subsequent equivalence analysis on overall test performance revealed there was also no evidence 
of equivalence (t(50) = 0.76, p = .22; see Appendix B for more details of this equivalence 
analysis). 
 
Figure 7. The TD group displayed a numerically, but not statistically, superior performance to 
the ASC group on the PAL task. Depicted are mean percentage of correct responses that 
participants from different groups provided on test blocks in the PAL task. The error bars show 
twice the standard error of differences between group means at different levels of block. 
To address the ambiguity presented by finding no evidence of either difference or 
equivalence in the analyses of the PAL, the possible role of IQ in the current implicit and explicit 
learning tests was considered. Specifically, a series of further analyses were conducted on all the 
tests but this time including an additional 5 children per group. While the addition of these extra 
children resulted in the same mean age and sex between groups, the groups were no longer 
matched on IQ (see ‘Entire Sample’ in Table 12 for participant characteristics). The analysis of 
the PAL data revealed that the ASC group performed worse than the TD group (TD: M = 50.70 
%; ASC: M = 39.41 %; SED = 5.39 %; main effect of Group, F(1, 60) = 4.39, p = .04, η2p = .07), 
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analyses of all implicit learning tests on the entire groups unmatched for IQ showed an identical 
pattern of preservation of implicit learning to those conducted on the matched groups. 
Finally, there was one further finding that also suggested that explicit processing may be 
more problematic than implicit processing in ASCs. During the learning phase of the AGL, the 
mean number of errors that participants made before correctly reproducing each letter string was 
significantly greater in ASC than TD participants (TD: M = 1.00; ASC: M = 1.48; SED = 0.20; 
t(36) = 2.47, p = .02, d = 0.68). Unsurprisingly, this result was the same, although the effect was 
more pronounced, when the groups were unmatched for IQ. These errors are indicative of a 
participant’s ability to explicitly remember and reproduce letter strings in the short-term, and 
have been used previously as a measure of explicit processing that is related to IQ (e.g., A. S. 
Reber, et al., 1991). These explicit processes are separate to those processes mediating implicit 
learning performance on the test phase of the AGL (e.g., A. S. Reber, et al., 1991). Indeed, the 
errors were not related to implicit learning on the AGL task in either group even when the two 
groups were considered as the entire sample (see Table 12; TD: r = -.40, N = 31, p = .06, r2 = .16; 
ASC: r = .02, N = 31, p = .99, r2 < .01). 
3.4. Explicit Interviews 
Post-task questionnaires indicated that participants of both groups could not freely report 
what they had learnt on the CC, SRT, AGL and PCL tasks. No further attempts were made to 
establish quantitatively the extent to which the products of learning were consciously retrievable 
because it was feared such post-task probing would encourage explicit strategies on subsequent 
implicit learning tasks (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007). Also, consistent with the 
interpretation that performance was implicit on these versions of the implicit learning tasks, there 
was no evidence of a correlation between performance on the implicit learning tasks and IQ in 
neither the TD nor ASC group. This was true even when each of the two groups were considered 
as entire samples, who were not matched for IQ, and therefore contained a large range of IQs 
(see Table 12; TD: range of Pearson’s r = -.08 to .32, N = 31, ps > .05, r2 ≤ .10; ASC: range of 
Pearson’s r = .08 to .40, N = 31, ps > .05, r2 ≤ .16). 
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3.5. SCQ Analysis 
The relationships were analysed between scores on the SCQ and overall indices of 
learning from each task (the average proportional increase in RT differences across blocks was 
used for CC and SRT; mean percentage correct above chance during test phase was used for the 
AGL and PCL; mean percentage of correct responses given during test was used for the PAL). In 
the IQ-matched sub-groups (see Table 12) there was no evidence of correlation between SCQ-
scores and any of the learning tasks in either group (TD: range of Pearson’s r = -.24 to .27, N = 
19, ps > .05, r2 ≤ .07; ASC: range of Pearson’s r = -.23 to .20, N = 15, ps > .05, r2 ≤ .05). 
Similarly, there was no evidence of correlation between SCQ-scores and learning tasks in the 
entire sample of children, who were not matched for IQ (see Table 12; TD: range of Pearson’s r 
= -.27 to .28, N = 23, ps > .05, r2 ≤ .08; ASC: range of Pearson’s r = -.17 to .18, N = 18, ps > .05, 
r2 ≤ .03).  
4. Chapter Discussion 
Performance on the implicit learning tasks reported here is preserved in ASC. Implicit 
learning was intact across a number of tasks that differed in surface features, each feature being 
in some way relevant to certain features of ASC: the PCL had a social element to it, involving 
cartoon faces and characters; the SRT required motor coordination; the CC task involved 
perceptual processing of context; and it has been argued that the AGL’s artificial grammar is 
related to language (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010; Gomez & Gerken, 2000; Kaufman, et al., in 
press).Thus, in contrast to previous studies, Study II found no deficits in implicit learning in ASC 
and suggests that a general deficit in implicit learning processes is not present in ASC. 
Furthermore, implicit learning was not related to an index of ASC symptomatology, the SCQ 
(Rutter, et al., 2003). Together, these findings undermine the argument that such a deficit might 
play a key role in the social, communicative or motor impairments (L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; 
Mostofsky, et al., 2000; Romero-Mungu a, 2008).  
These findings converge with other recent reports of intact implicit learning in ASC. For 
example, Barnes and colleagues, (2008) found preservation on the SRT and CC; Kourkoulou, 
Findlay, and Leekam (2010) on the CC; Travers, Klinger, Mussey, & Klinger (2010) on the SRT. 
Further, it is consistent with intact performance on related incidental procedures such as implicit 
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memory and priming (Bowler, Matthews, & Gardiner, 1997; Gardiner, Bowler, & Grice, 2003; 
Renner, Klinger, & Klinger, 2000).  
This raises the question of possible reasons for the discrepancy with other studies that 
have reported implicit learning deficits (Gordon & Stark, 2007; L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; 
L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000). One possibility that has been suggested by 
others is that the observation of intact implicit learning has been obscured in some studies as a 
consequence of poor matching of IQ between the group with ASC and comparison groups 
(Soulières, Mottron, Saumier, & Larochelle, 2007). For example, in those studies in which 
deficits have been reported, the groups of children with ASC had overall lower IQ scores 
(Gordon & Stark, 2007; L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, 
et al., 2000), raising the possibility that the deficit in implicit learning resulted from reduced 
overall general mental functioning. Interestingly, I did not find support for this possibility in 
Study II: when I included further individuals in the analysis, such that the ASC group’s average 
IQ score was lower than that of the typically developing group (see Table 12), the evidence of 
intact implicit learning in the ASC group remained. In direct contrast, comparing these two 
larger groups unmatched for IQ revealed deficits in ASC in explicit learning (PAL task). This 
observation suggests two important points. First, it reinforces the finding that IQ and explicit 
learning are intimately related, while implicit learning is relatively independent (e.g., Carroll, 
1993; Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press; A. S. Reber, et al., 1991). 
Second, the intact implicit learning observed in this study cannot be accounted for by IQ or 
compensations for poor implicit learning by the use of explicit strategies (cf L. G. Klinger, et al., 
2007). 
Another strong possibility is that the discrepancy between recent studies and the earlier 
ones reporting a deficit in implicit learning results (at least in part) from differences in the 
particulars of the tasks and stimuli employed, rather than from genuine differences in implicit 
learning between children with and without ASC. In particular, studies that have documented 
impairment in implicit learning have used procedures that seemed to have allowed for the greater 
use of explicit strategies (e.g., long response-to-stimulus intervals and deterministic sequences on 
the SRT, Gordon & Stark, 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000; non-probabilistic category learning, L. 
G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007). When both children with ASC and TD 
children use explicit, rather than implicit strategies, to solve the tasks, then the impairments in 
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the groups with ASC may well be accounted for by a poorer explicit, rather than implicit, 
learning performance. This seems a particularly compelling explanation given that 1) explicit, 
but not implicit, learning is closely related to IQ, 2) these studies reporting deficits included 
groups of children with ASC with lower IQ than the comparison groups, and 3) the current 
finding that children with ASC with lower overall IQ than TD children showed deficits in 
explicit learning in the entire sample analysis of explicit learning. Further, the current results also 
demonstrate that when implicit learning procedures are used that better prevent explicit strategies 
from emerging, preservation is found regardless of whether the groups are matched for IQ. 
Whether or not there is a negative effect of explicit strategies on implicit learning tasks that is 
independent of IQ and unique to ASC is not clear. For example, particularly dysfunctional 
strategies or a dysfunctional propensity to use such strategies in ASC would cause such an effect. 
The worse ASC performance on the explicit processing measure taken from the training phase of 
the AGL task would be consistent with this possibility. In order to examine this issue directly, 
Study III compared ASC individuals with IQ-matched TD individuals on an implicit learning 
task that encouraged explicit strategies. 
An issue that is worth emphasising is that on average the current ASC participants were a 
high-functioning group, as defined by IQ. While all the current results, and other studies (e.g., 
Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press; A. S. Reber, et al., 1991), 
emphasise the independence of IQ from implicit learning, it is acknowledged that the interaction 
of low IQ and autism may be an exceptional case. Furthermore, it is now broadly recognised that 
high functioning individuals with autism may constitute one of several subgroups of individuals 
with autistic symptoms, and that the generalizability of research results from this subgroup to 
another is an issue that can only be assessed empirically and cannot be assumed. Unfortunately, 
previous studies of implicit learning in autism cannot inform the issue. First, it is not the case 
that all studies reporting ASC deficits in implicit learning used low-functioning ASC participants 
(L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000). Second and most important, although the 
only two studies to have included low-functioning ASC groups did both report deficits, they 
were also among those to be confounded by the use of groups unmatched for IQ and tasks that 
promoted explicit learning (Gordon & Stark, 2007; L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001). 
Finally, the proposal that implicit learning is intact in ASC seems to contrast with the real 
world difficulties that ASC individuals have with skills associated with an implicit acquisition, 
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such as language, social and motor skills. However, there are, of course, many other processes 
that might be different in ASC, which would be sufficient to disrupt the implicit acquisition of 
those skills, in spite of otherwise intact implicit learning mechanisms. As discussed by Meltzoff 
and colleagues, (2009) what children learn implicitly in the real world is the product of a 
complex interaction between a variety of influences, and is therefore not simply contingent upon 
the functioning of learning mechanisms.  
For example, one possibility is that the real-world ‘implicit’ impairments may result from 
a greater propensity for individuals with ASC to use explicit strategies rather than rely on 
implicit processing. Indeed, there is evidence that for the implicit acquisition of skills to proceed 
normally, implicit learning must not be out-competed or obstructed by explicit strategies (e.g., 
Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Foerde, Knowlton, & Poldrack, 2006; 
Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Hoyndorf & Haider, 2008; Lieberman, et al., 2004; Lleras & Von 
Mühlenen, 2004; Poldrack & Rodriguez, 2004). Therefore, an ASC propensity to approach 
problems using explicit strategies might be sufficient to cause real-world impairment. In line 
with this possibility, there is evidence that ASC individuals are prone to completing learning 
tasks more explicitly than TD individuals (Gidley Larson & Mostofsky, 2008; L. G. Klinger, et 
al., 2007). In addition to this direct evidence, there are many other studies showing that ASC 
individuals are more prone to solving tasks explicitly (e.g., Theory of Mind performance is 
mediated explicitly in ASC Happé, 1995; Hill & Frith, 2003). Therefore if, as I have suggested, 
explicit strategies are overused, then these strategies may interfere with the capacity to learn 
language, social and motor skills implicitly. This interference would be particularly pronounced 
if this imbalance was combined with the use of atypical explicit strategies during learning. I have 
argued above that atypical explicit strategies may exist in ASC and I directly examined the 
possibility in Study III. 
In conclusion, the current data together with that from a number of other researchers 
(Barnes, et al., 2008; Kourkoulou, et al., 2010; Travers, et al., 2010) suggest that individuals with 
ASC can learn implicitly, and that it is unlikely that such processes are directly responsible for 
related real-world impairments in language, social and motor skills. It was acknowledged that 
ASC deficits on implicit learning tasks have also been documented but it was argued that this 
was due to differences in task procedures, in particular, procedures that promoted the use of 
explicit strategies and therefore disadvantaged the ASC groups that were not matched for IQ. In 
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order to determine whether those previously identified implicit learning deficits in ASC resulted 
just from differences IQ, or whether there was also a contribution from an ASC difficulty in 
explicit learning, Study III compared ASC individuals with IQ-matched TD individuals on an 
implicit learning task that encouraged explicit strategies. 
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IV. Explicit Learning on a Simple ‘Serial Reaction Time’ Task in 
Autism Spectrum Conditions: Study III & IV 
1. Introduction 
Implicit learning is thought to be one important mechanism for acquiring social, 
communicative and motor skills (e.g., Kaufman, et al., in press; McLeod & Dienes, 1993; 
Meltzoff, et al., 2009; Perruchet, 2008; A. S. Reber, 1993). Since Autism Spectrum Conditions 
(ASC) are characterized by social, communicative and motor impairments (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) researchers have argued that those impairments in ASC may arise, in part, 
from a general deficit in implicit learning (L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000; 
Romero-Mungu a, 2008). Indeed, initial empirical studies supported the theory by reporting 
deficits on a number of implicit learning procedures, including SRT tasks, (Gordon & Stark, 
2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000); Category Learning tasks, (L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001); and 
AGL tasks, (L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007). However subsequently, there have been several studies 
arguing that implicit learning is actually intact in ASC. Study II reported equivalent performance 
between TD and ASC groups on the AGL, CC, Probabilistic Classification Learning, SRT tasks, 
while other researchers have also reported intact ASC performance on the CC and SRT tasks 
(Barnes, et al., 2008); CC task (Kourkoulou, et al., 2010); and SRT task (Travers, et al., 2010). 
In Chapter III it was argued that one possible reason for the discrepancy between studies 
finding a deficit and those studies that did not was differences in the particulars of the tasks and 
stimuli employed, rather than from genuine differences in implicit learning between children 
with and without ASC. In particular, those studies documenting impairments in implicit learning 
tended to use procedures that allowed for the greater use of explicit strategies. For instance, some 
arranged deterministic sequences with long response-to-stimulus intervals on the SRT task 
(Gordon & Stark, 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000); asked participants to learn about non-
probabilistic categories (Klinger & Dawson, 2001); or used shape- rather than letter- stimuli on 
the AGL task (Klinger, et al., 2007; see Chapter III.1, for more a detailed discussion as to why 
these procedures encourage explicit strategies). The argument is that when both children with 
ASC and TD children use more explicit strategies to solve the tasks, then the impairments in the 
CHAPTER IV  92   
 
 
groups with ASC may well be accounted for by a poorer explicit, rather than implicit, learning 
performance. This interpretation is supported by the fact that researchers found no performance 
differences between TD and ASC children when they used procedures that did not promote such 
explicit strategies (e.g., Study II , Barnes, et al., 2008; Kourkoulou, et al., 2010; Travers, et al., 
2010). 
Reviewing these studies establishes that ASC learning deficits have only resulted when 
explicit strategies were encouraged. The natural conclusion might be that there is an ASC 
explicit learning deficit. However before coming to that conclusion, it is critical to note that in all 
those studies reporting deficits the groups of children with ASC also had overall lower IQ scores 
(Gordon & Stark, 2007; L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, 
et al., 2000). Therefore, the ASC groups showing poorer performance were unduly 
disadvantaged by being of lower general mental ability than the comparison group. This is a 
particularly compelling explanation given that explicit (in contrast with implicit) learning is 
closely related to IQ (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in 
press; A. S. Reber, et al., 1991). Indeed, Study II found that performance on an explicit Paired 
Associates Learning task was not significantly different between the ASC and TD groups as far 
as they were matched for IQ, but that an ASC deficit in explicit learning performance emerged 
when the full (non-IQ-matched) samples were considered. Thus, the available evidence is at least 
consistent with the interpretation that performance differences simply resulted from differences 
in the IQs of the groups.  
However, there are, in fact, persuasive reasons for supposing there might be atypical 
explicit processing in ASC individuals that are independent of IQ, and which could impact 
negatively on certain implicit learning procedures. First, there is evidence of dysfunctional 
explicit strategies during explicit tasks. For example, in Study II an IQ-matched ASC group were 
significantly worse than the typical group on the explicit memorisation phase of the AGL task, 
and there was also a trend for those ASC participants to perform worse on the explicit Paired 
Associates Learning task.  
Second and more generally, there are findings and theories that suggest that the processes 
supporting explicit learning could be impaired in ASC. Explicit learning requires flexibility and 
intentional processing (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), and a large body of research in ASC has 
reported impairments in executive planning (Hill, 2004; O'Hearn, Asato, Ordaz, & Luna, 2008; 
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Russell, 1997a); action in accordance with goals (Crane & Goddard, 2008; Toichi, et al., 2002); 
integrating the larger context (Frith, 2003; Happé & Frith, 2006; Loth, Gómez, & Happé, 
2008b); using prior knowledge (Loth, Gómez, & Happé, 2008a; Mottron, et al., 2006); deploying 
intentional/voluntary attention (Leekam & Moore, 2001); and in understanding own and others’ 
minds and intentions, (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000; Frith, 2001).  
The aim of the present study was therefore to determine whether the differences arising 
between ASC and TD individuals in an implicit learning task that encourages explicit processes 
could be observed independently of IQ, and could be attributed to an atypical way of processing 
explicit knowledge. The study used a simple sequence learning procedure that has been found to 
result in a considerable amount of explicit knowledge. This SRT procedure was combined with a 
contextual cueing task that provides an indirect, ongoing index of the extent to which sequence 
learning is explicit (see below). The idea was that if previous ASC deficits on implicit learning 
procedures that encouraged explicit processing were due to lower IQ in the ASC groups, then 
there should be no difference in performance in the current IQ-matched groups. However, if 
those previous ASC deficits were due to atypical explicit processing while solving the implicit 
tasks, then the performance of the current ASC group should still show some deficits when 
compared with the current IQ-matched TD group.  
1.1. Sequence Learning and Contextual Cueing 
In order to determine whether ASC deficits on implicit learning tasks that encourage 
explicit processes can be observed independently of IQ, the SRT was an ideal task for three 
reasons. First, and most importantly, the literature on sequence learning in ASC conforms to the 
literature review above about implicit learning procedures, ASC deficits and explicit strategies. 
Specifically, there have been two studies that used SRT procedures that encouraged explicit 
processes (both used slowly repeating deterministic sequences) that have both identified a deficit 
(Gordon & Stark, 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000), but in those two studies participants were also 
not matched for IQ. In contrast, there are other studies that used quickly repeating probabilistic 
sequences, and which matched both groups for IQ, and none of them found significant deficits in 
ASC performance (Study II, Barnes, et al., 2008; Travers, et al., 2010). Therefore, it is necessary 
to determine whether the ASC deficits obtained in the first two studies of SRT, which 
encouraged explicit strategies, would have still arisen if the two groups were matched for IQ; in 
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other words, to determine whether there was an independent contribution to ASC deficits on 
SRT procedures encouraging explicit strategies from atypical explicit processing in ASC.  
Second, the conditions that make learning more explicit and less implicit, and vice versa, 
have been thoroughly researched: several studies have established that procedures involving 
slowly repeating, so-called ‘deterministic sequences’ (i.e. sequences that follow a continually 
and slowly repeating sequence without interruption) encourage the development and use of 
explicit strategies to solve the task (e.g., Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001, 2003; Norman, et al., 
2007). 
The third reason for using the SRT task relies on the recent development of an adaptation 
to the SRT task. The adaptation can be used to provide an ongoing assessment of the extent to 
which the sequence learning is explicit. Jiménez and Vázquez (in press) recently demonstrated 
that the sequence learning effect can be acquired and expressed in the context of a search task. 
Further, they showed that, if the search contexts contain information about the location of the 
target, then a contextual cueing effect can be acquired and expressed alongside the sequence 
learning effect. Jiménez and Vázquez adapted the basic contextual cueing procedure to fit with a 
SRT task by using four different responses instead of the usual two-alternative task. In a series of 
experiments to investigate the dual contextual cueing and sequence learning effect, the authors 
established that when the sequence learning was implicit then both implicit contextual cueing 
and sequence learning effects emerged. The sequence learning was considered implicit because 
probabilistic sequences were used and this was verified by participants’ inability to explicitly 
generate examples of the sequence in a post-test generation task. In contrast, in another condition 
in which participants were required to learn deterministic sequences, the contextual cueing effect 
was substantially attenuated. Deterministic sequences were intended to encourage the use of 
explicit learning strategies. This was confirmed by the ability of the participants to explicitly 
generate the sequence that had occurred during a post-test generation task. Thus, only when the 
learning and use of sequence information had been more explicit was the contextual cueing 
effect suppressed. This interpretation was supported by the fact that the contextual cueing effect 
was reinstated in a test block when the relevant deterministic sequence was removed. The 
suppression of the contextual cueing effect therefore reflected the fact that participants were able 
to respond on the basis of their explicit sequence knowledge, and hence no longer needed to 
process the context.  
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Study III used this same modification of the CC task to determine the stage at which the 
two groups explicitly learnt and applied sequence information, by comparing the stage at which 
the groups withdrew their processing of the context. Prior to learning the sequence information 
sufficiently explicitly, learning of the sequence will be implicit and should therefore be 
accompanied by unattenuated contextual cueing. Important to the validity of the use of this 
manipulation for Study III, it has previously been demonstrated that there is intact implicit 
learning performance in ASC individuals on the standard, unmodified CC-task (e.g., Study II, 
Barnes, et al., 2008; Kourkoulou, et al., 2010). It is predicted that if previous poor performance 
in tasks involving both implicit and explicit learning is due to a deficit in explicit learning, then 
the performance of children with ASC would take longer to be dominated by explicit processing, 
and would instead learn implicitly for an extended period. Therefore, I expected this weaker 
explicit learning and continued implicit learning to be manifest in ASC by a reduction in the 
typical attenuation of the contextual cueing effect. 
As already discussed, learning on certain implicit learning procedures can sometimes be 
more explicit than is typical and it is therefore important to include measures to assess the nature 
of the learning displayed. Study III included three means of assessing the extent to which 
knowledge was explicit: a sequence validity manipulation during the test block; generation tasks 
(Chun & Jiang, 2003; Jiménez & Vázquez, in press); and subjective measures, such as 
confidence ratings and judgments (Dienes, 2008; Dienes, et al., 1995).6 
In summary, Study III compared children with ASC and typical children closely matched 
for IQ on a hybrid SRT-CC task that assessed the extent to which performance was dominated by 
explicit processing. To anticipate the result, there was reduced attenuation of the contextual 
cueing effect at the outset of learning in the ASC group compared to the TD group, suggesting 
initially reduced explicit processing of the sequence. A second study, Study IV, replicated the 
difficulty in explicit processing while exploring possible reasons for its existence. Specifically, 
                                                 
6An exclusion generation task was designed and programmed, and it was intended that all participants 
would complete the task at the end of Study III as another assessment of the degree to which SRT knowledge was 
explicit. However, testing sessions were limited to one hour, and this task was presented last. Consequently, some 
participants did not reach that part of the experiment. Given the number of alternative explicit learning measures, the 
partial results were disregarded. A similar time constraint was envisaged for Study IV, and therefore the exclusion 
generation task was not included in the programme. 
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the study examined whether the difficulty resulted from slower explicit learning about the 
sequence or from difficulties in applying explicit knowledge of the SRT sequence.  
2. Study III 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
16 children with ASC (referred to as the ASC group) and 16 Typically-Developing 
children (referred to as the TD group) were included in the study. All children in the ASC group 
met established criteria for ASC, such as those specified in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) and had previously received a diagnosis for ASC by trained clinicians using 
instruments such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview (Le Couteur, et al., 2003). Any other 
psychiatric diagnosis acted as an exclusion criterion for both the ASC and TD group. Table 14 
presents the participant characteristics for each group. The two groups of children were matched 
for sex (16 males), chronological age (t(30) = 1.85, p = .07, d = 0.66) and IQ (t(30) =0 .05, p = 
.96, d = 0.02) of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI: Wechsler, 1999), see 
Table 14. Informed parental consent and the assent of the children were obtained, and ethical 
permission to conduct the study received from the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee. 12 of the parents of children with ASC and 14 of the parents of TD children 
completed the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ: Rutter, et al., 2003). The SCQ is a 
screening tool for autism, which comprises 40 items derived from the ADI-R. The raw scores on 
the SCQ were converted into percentage scores. All the children in the TD group had scores 
below the cut-off score of 38.46 % specified by Rutter and colleagues, see Table 14. Further, the 
highest score for the TD group was 8.35 standard deviations below the mean of the ASC group. 
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Table 14. Mean Age (in years), WASI IQ Scores and Social Communication Questionnaire 
(SCQ) Scores (percentage) for the ASC and TD Groups 
Measure Study III  
 TD (N = 16)  ASC (N = 16)  
 M SD R  M SD R  
Chronological age 12.3 0.9 10.8 – 13.4  12.9 0.9 11.9 – 14.7  
Full-scale IQ 105.4 10.1 84 – 119  105.2 11.6 86 – 128  
 TD (N = 14)  ASC (N = 12)  
SCQ Score  7.7 5.6 0 – 18.0  65.0 12.3 38.46 – 82.0  
2.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
A fourteen-inch LCD Windows notebook computer was used for all the computerised 
testing. Responses were recorded using the notebook’s keyboard. All parts of the computerised 
task were programmed using INQUISIT 2.0.6, which provides millisecond timing accuracy (De 
Clercq, Crombez, Buysse, & Roeyers, 2003). 
The stimuli consisted of a set of coloured digits printed in Garamond font, 1.3 cm high x 
0.8 cm wide, over a grey background, see Figure 8. Target stimuli were even numbers (2, 4, 6, 8) 
presented in one of four possible colours (red, blue, green, or yellow). The target appeared on 
each trial at one of the 16 locations defined by an invisible 4 x 4 matrix, 9.2 cm wide x 9.4 cm 
high, accompanied by seven distractors. Distractors were odd numbers (1, 3, 5, and 7) but within 
a trial, all had the same numerical identity. Distractor colour and location was chosen so that on 
each trial there were two stimuli of each colour, with stimuli evenly distributed over the four 
quadrants of the display and filling 8 out of 16 possible stimuli locations. Vertical and horizontal 
lines divided the matrix into four quadrants. Between neighboring slots there was a horizontal 
separation of 2.1 cm and a vertical separation of 1.5 cm. 




Figure 8. Illustration of 8 successive trials from the SRT-CC hybrid task. The above sequence of 
8 even number targets was one of the training sequences used. 7 possible contexts (combinations 
of distractor position, colour and identity) are presented above. One context is repeated on the 
first and seventh trials presented. 
2.1.3. Design and Procedure 
 General 
Participants responded as quickly and as accurately as possible according to the identity 
of the even number (2, 4, 6, and 8) by pressing the keys V, B, N, M, respectively, with the 
middle and index fingers of each hand. Training consisted of 1152 trials, divided into 12 blocks 
of 96 trials. At the start of each block, the solid lines creating the quadrant (see Figure 8) were 
presented and remained on the screen for the entire block. Each trial then began with the 
presentation of distractors and target. The stimuli all remained on screen until the participant 
responded correctly; if a participant responded incorrectly the word “Error” appeared in red at 
the top of the screen and remained with the rest of the stimuli until the correct response was 
provided. The next trial began after a response-to-stimulus interval of 200 ms. Between blocks, 
the experimenter provided participants with feedback about their accuracy and reaction times 
(RTs). Training was preceded by a short practice block, after which it was ensured that the 
participant had understood the demands of the task.  
The location of the target was decided randomly without replacement over successive 
series of 16 trials. Therefore, effectively each block was comprised of 6 series of 16 trials. After 
a series of 16 trials, the next trial could appear at any other location except at the location 
sampled on the previous trial. Distractor identity was pseudo-randomly chosen for each trial 
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from the set so that each distractor-type appeared equally often. The seven distractors plus the 
target stimulus were coloured and located pseudo-randomly for each trial, so that two of them 
were drawn in each possible colour (red, blue, green, and yellow), and two items were located in 
each one of the four matrix quadrants, see Figure 8. 
 Sequence information 
With the exception of the 8-trial practice block, the identity of the target repeatedly 
followed a deterministic 8-digit sequence (either sequence-a: 2-6-4-8-2-6-8-4 or sequence-b: 2-4-
6-8-2-4-8-6) and therefore required a repeated sequence of responses. This was true of all blocks 
except for block 11. Block 11 was the test block; on half the trials of this block the sequence 
followed the control sequence. The control sequence was always the sequence to which 
participants had not previously been exposed during training. Which of the two sequences was 
the main and which was the control was counterbalanced, in order to prevent the possibility that 
one of the sequences would produce faster responses just because certain transitions (i.e. the 
movement between two required responses in a sequence,) were more comfortable than others. 
Further, both sequences were structurally analogous. Each sequence compromised two 
presentations of each digit and had only one unique transition, which allowed participants to 
predict the next event by considering the identity of the previous target (e.g., in sequence-a, the 
two presentations of target 2 were followed by 6, and in sequence-b, the two presentations of 2 
were followed by 4). The two repetitions of these unique transitions were separated by two 
intervening events, which gave rise to six ambiguous transitions (i.e., transitions in which a 
single event predicted a different successor on each of its occurrences, as it is the case, for 
instance, of target 6, which was followed by items 4 or 8 in sequence-a, and by items 2 or 8 in 
sequence-b). No immediate repetitions (e.g., 6-6) or reversals (e.g., 6-2-6) were allowed within 
either sequence. Sequences a and b had three transitions in common, but they differed in their 
unique transitions, and in half of their ambiguous transitions. 
During the 11 training blocks (i.e., blocks 1 to 10 and block 12) the training sequence 
repeated 12 times. Test block 11 contained six repetitions of the training sequence, randomly 
interspersed with six repetitions of the control sequence. To make sure that the transitions 
between training and control sequences were made in accordance with the second-order 
transitions stipulated by the upcoming sequence, the starting (and therefore the end) point of the 
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test block was not selected at random. Instead, the beginning was chosen so that the outgoing 
sequence ended on a digit (e.g., 4) such that the next digit created a transition that was legal for 
both sequences (e.g., 4-8). Therefore, the transition from one sequence to the other was legal 
according to the outgoing sequence and consistent with a second-order transition stipulated by 
the upcoming sequence. The order participants received the training and control sequence during 
the test block was fixed to allow a more accurate between-group comparison, but 
counterbalanced across participants to minimise any order effects. 
To assess sequence learning indirectly, RTs in response to control-sequence trials over 
test block 11 were compared with the average RTs in response to training-sequence trials over 
the neighboring training blocks 10 and 12. In a test phase design, this represents the fairest and 
most common assessment of learning because using the average performance from two blocks 
equally before and after the test block controls for the effects of practice (Jiménez & Vázquez, 
2008). Direct comparison with RTs on training-sequence trials within the same test block would 
not have been fair because the validity of the sequence information on that block has been 
compromised, and could have negatively impacted upon the application of the sequence 
knowledge (Jiménez, et al., 2006). However, a number of trials structured according to the 
training sequence were included within the test block for another reason: to assess the relative 
flexibility of the acquired knowledge. Jiménez and colleagues (2006) showed that only 
participants with explicit knowledge of a sequence noticed that their knowledge was no longer 
valid over such a test block. Participants with explicit sequence knowledge stopped using that 
knowledge to speed responding on trials in which the training sequence was presented in the test 
block, in order to avoid being misled by irrelevant knowledge when the training sequence was 
not present in that test block. Thus, the explicitness of knowledge was indirectly assessed by 
measuring the participants’ sensitivity to such a decrease in the validity of sequence information 
during the test block.  
 Contextual information 
The precise combination of location, identity and colour of distractors created a context 
for the location of the target on each trial. 40 such combinations were generated and each context 
was always associated with the same target location but a changing target identity. 8 ‘high-
frequency’ contexts were repeated frequently (6 times a block), while the remaining 32 ‘low-
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frequency’ contexts were repeated infrequently (on average 1.5 times a block). Each high-
frequency context was associated with a unique target location, while sets of 4 low-frequency 
contexts were each associated with a different one of the remaining 8 possible target locations. 
Of the sets of 4 low-frequency contexts associated with a given target location, each context was 
characterized by a different distractor identity, as well as by a different distribution of locations 
and colours. Similarly, of the 8 high-frequency contexts, two contexts contained 1’s, two 
contained 3’s, two contained 5’s and two contained 7’s and were each characterised by a 
different distribution of distractor locations and colours. Thus, all target locations were equally 
cued, and all distractor identities, colours and locations were equally present. However, only the 
precise combination of distractor location, identity and colour of a high frequency context 
provided a unique cue to a target location, which, in addition to the more regular occurrence of 
high-frequency contexts, helped participants to respond faster to the numerical identity of the 
targets among high, in contrast with low, frequency contexts. Which 8 of the 16 locations were 
predicted by the high-frequency contexts and which by the low-frequency contexts was 
counterbalanced, together with the corresponding exact composition of the 40 contexts (8 high 
and 32 low). Trials with high frequency and low frequency contexts were randomly intermixed 
across all trials but this order was then fixed to minimise the noise in the crucial between group 
comparisons. 
Learning was indirectly indexed by comparing reaction times on high vs. low frequency 
context trials. If participants were cued to the target location by the contextual information, then 
across the blocks participants would have responded progressively faster to high as compared to 
low frequency context trials. Also, the effect of contextual cueing over the sequence test block 
11 and neighboring blocks 10 and 12 was assessed separately, to ascertain whether the change of 
sequence over these blocks affected contextual cueing. 
 Post-task measures 
Subsequent to block 12, direct measures of contextual cueing and sequence learning were 
presented with the order counterbalanced across participants. To assess explicit contextual 
cueing knowledge, participants were instructed to guess the location of the target in a task in 
which the high-frequency contexts were presented, but in which the target was replaced by an 
additional distractor (Chun & Jiang, 2003; Jiménez & Vázquez, in press; c.f., Smyth & Shanks, 
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2008). If contextual cueing was implicit (or had not occurred), then participants should not be 
able to guess the correct location above the chance level. Following the suggestions of Smyth 
and Shanks (2008), two presentations of each repeated context were included, instead of a single 
one, so as to improve the sensitivity of the location guessing task. Additionally, 8 novel displays 
were also presented twice each. Rather than guessing the specific location of the removed target, 
participants were only instructed to guess the quadrant at which it would have appeared in that 
particular context. Responses were issued by pressing the keys F, V, K, M to indicate the upper 
left, lower left, upper right, and lower right quadrants respectively. To assess the extent of the 
explicit knowledge, the proportion of correct responses produced on high-frequency trials was 
compared with that on novel-context trials.  
For sequence learning, a cued generation task comprised of 24 generation blocks was 
included. Each generation block consisted of 3 trials. The first two trials of each block were 
exactly the same as those presented over training. On the third, however, the target was removed 
and replaced by another distractor. Participants were asked to guess the identity of the removed 
target by relying on the target identity of the previous two trials. The first two trials of each block 
constituted one of the 12 possible two-trial fragments that could have appeared during the 
training or test blocks, and participants were instructed to respond to them as they had in the SRT 
task. Each of the 12 possible two-trial fragments was presented twice, totaling 24 generation 
tests. The targets were presented in low-frequency contexts, in order to enhance task sensitivity 
by keeping the generation trials as similar as possible to the main task. To assess the extent of 
explicit sequence knowledge, the proportion of prediction trials on which participants correctly 
generated a successor corresponding to the training sequence was compared with that on the 
control sequence. At the start of this generation task, the importance of accuracy over RTs was 
emphasized for the third prediction trial, and no feedback was provided on the accuracy of their 
generation responses. Finally, at the end of all testing, children were asked to report the entire 
sequence as accurately as possible. 
For both SRT and CC generation tasks, the order was generated pseudo-randomly such 
that each trial had appeared once before any of the trials appeared for the second time, and was 
then fixed across participants to minimize noise for the between-group comparison. 
In accordance with the recommendations of Smyth and Shanks (2008), prior to each of 
the contextual cueing and sequence learning generation tasks, participants were asked direct 
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awareness questions about the presence of contextual and sequential information respectively. 
Before the contextual cueing generation task, participants were asked on-screen, “During the 
experiment, do you think that any of the displays of odd numbers were repeated?” Those who 
answered positively received a follow-up question: “Approximately, when did you begin to 
notice this repetition?” Using a slider labeled from 1 to 12, participants estimated the block in 
which awareness occurred before finally being asked, “After you realized particular displays of 
odd numbers were being repeated, did you try to memorize these displays?” Following these 
questions and before beginning the generation task, all participants were informed that “the 
displays of odd numbers were repeated”. Before the sequence learning generation task, 
participants were asked on-screen “During the experiment, do you think that there was any 
sequence or pattern to the order in which you pressed the keys?” Those who noticed a repetition 
received a follow-up question: “Approximately, when did you begin to notice this sequence or 
pattern?” Using a slider labeled from 1 to 12, participants estimated the block in which 
awareness occurred before finally being asked, “After you realized there was a sequence or 
pattern to the order in which you pressed the keys, did you try to memorize this sequence or 
pattern?” Following these questions and before beginning the generation task, all participants 
were informed that there was “a sequence to the order in which you pressed the even numbers”. 
There was also one direct question asked after both the generation tasks were completed: 
participants were told, if possible, to reproduce the sequence from the experiment. 
Finally, in accordance with Dienes and colleagues’ (Dienes, 2008; Dienes, et al., 1995) 
research on dissociating implicit and explicit performance, subjective measures of awareness 
were also included during the generation tasks. Following each generation response, participants 
classified their answer as either "A complete guess", "A feeling/intuition", "A 
memory/knowledge" and rated how confident they were their answer was correct using a 1 to 7 
confidence scale with the anchors 1 = "Completely uncertain", 4 = "Moderately certain", 7 = 
"Completely certain". According to Dienes’ ‘zero-correlation criterion’ implicit knowledge 
exists if there is no relationship between confidence and performance, while his ‘guessing 
criterion’ states that implicit knowledge exists if a participant’s performance is above chance 
even when they claim to be guessing. 




First trial data were excluded from the main task (blocks 1-12) for all RT analyses of the 
SRT task because meaningful assessment can only occur when the stimuli have been presented 
sequentially. RTs on error trials were discarded for all RT analyses. For all analyses, the alpha 
level was set at .05, two-tailed and extreme outlying RTs (values either less than three times the 
interquartile range below the lower quartile, or greater than three times the interquartile range 
above the upper quartile) were excluded. Where relevant, the appropriate epsilon correction was 
used when sphericity was violated. Šidák corrections were used to control for familywise error 
rates during multiple comparisons. Where significant interactions were found in the mixed 
analyses of variance, separate ANOVAs were conducted on the levels of interest to establish 
simple effects. When conducting independent sample t-tests, equal sample variances were 
assumed unless Levene’s test for the equality of variances was significant. Cohen’s d is reported 
as a measure of effect size except where relative measures of effect size are more appropriate, 
and then partial eta-squared (η2p) is reported.  
For the SRT task, both RT and accuracy provided indices of learning. RT and accuracy 
data were subjected to similar analyses. However, the results of the two analyses were entirely 
consistent with one another, and thus it was deemed unnecessary to report both analyses. Since 
accuracy is a relatively insensitive index of learning on the SRT (e.g., Study II), no analysis of 
the accuracy data is reported here beyond the finding that overall accuracy was similar between 
the groups (TD: M = 93.48 %, SEM = 1.24 %; ASC: M = 94.05 %, SEM = 1.02 %; t(30) = 0.36, 
p = .72, d = 0.13; see Appendix B for the full accuracy analysis). 
2.2.1. Sequence learning 
 Training: Block 1-10 
Figure 9 represents the mean RT at each level of block for each of the two groups. There 
was a decrease in RTs as participants progressed through the blocks. This improvement in 
performance could reflect increasing skill with general practice of the task together with 
acquisition of sequence learning. A mixed analysis of variance, with one between subject factor 
of Group (ASC vs. TD), and one within subject factor of Block (1-10), confirmed this effect of 
Block (F(3, 99) = 79.43, p < .001, η2p = .73). There was no evidence of a Group effect (F(1, 20) 
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= 0.93, p = .34, η2p = .03) and the interaction did not reach significance (F(3, 99) = 2.11, p = .10, 
η2p = .07). The numerical difference between groups in early blocks of trials is consistent with 
the finding reported in Study II that ASC participants take longer than TD participants to benefit 
from the opportunity to generally practice the SRT task. Equally, the performance pattern in the 
ASC group may also reflect slower acquisition of the sequence learning. 
 
Figure 9. In Study III, TD and ASC groups displayed similar final sequence learning on the SRT 
task, as measured by the increase in RTs to the control sequence on the Test block compared 
with those on blocks 10 and 12. The final learning was also similarly explicit in the two groups, 
as measured by the increase in RTs to the training sequence presented with low global validity 
during the test block. There was an indication that the ASC group were initially slower than the 
TD group. Depicted are mean reaction times across the experiment for different groups. The 
error bars show twice the standard error of differences between group means at different levels 
of block. 
 Test: Block 10-12 
To specifically assess whether participants had learnt the sequence (without the 
additional effect of general practice that was also present during initial training blocks), 
performance was compared between training blocks 10 and 12 and in test block 11. Mean RTs to 
just the novel control sequences in test block 11 were compared with mean RTs to the training 
sequences averaged between the neighbouring blocks 10 and 12, in order to assess whether 
performance was disrupted on novel control sequences in test block 11. Indicative of sequence 
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The magnitude of this difference was comparable between the groups (TD: Mean difference (M) 
= 398.74 ms; ASC: M = 539.44 ms; SED = 137.45 ms). Consistent with this interpretation, a 
mixed ANOVA with factors of Group and Block (Control Sequences Block 11 vs. Block 10&12) 
confirmed the sequence learning effect with an effect of Block F(1, 30) = 46.59, p < .001). The 
ASC group were not significantly slower overall than the TD group (F(1, 30) = 3.79, p = .06, η2p 
= .11). More importantly, there was a lack of evidence for an interaction between Group and 
Block (F(1, 30) = 1.05, p = .31, η2p = .03), which was consistent with a final sequence learning 
effect that was similar between the groups.  
 Sequence validity: Block 10-12 
To assess whether this sequence learning was explicit, an indirect measure was taken 
comparing performance on the training sequence of Block 11 to that on the same training 
sequence in Blocks 10 and 12. If participants were explicitly aware of the sequence and thus 
surprised by the appearance of the novel control sequence in Block 11, then performance would 
be expected to be slower across all sequences in Block 11 relative to the familiar training 
sequence exclusively present in Blocks 10 and 12. Responses were indeed slower to the training 
sequence in Block 11 than in Block 10 and 12. The magnitude with which the RTs were slowed 
was similar between the groups (TD: Mean difference (M) = 281.69 ms; ASC: M = 207.26 ms; 
SED = 72.01 ms). A mixed ANOVA with factors of Group and Block (Training Sequences 
Block 11 vs. Block 10&12) revealed a main effect of Block F(1, 30) = 46.10, p < .001, η2p = .61) 
and no significant effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 0.07, p = .80, η2p < .01) nor interaction between 
Group and Block F(1, 30) = 1.07, p = .31, η2p = .03). This analysis suggested that the learning 
was similarly explicit between the groups according to this indirect measure. 
 Post-task Tests: SRT Generation 
A direct measure of whether explicit sequence knowledge had been acquired was taken in 
an SRT generation task by comparing the percentage of correctly generated sequence fragments 
on training versus control sequences. Performance on the training sequence was superior to 
control sequence performance (Training: M = 67.19 %; Control: M = 47.10 %; SED = 4.55 %). 
This difference in performance between sequences was comparable between the groups (TD: 
Mean difference between Training and Control sequences (M) = 19.64 %; ASC: M = 20.54 %; 
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SED = 9.09 %). A mixed ANOVA with using factors of Group and Sequence (Training vs. 
Control) as factors revealed an effect of Sequence (F(1, 30) = 19.53, p < .001, η2p = .39) but no 
significant effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 1.22, p = .28, η2p = .04) nor interaction between Group 
and Sequence (F(1, 30) = 0.01, p = .92, η2p < .01). This analysis suggested that the sequence 
learning of each group was explicit to the same extent. 
2.2.2. Contextual cueing  
 Training: Block 1-10 
Mean RTs to high- and low-frequency contexts were compared as a measure of 
contextual cueing. Figure 10 represents the mean difference between high- and low-frequency 
context trials in each block for both the groups. A difference score greater than zero indicates 
contextual cueing. In general, there appeared to be minimal contextual cueing during the training 
blocks 1-10, see Figure 10. A mixed ANOVA with factors of Group, Context (High vs. Low) 
and Block (1-10) as factors provided support for this interpretation. There was an effect of Block 
(F(3, 99) = 78.73, p < .001, η2p = .72) but no significant effect of Context (F(1, 30) = 0.56, p = 
.46, η2p = .02) or interaction between Context and Block (F(5, 152) = 1.26, p = .28, η
2
p = .04). 
There was no significant effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 0.96, p = .34, η2p = .03) or interaction of 
Group with any other factor (Group and Context: F(1, 30) = 0.11, p = .75, η2p < .01; Group and 
Block: F(3, 98) = 2.11, p = .10, η2p = .07). 




Figure 10. In Study III, the ASC group showed an atypical attenuation of contextual cueing in 
the first two blocks of training. After this acquisition phase, both groups showed an extremely 
similar pattern and magnitude of contextual cueing; contextual cueing was attenuated in both 
groups until the test block, when training sequence knowledge was removed and invalidated, and 
consequently contextual cueing emerged. This re-affirmed the role of explicit sequence 
knowledge in suppressing contextual cueing throughout the rest of task. Presented are the RT 
differences between contexts across the task. The error bars show twice the standard error of 
differences between group means at different levels of block.  
Examination of Figure 10 indicated a numerical tendency for a lack of the typical 
attenuation of contextual cueing in the performance of the group with ASC in the earliest two 
blocks. Unsurprisingly, this was not supported by the presence of a three-way interaction (F(5, 
152) = 1.21, p = .31, η2p = .04), as this difference was masked by the similarity of performance 
between the two groups in all later trial blocks. Given the prediction that atypical explicit 
processing in the ASC group may affect the typical attenuation of contextual cueing, the training 
data were separated into two groups of trial blocks and analysed further. The first group of trial 
blocks consisted of blocks 1 and 2; the second comprised trial blocks 3-10. 
For the first group of blocks (blocks 1 and 2), the TD group’s mean difference score was 
close to zero but the mean difference score in the ASC group was larger (TD: M = -8.21 ms; 
ASC: M = 34.12 ms; SED = 20.24 ms). This implied that there was contextual cueing in the ASC 
group, and that this was larger than the contextual cueing effect in the TD group who did not 
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Group, Context and Block (1-2). The analysis yielded main effects of Group (F(1, 30) = 4.59, p 
= .04, η2p = .13), Block (F(1, 30) = 23.96, p < .001, η
2
p = .44) and an interaction between these 
two factors (F(1, 30) = 4.73, p = .04, η2p = .14). There was no evidence of an effect of Context 
(F(1, 30) = 1.64, p = .21, η2p = .05), or interaction between Context and Block (F(1, 30) = 0.79, p 
= .38, η2p = .03). Of greatest importance was an interaction between Group and Context (F(1, 30) 
= 4.37, p = .05, η2p = .13). Simple effects analysis, investigating the difference in responding to 
high vs. low frequency contexts in each group separately, established contextual cueing in the 
ASC group (F(1, 15) = 7.98, p = .01, η2p = .35) in these initial two trial blocks, but provided no 
evidence for contextual cueing in the TD group (F(1, 15) = 0.26, p = .62, η2p = .02). This analysis 
therefore confirmed that there was a contextual cueing effect over the first two blocks in the ASC 
but not the TD group. There was no evidence of a three-way interaction (F(1, 30) = 0.90, p = .35, 
η2p = .03). 
The analysis of performance between blocks 3-10 examined contextual cueing during the 
main section of the task. On average, the differences between high- and low-frequency contexts 
were close to zero and this seemed true of both the groups (see Figure 10). This suggested that 
there was no contextual cueing effect in either group in this group of trial blocks. A mixed 
ANOVA, with factors of Group, Context and Block (3-10), confirmed this impression. There 
was no significant effect of Context (F(1, 30) = 0.10, p = .76, η2p < .01), replicating the 
modulation of contextual cueing by the presence of explicit sequence learning demonstrated by 
Jiménez and Vázquez (in press), and the lack of evidence of an interaction between Group and 
Context (F(1, 30) = 1.24, p = .27, η2p = .04) or Context and Block (F(5, 139) = 1.55, p = .18, η
2
p 
= .05) suggested typical modulation of contextual cueing by explicit sequence knowledge in both 
groups during trial blocks 3-10. There was a main effect of Block (F(3, 101) = 27.11, p < .001, 
η2p = .48), indicating that RTs (irrespective of high- or low-frequency context) decreased across 
trial blocks 3-10. There was no evidence of a Group effect (F(1, 30) = 0.56, p = .46, η2p = .02), 
an interaction between Group and Block (F(3, 101) = 2.15, p = .09, η2p = .07), or a three-way 
interaction (F(5, 139) = 0.18, p = .97, η2p = .01). 
 Test: Block 10-12 
The analysis of performance in trial blocks 10-12 examined the effect of invalidating and 
removing sequence knowledge during Trial Block 11 on contextual cueing. Mean RTs between 
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contexts on Block 11 were compared with those in the two neighbouring blocks 10 and 12.There 
was an increase in contextual cueing on Block 11 relative to Block 10 and 12 (see Figure 10). 
The magnitude of this increase in contextual cueing was similar between the groups (see Figure 
10). A mixed ANOVA with factors of Group, Context and Block (10-12) revealed a main effect 
of Block (F(2, 57) = 41.41, p < .001, η2p = .58), reflecting the sequence learning effect reported 
earlier. The overall effect of Context was not significant (F(1, 30) = 3.93, p = .06, η2p = .12) but, 
more importantly for the present purposes, there was an interaction between Context and Block 
(F(2, 56) = 8.53, p < .01, η2p = .22). Simple effects analysis of this interaction revealed a 
significant difference between RTs to high- and low-frequency contexts during block 11 (F(1, 
31) = 11.53, p < .01, η2p = .27) but no such evidence of contextual cueing during block 10 and 12 
(F(1, 31) = 0.01, p = .93, η2p < .01). Furthermore, a planned contrast comparing the difference 
between the contexts in block 11 with the differences in block 10 and 12 demonstrated that the 
contextual cueing effect was significantly larger in Block 11 (F(1, 31) = 12.14, p < .01, η2p = 
.28). There was no main effect of Group (F(1, 30) = .68, p = .42, η2p = .02) or interaction of 
Group with any other factor (Group x Context F(1, 30) = 0.06, p = .81, η2p < .01; Group x Block 
F(2, 57) = 0.28, p = .75, η2p = .01; Group x Context x Block F(2, 56) = 0.79, p = .45, η
2
p = .03). 
Overall, these results indicated that contextual cueing emerged in test block 11 and that its 
emergence occurred comparably in both groups. In turn, the appearance of contextual cueing 
during block 11, when sequence knowledge was removed and invalidated, reconfirmed the 
critical role explicit sequence knowledge must have been playing in suppressing contextual 
cueing earlier in the rest of task. 
 CC Generation task 
Performance was analysed by comparing the percentage of correctly generated target 
locations on high-frequency contexts with the chance level of 25 %. There was no evidence that 
performance was above chance (M = -1.17 %, SEM = 2.01 %, t(31) = 0.58, p = .57, d = 0.10) or 
that there was a difference between the groups (TD: M = -1.56 %; ASC: M = -0.78 %; SED = 
4.09 %; t(30) = 0.19, p = .85, d = 0.07). This analysis implied that neither group had explicit 
knowledge about contexts and that all learning about context was implicit. 
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2.2.3. Subjective measures 
The above analyses demonstrated that participants had knowledge about the sequence 
capable of underpinning performance on the SRT generation task. Additionally, such 
performance implied that the sequence knowledge was explicit, to the extent that it was available 
for use in more than one context (see Chapter I.4 for more discussion of the theoretical 
underpinnings of generation tasks). As a further assessment of the degree to which the sequence 
knowledge was explicit, the subjective measures obtained during the SRT generation task were 
also analysed. Specifically, the analysis considered whether sequence knowledge was explicit in 
the sense that participants also had the subjective experience of knowing when they were 
accurately generating examples (Dienes, 2008; Dienes, et al., 1995). According to the guessing 
criterion for subjective measures, there was no evidence of implicit sequence knowledge: there 
was no evidence that training sequences could be generated more often than test sequences when 
participants claimed to be guessing (Mean difference = 10.48 %, SED = 8.55 %, t(26) = 1.23, p = 
.23, d = 0.24). There was no evidence of a group difference in this regard (TD: M = 13.15 %; 
ASC: M = 8.00 %; SED = 5.15 %; t(25) = 0.30, p = .77, d = 0.11). Similarly, there was a 
suggestion that sequence knowledge was not implicit because it did not appear to meet the zero-
correlation criterion. Specifically, there was an indication that participants generated more 
training than control sequences when their confidence was high than when it was low (High 
Confidence, ratings 5 to 7, = 21.74 %; Low Confidence, ratings 1 to 4, = 4.93 %; SED = 13.82 
%). However, a mixed ANOVA on generation performance with factors of Group, Sequence 
(Training vs. Control) and Confidence (High vs. Low) showed that the interaction between 
Sequence and Confidence was not significant (F(1, 22) = 1.36, p = .26, η2p = .06). Further, there 
was no evidence that this interaction was different between the groups, as there was no evidence 
of three-way interaction with Group (F(1, 22) < 0.01, p = .98, η2p < .01). However, there was an 
issue of power in this particular analysis of the zero-correlation criterion: six participants 
provided no low-confidence answers, and thus provided no data, while the number of generation 
trials (22) was already small before being split between into high and low confidence. 
The analyses of performance on the CC generation task provided no evidence of accurate 
generation performance, and thereby implied that any CC knowledge was not explicit. Since 
there was no evidence of accurate CC generation, it was impossible to determine whether 
accurate and inaccurate performances were accompanied by appropriate subjective experiences. 
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However, a comparison between the subjective measures taken from the two different generation 
tasks was appropriate because the comparison provided a more powerful test of the zero-
correlation criterion for sequence knowledge. Specifically, the analysis determined whether 
accurate SRT and inaccurate CC generation performances were accompanied with appropriate 
subjective experiences. Confidence on the SRT-generation task was greater than the confidence 
on the unseen contexts from the CC-generation task (SRT: M = 4.77; CC: M = 3.65; SED = 
0.15); this implied the knowledge underpinning performance on the SRT generation task was 
explicit. The two groups were quite similar in overall confidence across both generation-tasks 
(TD: M = 4.50; ASC: M = 3.92; SED = 0.38). Critically, the difference in confidence between 
the two tasks was similar between the groups (TD: M = 1.24; ASC: M = 1.01; SED = 0.30). This 
was confirmed by a mixed ANOVA on the mean confidence ratings using factors of Group and 
Generation Task (SRT vs. CC - Unseen Contexts). There was a main effect of Generation Task 
(F(1, 30) = 57.02, p < .001, η2p = .66), and no evidence of an effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 2.44, p 
= .13, η2p = .08) or interaction (F(1, 30) = 0.60, p = .45, η
2
p = .02).  
Furthermore, both groups classified a greater number of answers as memories during the 
SRT as compared to the CC generation task (SRT: M = 45.60 %; CC: M = 21.68 %; SED = 4.63 
%); this also indicated that performance on the SRT generation task was determined by explicit 
knowledge. Overall, the groups classified a similar percentage of answers as memories (TD: M = 
35.60 %; ASC: M = 31.68 %; SED = 8.00 %) but more importantly, the difference percentage 
between the tasks was similar between the groups (TD: M = 28.23 %; ASC: M = 19.60 %; SED = 
9.27 %). This was confirmed by a mixed ANOVA on the mean percentage of answers classified 
as memories using Group and Generation-Task as factors. There was a main effect of Generation 
task (F(1, 30) = 26.64, p < .001, η2p = .47), but no evidence of an effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 
0.24, p = .63, η2p = .01) or interaction (F(1, 30) = 0.87, p = .36, η
2
p = .03). This evidence of 
accurate subjective knowledge about generation performance reinforced the conclusion that both 
groups had explicit sequence knowledge. 
2.2.4. Direct awareness questions 
Subjective measures, RT analyses and generation performance all suggested that 
sequence knowledge was similarly explicit for both groups by the end of the task. Consistent 
with this finding, the majority of participants from both groups reported that they had noticed the 
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sequence (all 16 TD participants and 13 of the 16 ASC participants). Further, of those 
participants who noticed the sequence the majority of participants from both groups tried to 
memorise it (15 of the 16 TD participants and all 13 ASC participants). A majority of those 
participants demonstrated that they had memorised the entire sequence successfully by correctly 
producing the 8-digit training sequence at the end of the experiment (9 TD participants and 11 
ASC participants). The answers to the direct awareness questions were also consistent with the 
finding that contextual knowledge was not explicit, and that that absence of explicit knowledge 
was true for both groups: only a minority of participants from each group claimed to have 
noticed some regularity in the contexts (5 out of the 16 TD participants and 6 out of the 16 ASC 
participants), and only 4 participants from each group reported trying to memorise any of the 
contexts. Finally, there was consistency from these responses with the conclusion that the lack of 
contextual cueing attenuation in the first two trial blocks reflected slower acquisition of explicit 
sequence knowledge in the ASC participants: only 1 ASC participant reported noting the 
sequence in block 1 or 2 compared with 4 TD participants.  
2.2.5. Discussion  
The main aim of Study III was to assess whether there were differences in explicit 
sequence learning between ASC and TD individuals that were independent of IQ. The analyses 
reported here demonstrated both groups successfully achieved sequence learning, and that the 
magnitude of the effect, as measured by differences between mean RTs to control sequences on 
test block 11 and compared with mean RTs to training sequences on the neighbouring blocks 10 
and 12, was large and equivalent between the groups. Furthermore, there was a variety of 
evidence that the sequence learning was explicit, and the extent to which it was explicit was 
equivalent between the groups: there was a similarly detrimental effect of sequence invalidation 
to both groups, and both groups demonstrated successful generation performance and accurate 
subjective measures. This leads to the conclusion that the groups achieved a significant and 
similar final level of explicit sequence learning, and that there were no differences between ASC 
and TD individuals in final explicit learning when matched for IQ. 
However, there is also evidence that ASC individuals were slower to learn and/or apply 
the sequence explicitly, independently of IQ. This initial acquisition of explicit sequence learning 
has not been assessed before. First, there was a suggestion that the ASC group were initially 
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slower. This reduced explicit processing was corroborated by the atypical attenuation of implicit 
contextual cueing in the ASC group during the first two blocks of the task. Learning explicitly 
about the sequence typically leads to the selective attenuation of learning about the context 
(Jiménez & Vázquez, in press), as demonstrated by the current TD group. Therefore, the absence 
of the typical attenuation of contextual cueing in the ASC group is indicative of slowed explicit 
sequence learning. This interpretation, that the initial ASC contextual cueing effect is a 
consequence of the ASC group having not yet acquired and/or applied explicit sequence 
knowledge, is strongly supported by the interaction of contextual cueing and sequence 
knowledge for the rest of the task. The two groups show an identical use of explicit sequence 
knowledge to suppress contextual cueing during blocks 3-10, and both show equivalent 
contextual cueing when the sequence knowledge has been manipulated to be invalid during test 
block 11. Consistent with this interpretation, fewer ASC individuals reported noticing the 
sequence as early as the first or second block. 
In order to further corroborate this important finding, an additional analysis was 
conducted to compare the initial contextual cueing of the ASC and TD individuals in either the 
presence or absence of sequential information. The performance of two groups from this study 
was compared with the contextual cueing performance of a subset of the two groups from Study 
II. Subsets of the two groups in Study II were chosen in order that the four groups were matched 
for sex (all males), chronological age (F(3, 66) = 2.12, p = .11, η2p = .09) and IQ (F(3, 66) = 
0.82, p = .49, η2p = .04) of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI: Wechsler, 
1999), see Table 15. The crucial difference between the two studies was that Study II used a non-
sequential CC design. Everything else about the design of the tasks in the two different studies 
was comparable (see III.2.3.1 for a comparison). There was one procedural difference: the length 
of the blocks in Study II was half the number of trials. While this would have made a complete 
analysis of RTs from the two studies inappropriate, the consideration of the learning index 
(difference scores) and the relative comparisons between the groups were valid. In Study II, there 
was evidence of similar contextual cueing in both the groups, named here as the ASC-Study II 
(Mean DS = 44.40 ms, SED = 6.54 ms) and TD-Study II groups (Mean DS = 25.93 ms, SED = 
12.13 ms). Consistent with this, a mixed ANOVA on RTs (Group x Context (High vs. Low) x 
Block (1-2)) yielded an effect of Context (F(1, 36) = 26.05, p < .01, η2p = .42) but provided no 
evidence of any other effects or interactions relating to learning (all Fs ≤ 2.21, ps ≥ .15 and η2p ≤ 
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.06). There was a Group effect for the ASC-Study II individuals to be slower overall (F(1, 36) = 
4.22, p < .05, η2p = .11; see Chapter III.3.1 for more details). The contextual cueing effect in the 
ASC group from Study III (ASC-Study III: Mean DS = 34.12 ms, SED = 12.08 ms) and the 
absence of evidence for contextual cueing in the TD group from Study III (TD-Study III: Mean 
DS = -8.21 ms, SED = 16.24 ms), has already been established above. Therefore, separate 
analyses had provided evidence of contextual cueing in the ASC-Study III, ASC-Study II and 
TD-Study II groups but had provided no evidence in the TD-Study III group. Consistent with 
these analyses, a one-way ANOVA between all four Groups from the two studies (Group (ASC-
Study II; TD-Study II; ASC-Study III; TD-Study III) on the mean difference scores across the 
first 192 trials, yielded an effect of Group (F(3, 66) = 3.52, p = .02 η2p = .14). Furthermore, two 
planned contrasts comparing (i) the TD-Study III group with the TD-Study II group, and (ii) the 
TD-Study III group with the three remaining groups (ASC-Study II; TD-Study II; ASC-Study 
III) demonstrated that the TD-Study III group’s contextual cueing effect was significantly 
smaller than (i) the TD-Study II group (F(1, 66) = 4.09, p = .05, η2p = .06) and (ii) the average 
effect for the ASC-Study II; TD-Study II; ASC-Study III groups (F(1, 66) = 9.22, p < .01, η2p = 
.12). Finally, a one-way ANOVA comparing just the three groups that had demonstrated a 
contextual cueing effect (ASC-Study II; TD-Study II; ASC-Study III) provided no evidence of 
group differences (F(2, 51) = 0.83, p = .44 η2p = .03). Together, these analyses suggested that the 
presence of a sequence had inhibited contextual cueing in the first 192 trials in TD individuals. 
In contrast, there was no evidence that the sequence had any effect on the contextual cueing of 
ASC individuals during the first 192 trials. Thus altogether there is convincing evidence that 
there was a difference between the groups in initial explicit sequence learning. 
CHAPTER IV  116   
 
 
Table 15. Mean Age (in years), WASI IQ Scores and Social Communication Questionnaire 
(SCQ) Scores (percentage) for ASC and TD Groups 
Measure Subset of groups from Study II  
 TD-Study II (N = 19)  ASC-Study II (N = 19)  
 M SD R  M SD R  
Chronological age 12.2 1.4 9.2 – 14.3  12.0 1.0 10.8 – 14.4  
Full-scale IQ 105.6 11.0 91 – 135  100.3 15.0 79 – 126  
 TD (N = 15)  ASC (N = 11)  
SCQ Score  11.6 8.1 2.5 – 32.5  69.9 16.9 30.0 – 85.0  
3. Study IV 
The findings of Study III indicate a difference in initial explicit sequence learning in 
ASC. However, the nature of the difference is not clear. It is possible that the reduced attenuation 
of contextual cueing in the ASC group may have been a consequence of either a difficulty in the 
initial stages of acquisition of the actual sequence information or poorer application of that 
acquired sequence knowledge. A second study attempted to tease apart whether the reduced 
effect of explicit processing on contextual cueing in the ASC group was due to slower explicit 
learning about a sequence or reduced ability to apply explicit sequence knowledge.  
In order to do so, precisely the same method was used but with a critical manipulation: 
the inclusion of a pre-task learning phase. In this pre-task phase, all participants memorised the 
sequence that would be present in their task to the same criterion performance level. As a 
consequence of such a pre-task manipulation, both groups would have demonstrably equivalent 
knowledge of the actual sequence information. Therefore, remaining performance differences 
would imply that ASC individuals are slower at explicitly applying sequence information to 
sequence learning task success. Additionally, remaining performance differences would provide 
a replication of the modest ASC difficulty identified in Study III. 





16 children with ASC (referred to as the ASC group) and 16 Typically-Developing 
children (referred to as the TD group) were included in the study. None of the children had 
participated in the previous study. All children in the ASC group met established criteria for 
ASC, such as those specified in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and had 
previously received a diagnosis for ASC by trained clinicians using instruments such as the 
Autism Diagnostic Interview (Le Couteur, et al., 2003). Any other psychiatric diagnosis acted as 
an exclusion criterion for both the ASC and TD group. Table 16 presents the participant 
characteristics for both the groups. The two groups of children were matched for sex (16 males), 
chronological age (t(21) = 1.13, p = .27, d = 0.40) and IQ (t(30) =0 .75, p = .46, d = 0.26) of the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI: Wechsler, 1999), see Table 16. Informed 
parental consent and the assent of the children were obtained, and ethical permission to conduct 
the study received from the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee. 13 of the 
parents of children with ASC and 9 of the parents of TD children completed the Social 
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ: Rutter, et al., 2003). The raw scores on the SCQ were 
converted into percentage scores. All the children in the TD group had scores below the cut-off 
score of 38.46 % specified by Rutter and colleagues, see Table 16. Further, the highest score for 
the TD group was 8.94 standard deviations below the mean of the ASC group. See Table 16 for a 
summary of the groups’ characteristics. 
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Table 16. Mean Age (in years), WASI IQ Scores and Social Communication Questionnaire 
(SCQ) Scores (percentage) for the ASC and TD Groups 
Measure Study IV  
 TD (N =16)  ASC (N =16)  
 M SD R  M SD R  
Chronological age 12.0 0.5 11.3 – 13.1  12.3 1.2 10.4 – 14.8  
Full-scale IQ 107.0 11.2 92 – 126  104.1 10.6 83 – 122  
 TD (N =11) ASC (N =15) 
SCQ Score  6.5 5.1 0 – 12.8  59.1 21.0 28.2 – 89.7  
3.1.2. Apparatus, materials, design and procedure 
Precisely the same apparatus and materials were used as in Study III. The same design 
and procedure were used with two modifications. First, following initial instructions and the 8 
practice trials but prior to start of the main task, participants were told that they would be 
presented with an 8-digit sequence. Further, they were instructed to memorise the sequence 
because it would present in the subsequent task, which they had just practised, and so 
memorising it would help them to press the buttons more quickly. Finally, they were told that 
once the sequence had disappeared after 3 seconds, they would be required to reproduce the 
sequence without making a mistake five times. When reproducing the sequence, upon typing an 
incorrect number, participants were instructed “That is not the right number - please start 
again”. Participants were then presented with the sequence for another 3 seconds before trying 
again to reproduce it. Second, blocks 3-10 were removed from the main task, since Study III had 
demonstrated that the differences of interest in explicit processing had occurred during the first 
two blocks, and by removing blocks 3-10, the other indices of explicit processing (the test block, 
the sequence validity manipulation, the generation task and subjective measures) would all be 
more appropriately placed and thus sensitive to detect such differences. 




Exactly the same analysis techniques and procedures were applied as described for Study 
III. For the SRT task, the results of the two analyses of accuracy and RT were entirely consistent 
with one another. Thus as in Study III, the analysis of accuracy is not reported here beyond the 
finding that overall accuracy was similar between the groups (TD: M = 93.39 %; ASC: M = 
91.13 %; SED = 1.85 %; t(25) = 1.23, p = .23, d = 0.43; see Appendix B for the full accuracy 
analysis).  
3.2.1. Pre-task phase 
All participants memorised the sequence, which would be present in their task, to the 
same criterion performance level. Specifically, all participants correctly reproduced the sequence 
without errors 5 times. Further, there was no evidence of a difference between the groups in the 
number of mistakes made in achieving this (TD: M = 3.94; ASC: M = 4.25; SED = 1.41; t(30) = 
0.22, p = .83, d = 0.08) 
3.2.2. Sequence application learning 
 Training: Block 1-2 
Figure 11 represents the mean RT at each level of block for each of the two groups. There 
was a decrease in RTs as participants progressed from blocks 1 to 2. A mixed ANOVA with 
factors of Group, and Block (1-2), confirmed this effect of Block (F(1, 30) = 83.21, p < .001, η2p 
= .74). There was no evidence of an effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 1.39, p = .25, η2p = .04), 
however, importantly, there was an interaction between Group and Block (F(1, 30) = 4.95, p = 
.03, η2p = .14). Inspection of Figure 11 and simple effects analysis revealed the source of this 
interaction: the performance of the groups was very similar in Block 1 (F(1, 30) = 0.32, p = .58, 
η2p = .01), and although both groups’ performance improved significantly between blocks 1 and 
2, (TD: main effect of block, F(1, 15) = 58.69, p < .001, η2p = .80; ASC: main effect of block, 
F(1, 15) = 26.34, p < .001, η2p = .64), the performance of the TD group was numerically, though 
not quite significantly, better than that of the ASC group in Block 2 (F(1, 30) = 3.22, p = .08, η2p 
= .10). Thus, the performance of the TD group improved to a greater extent compared to the 
ASC group. As discussed above, the improvement in performance over the first few blocks of 
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SRT tasks reflects both general practice effects and sequence learning (both learning sequence 
information and applying it). In Study II, which used a task that allowed sequence learning to be 
dissociated from general practice effects, ASC participants were shown to benefit from general 
practice. Critically, ASC participants took longer to benefit from that practice effect, i.e. over 
time the practice effect decreased TD and ASC differences in RTs. In contrast, the interaction in 
the present study demonstrated that the difference between the ASC and TD performance 
increased over time – i.e. after the first block. Therefore, the interaction was highly suggestive 
that the difference emerged as a result of slower learning to apply the sequence in the ASC 
group. 
 
Figure 11. In Study IV, TD and ASC groups both displayed disruption on the test block, as 
measured by the increase in RTs to the control sequence on the Test block compared with those 
on blocks 10 and 12 and the increase in RTs to the training sequence presented with low global 
validity. To the extent that the two groups did not differ in this disruption, it might be assumed 
that the ASC group learnt to apply sequence knowledge typically. However, this conclusion was 
mitigated by several other pieces of evidence that demonstrated worse sequence application 
learning in the ASC group. Depicted are mean reaction times across training for different 
groups. The error bars show twice the standard error of differences between group means at 
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 Test: Block 2-4 
Whether or not the participants had learnt to apply the sequence was assessed by 
comparing the mean RTs to control sequences in Test Block 3 to mean RTs to training sequences 
on the neighbouring Blocks 2 and 4. For both groups, there were faster RTs on blocks 2 and 4 
relative to test block 3, indicating that both groups had learnt to apply the sequence. The 
magnitude of these difference scores were comparable between the groups and therefore 
suggested that application of sequence knowledge was similar in both groups (TD: Mean 
difference (M) = 536.06 ms; ASC: M = 423.29 ms; SED = 93.79 ms). Consistent with these 
interpretations, a mixed ANOVA with factors of Group and Block (Control Sequences Block 3 
vs. Block 2&4) confirmed the effect of sequence application learning with a main effect of Block 
(F(1, 30) = 104.64, p < .001, η2p = .78). The ASC group were numerically, but not significantly, 
slower overall than the TD group (Group F(1, 30) = 3.92, p = .06, η2p = .12), but, the lack of an 
interaction provided no evidence of group differences in learning to apply the sequence (F(1, 30) 
= 1.45, p = .24, η2p = .05).  
 Sequence validity: Block 2-4 
As an indirect measure of whether the application of the sequence was explicit, mean 
RTs to training sequences on test block 3 (during which the sequence validity was disrupted) 
were compared with mean RTs to training sequences on neighbouring blocks 2 & 4. Both groups 
had increased RTs on the test block 3 compared with neighbouring blocks 2 & 4, and the 
magnitude with which the RTs were increased was similar between the groups (TD: Mean 
difference (M) = 190.94 ms; ASC: M = 170.74 ms; SED = 53.36 ms). A mixed ANOVA using 
factors of Group and Block (Training Sequences Block 3 vs. Block 2&4) supported this 
interpretation: although, the group with ASC was overall slower than the TD group (F(1, 30) = 
4.60, p = .04, η2p = .13), there was a main effect of Block (F(1, 30) = 45.94, p < .001, η
2
p = .61) 
but no evidence of an interaction between Group and Block (F(1, 30) = 0.14, p = .71, η2p = .01). 
The similarly detrimental effect of sequence invalidation to both groups suggested that the 
application of sequence knowledge was similarly explicit between the groups.  
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 SRT Generation task 
Performance was analysed by comparing the percentage of correctly generated sequence 
fragments on training and control sequences. Performance on the training sequence was superior 
to control sequence performance, and thereby implied the groups had learnt to apply the 
sequence (Training: M = 77.90 %; Control: M = 41.74 %; SED = 4.80 %). However, this 
superiority was smaller in the ASC group, as a consequence of the ASC group generating fewer 
correct sequence fragments of training sequences (TD: Mean difference between Training and 
Control sequences (M) = 45.98 %; ASC: M = 26.34 %; SED = 9.60 %). This interpretation was 
supported by a mixed ANOVA with factors of Group and Sequence (Training vs. Control) as 
factors. There was a main effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 5.21, p = .03, η2p = .15) and Sequence 
(F(1, 30) = 56.77, p < .001, η2p = .65), and an interaction between Group and Sequence F(1, 30) 
= 4.19, p = .05, η2p = .12). Closer inspection of the data revealed the source of this interaction: 
while the groups were similar on control sequence generation (TD: M = 40.63 %; ASC: M = 
42.86 %; SED = 5.48 %), they were very different on training sequence generation (TD: M = 
86.61 %; ASC: M = 69.20 %; SED = 6.17 %). Simple effects, investigating the effect of Group 
for each of the training and control sequence generation separately provided statistical evidence 
of a difference between the groups on training (F(1, 30) = 7.96, p = .01, η2p = .21) but not control 
sequences (F(1, 30) = .17, p = .69, η2p < .01). Further simple effects, which considered the effect 
of Sequence in each group separately, established that an effect remained in each group (TD: 
F(1, 15) = 92.15, p < .001, η2p = .86; ASC: F(1, 15) = 10.03, p = .01, η
2
p = .40), and therefore 
implied that the interaction between Group and Sequence in the original analysis was the result 
of the sequence effect being greater in the TD than the ASC group, and not an absence of the 
ASC sequence effect altogether. In summary, this led to the conclusion that both groups were 
able to apply sequence knowledge explicitly, but the TD group were better able to do so, 
evidenced by their superior generation of training sequence fragments.  
3.2.3. Contextual cueing  
 Training: Block 1-2 
Mean RTs to high- and low-frequency contexts were compared as a measure of 
contextual cueing. Figure 12 represents the mean difference between high and low frequency 
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context trials in each trial block for both groups; a difference score greater than zero is evidence 
of contextual cueing. There appeared to be minimal contextual cueing during the training blocks. 
A mixed ANOVA with Group, Context and Block (1-2) as factors provided some support for this 
interpretation. There was a main effect of Block (F(1, 30) = 84.67, p < .001, η2p = .74) and an 
interaction of Group and Block (F(1,30) = 4.42, p = .04, η2p = .13), but no evidence of an overall 
effect of Context (F(1, 30) = 3.96, p = .06, η2p = .12), Group (F(1, 30) = 1.40, p = .25, η
2
p = .04) 
or interaction of Group and Context (F(1, 30) = 0.76, p = .39, η2p = .03). However, there was an 
interaction of Context and Block (F(1, 30) = 4.50, p = .04, η2p = .13). Inspection of Figure 12 
suggests that this interaction arose as a consequence of some contextual cueing in Block 2. 
Indeed, simple effects showed there was evidence of contextual cueing in Block 2(F(1, 31) = 
6.54, p = .02, η2p = .17) but not in Block 1 (F(1, 31) < 0.01, p = .96, η
2
p < .01). This appeared to 
arise chiefly as a consequence of the contextual cueing in the ASC group. The three-way 
interaction that would have supported this interpretation was not significant (F(1, 30) = 0.74, p = 
.40, η2p = .02) but given the Study III finding of atypical attenuation in the ASC group, the 
evidence of contextual cueing in Block 2 was considered separately for each group. Indeed, there 
was evidence of contextual cueing in the ASC group (F(1, 15) = 6.89, p = .02, η2p = .32) but not 
the TD group (F(1, 15) = 1.06, p = .32, η2p = .07). 




Figure 12. In Study IV, the ASC group showed an atypical attenuation of contextual cueing 
across blocks 2-4, as demonstrated by a greater contextual cueing effect. Overall, the effect of 
removing and invalidating sequence information in block 3 caused contextual cueing to increase 
in both groups. Crucially this increase was part of an overall effect of contextual cueing across 
the blocks 2-4 in the ASC, but not the TD, group. Presented are the RT differences between 
contexts across the task. The error bars show twice the standard error of differences between 
group means at different levels of block.  
 Test: Block 2-4 
The analysis of performance in trial blocks 2-4 examined the effect of invalidating and 
removing sequence knowledge during Trial Block 3 on contextual cueing. Mean RTs between 
contexts on Block 3 were compared with those in the two neighbouring blocks 2 and 4.There 
was an increase in contextual cueing on Block 3 relative to Block 2 and 4 (see Figure 12). While 
this pattern was common to both groups, the overall effect of Context appeared greater in the 
ASC group (see Figure 12). A mixed ANOVA with factors of Group, Context and Block (2-4) 
fully corroborated this interpretation. There were overall effects of Group (F(1, 30) = 4.72, p = 
.04, η2p = .14), Context (F(1, 30) = 11.20, p < .01, η
2
p = .27) and Block (F(2, 60) = 56.29, p < 
.001, η2p = .65). There was no evidence of a Group and Block interaction (F(2, 60) = 0.79, p = 
.46, η2p = .03), but critically, there was an interaction between Group and Context (F(1, 30) = 
4.22, p = .05, η2p = .12). This Context by Group interaction reflected an overall greater 
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overall context effect in the ASC (F(1, 15) = 12.04, p < .01, η2p = .45) but not the TD group (F(1, 
15) = 1.06, p = .32, η2p = .07). There was also a Context by Block interaction (F(2, 60) = 8.10, p 
< .01, η2p = .21), reflecting the prominence of the contextual cueing effect in the test block when 
sequence information was removed and invalidated (see Figure 12). A linear contrast, comparing 
the difference between the contexts in Block 3 with the differences in Blocks 2 and 4, confirmed 
that the contextual cueing effect was significantly larger in Block 3 (F(1, 31) = 8.52, p = .01, η2p 
= .22). The increase in contextual cueing appeared equally true for both groups (see Figure 12). 
However, in order to confirm there was a contextual cueing effect in the TD group in Block 3, 
and remove any doubt that might have been raised by the interaction between Group and 
Context, further simple effects demonstrated a significant contextual cueing effect in the TD 
group in Block 3 (F(1, 15) = 5.79, p = .03, η2p = .28). There was no three-way interaction (F(2, 
60) = 0.04, p = .97, η2p < .01). 
Overall, this CC analysis of the test blocks demonstrated that the effect of removing and 
invalidating sequence information in block 3 caused contextual cueing to increase in both 
groups. Crucially, this increase was part of an overall effect of contextual cueing across the 
blocks 2-4 in the ASC group. This overall contextual cueing effect was significantly larger than 
in the TD group, for whom there was no evidence of an overall contextual cueing effect across 
blocks 2-4. 
 CC Generation task 
Performance was analysed by comparing the percentage of correctly generated target 
locations on high-frequency contexts against the chance level of 25 %. There was no evidence 
that overall performance was above chance (M = 5.08 %, SEM = 2.77, t(31) = 1.83, p = .08, d = 
0.32) but there was a difference between the groups (TD: M = -0.78 %; ASC: M = 10.94 %; SED 
= 5.21 %; t(23) = 2.24, p = .03, d = 0.80). However, there was still no convincing evidence of 
above chance performance when each group was considered separately (TD: M = -0.78 %, SEM 
= 2.48, t(15) = 0.32, p = .94, d = 0.08; ASC: M = 10.94 %, SEM = 4.58, t(15) = 2.39, p = .06, d = 
0.60). While, this represented a hint of generation performance in the ASC group, critically, only 
41.37 % of the correct generations provided were answered correctly on both presentations of the 
context. Only these answers that were provided on both presentations of the context represented 
reliable evidence of explicit performance. Yet, there was no evidence that this proportion of 
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repeated responses was greater for correct than incorrect answers (Mean difference between 
percentage of repeated answers for correct and incorrect generations = 11.70 %, SED = 9.96 %, p 
= .26, d = 0.29). Therefore, it appeared that the ASC trend was not indicative of explicit 
generation performance. Correspondingly, participants were less confident about their answers, 
and classified fewer answers as memories, on high-frequency repeated contexts than to 
previously unseen contexts (Mean difference in confidence ratings = 0.19, SED = 0.08, t(15) = 
2.51, p = .02, d = 0.63; Mean difference in percentage of memories = 6.64 %, SED = 3.15 %, 
t(15) = 2.11, p = .05, d = 0.53). Overall, this analysis implied that neither group had strong 
explicit knowledge about contexts and that learning about context was largely implicit. 
3.2.4. Subjective measures 
The analyses of the SRT generation task demonstrated that participants had knowledge 
about the sequence that was explicit, to the extent that it was available for use in more than one 
context. There was further evidence that sequence knowledge was explicit from the subjective 
measures. Specifically, according to the guessing criterion there was no evidence of implicit 
knowledge: when the participants reported themselves to be guessing, there was no evidence that 
training sequences were generated more often than the test sequences (Mean difference = 0.40 
%, SED = 13.08 %, t(14) = 0.03, p = .98, d < 0.01). There was no evidence of a group difference 
in this regard (TD: M = -25.85 %; ASC: M = 23.36 %; SED = 23.52 %; t(13) = 2.09, p = .06, d = 
1.08). Additionally, there was evidence that the knowledge was not implicit because it failed the 
zero-correlation criterion: participants generated more training than control sequences if their 
confidence was high than when it was low (High Confidence, ratings 5 to 7, = 49.61 %; Low 
Confidence, ratings 1 to 4, = 10.66 %; SED = 10.40 %). This difference in generation 
performance depending on confidence was similar between the groups (TD: M = 56.08 %; ASC: 
M = 24.46 %; SED = 20.25 %). A mixed ANOVA on generation performance with factors of 
Group, Sequence (Training vs. Control) and Confidence (High vs. Low) confirmed the 
interaction between Sequence and Confidence (F(1, 22) = 15.81, p < .01, η2p = .42), and was 
consistent with the lack of a three-way interaction with group (F(1, 22) = 2.44, p = .13, η2p = 
.10). 
The analyses of performance in the CC generation task provided no evidence of accurate 
generation performance, and thereby implied that any contextual cueing knowledge was not 
CHAPTER IV  127   
 
 
explicit. Since there was no evidence of accurate CC generation, it was impossible to determine 
whether accurate and inaccurate performances were accompanied by appropriate subjective 
experiences. However, a comparison of subjective measures between the two generation tasks 
allowed a further assessment of sequence knowledge in relation to the zero-correlation criterion. 
Specifically, there was an assessment of whether accurate SRT generation and inaccurate CC 
generation were accompanied with appropriate subjective experiences. Confidence on the SRT-
generation task was greater than the confidence on the unseen contexts from the CC-generation 
task (SRT: M = 5.22; CC: M = 4.11; SED = 0.16), which implied the knowledge that 
underpinned performance on the SRT generation task was explicit. Across both the generation 
tasks, overall confidence was very similar between the groups (TD: M = 4.49; ASC: M = 4.85; 
SED = 0.28). Critically, the difference in confidence between the two tasks was in the same 
direction for both groups, and as was expected given the TD group’s superior performance on the 
SRT-task, the difference was larger in the TD group (TD: M = 1.43; ASC: M = 0.79; SED = 
0.32). A mixed ANOVA on the mean confidence ratings with factors of Group and Generation-
Task (SRT vs. CC-Unseen Contexts) confirmed the greater confidence on the SRT task (F(1, 30) 
= 48.41, p < .001, η2p = .62), and an interaction between Group and Generation-Task (F(1, 30) = 
4.07, p = .05, η2p = .12) confirmed the interpretation that the TD group displayed a greater 
difference in confidence in favour of the SRT task. Simple effects analysis, looking at the 
difference in confidence between tasks in just the ASC group separately (ASC: F(1, 15) = 22.78, 
p < .001, η2p = .60), confirmed that the ASC group was also more confident during the SRT, and 
that the interaction must have stemmed from a greater difference in the TD group. There was no 
evidence of a group difference in overall confidence (F(1, 30) = 1.71, p = .20, η2p = .05). 
Furthermore, both groups classified a greater percentage of answers as memories during 
the SRT as compared to the CC generation task (SRT: M = 54.97 %; CC: M = 17.58 %; SED = 
5.39 %); this also indicated that performance on the SRT generation task was determined by 
explicit knowledge. Across both tasks, the percentage of memory classifications was similar 
between the groups (TD: M = 31.37 %; ASC: M = 41.18 %; SED = 6.74 %). More importantly, 
the difference between the two tasks was in the same direction for both groups, and that 
difference was larger in the TD group (TD: M = 46.34 %; ASC: M = 28.44 %; SED = 10.45). A 
mixed ANOVA with factors of Group and Generation-Task on the mean percentage of answers 
classified as memories corroborated the difference in that percentage between the tasks (F(1, 30) 
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= 51.19, p < .001, η2p = .63). However, the interaction failed to reach significance (F(1, 30) = 
2.93, p = .10, η2p = .09). There was no evidence of a group difference in overall memory 
classification (F(1, 30) = 2.11, p = .16, η2p = .07). 
Altogether, this evidence of accurate subjective knowledge (confidence and 
classification) relating to generation performance reinforced the conclusion that both groups had 
explicit sequence knowledge. Additionally, the finding that the TD compared with the ASC 
group had a greater difference in confidence between tasks provided convergent evidence that 
the TD group had been better than the ASC group at generating sequence fragments explicitly. 
This latter conclusion was supported by the fact that in Study III, when there had been no 
evidence of differences in generation performance, there was no evidence of differences between 
the groups on the subjective measures. 
3.2.5. Direct awareness questions 
Subjective measures, RT analyses and generation performance all suggested that 
sequence knowledge was explicit for both groups by the end of the task. Consistent with this 
finding, all participants from both groups reported that they believed there was usually a 
sequence to the order in which they pressed the keys. Further, 15 of the 16 participants in both 
groups reported that they used the memorised sequence to help them to go faster. Of these 15, 14 
of the TD and 12 of the ASC, participants reported using it to help them within the first two 
blocks. A majority of the participants also demonstrated that they could still repeat the entire 
sequence by correctly producing the 8-digit training sequence at the end of the experiment (15 
TD participants and 13 ASC participants). However, there was no additional evidence from these 
direct questions that could distinguish a group difference in the success with which the sequence 
was applied. 
In contrast to sequence knowledge, there was no convincing evidence from any of the 
previous analyses that contextual knowledge was explicit. Correspondingly, only a minority of 
participants from each group claimed to have noticed some regularity in the contexts (4 out of 
the 16 TD participants and 6 out of the 16 ASC participants), and of those participants only 1 
ASC participant reported trying to memorise any of the contexts. 




In general, Study IV intended to further elucidate ASC differences in explicit processing. 
Specifically, the aim was to determine whether the reduced attenuation of contextual cueing 
shown in the ASC group in Study III was a consequence of a difficulty in learning about the 
actual sequence or poorer application of acquired sequence knowledge. The same method was 
therefore used but with the inclusion of a critical manipulation: a pre-task learning phase in 
which all participants memorised the sequence to the same criterion performance level. 
Consequently, both groups had demonstrably equivalent knowledge of the actual sequence 
information prior to the start of the hybrid task. Thus, any performance differences during the 
hybrid task are attributable to differences in the extent with which the groups had learnt to apply 
that knowledge. Insofar that the two groups did not differ in the degree to which their 
performance was disrupted by the control sequences in the test block, it might be assumed that 
the ASC groups were able to apply the trained sequences typically.  
However, this conclusion is mitigated by several other pieces of evidence showing poorer 
application of sequence knowledge. In detail, the RT data indicated that the ASC group were less 
able to apply their sequence knowledge across blocks 1 & 2 compared to the TD group. This was 
corroborated by the fact that, even though the majority were able to report the entire sequence at 
the end of testing, thus demonstrating knowledge of the sequence, their ability to complete 
sequence fragments and their confidence in the generation task was significantly reduced. 
Finally, they showed evidence of atypical attenuation of contextual cueing. Therefore, these 
performance differences imply that ASC individuals are slower at explicitly applying sequence 
information to sequence learning task success. Additionally, these performance differences imply 
that the disruption by control sequences, on which there was no evidence of group differences, 
may not be a sufficiently sensitive measure of the application of sequence knowledge. 
Although clear evidence of greater contextual cueing in the ASC but not TD group was 
observed in Study IV, this evidence emerged in later trial blocks compared to Study III. Given 
that the only difference in procedure between the two studies was the training on the sequence to 
a criterion performance level prior to beginning the hybrid task in Study IV, the later emergence 
of contextual cueing in the ASC group suggests the explicit sequence knowledge did have an 
effect on contextual cueing in the ASC group early in the task. Presumably their atypical 
attenuation of contextual cueing was shifted to later trials because the explicit sequence 
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knowledge at the outset of the hybrid task slowed the rate at which the ASC group acquired 
implicit contextual cueing. However, complete and typical attenuation of the contextual cueing 
must also be contingent upon learning to apply the sequence knowledge: in Study IV, the group 
with ASC both demonstrated the greater contextual cueing effect in later trial blocks and were 
demonstrably worse in applying their sequence knowledge, as evidenced by inferior sequence 
fragment generation performance. In contrast, by the end of 12 blocks in Study III the ASC 
group had learnt how to apply the sequence as well as the TD group, since there was no evidence 
of a difference between the groups on any of the measures of sequence learning, and accordingly 
there was typical attenuation of contextual cueing. Presumably, the 12 blocks of Study III 
provided sufficient opportunity for the ASC participants to learn how to apply their sequence 
knowledge equivalently to the TD group. 
Also, in contrast to Study III, the groups were comparably fast in the first block. 
Presumably, this was also a consequence of the pre-task manipulation. That is, participants were 
both given the sequence information, and therefore considerable encouragement to apply it. Both 
groups successfully used the sequence knowledge to their advantage, and this therefore 
eliminated the difference between the groups in the first block. It was only with time across the 
blocks, that the TD group’s superior application learning came to cause a group difference.  
4. Chapter Discussion 
Study III used an implicit learning task that encouraged explicit processing to assess 
whether there were differences in explicit sequence learning between ASC and TD individuals 
that were independent of IQ. It was argued at the outset that if the poorer ASC performance on 
those implicit learning procedures that encouraged explicit processing was due simply to lower 
IQ in the ASC groups (Gordon & Stark, 2007; L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, et 
al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000), then we should see no difference in performance in the 
current IQ-matched groups. The findings of Study III demonstrated that final explicit sequence 
learning in ASC and TD individuals was similar in both magnitude and the extent to which it is 
explicit, thereby providing no evidence of final differences between the groups when matched 
for IQ. However, there was evidence that initial explicit sequence learning, which had not before 
been assessed, was atypical in ASC individuals independently of IQ.  
CHAPTER IV  131   
 
 
The early RT slowness in the ASC group was consistent with the ASC group being less 
able to learn the sequence across the first two blocks, but the only conclusive evidence came 
from the atypical attenuation of implicit contextual cueing found in the ASC group during those 
early blocks. Learning explicitly about the sequence typically leads to the selective attenuation of 
learning about the context (Jiménez & Vázquez, in press), as demonstrated by the current TD 
group. Therefore, the absence of the typical attenuation of contextual cueing in the ASC group 
was indicative of slowed explicit sequence learning. Further, for the remainder of the task, once 
explicit sequence knowledge had been learnt, the sequence knowledge modulated performance in 
exactly the same fashion between the two groups: between blocks 3-10, explicit sequence 
knowledge suppressed contextual cueing in both groups, but during the test block when sequence 
knowledge was invalidated, a contextual cueing effect emerged equivalently between the groups.  
Study IV replicated the early RT slowness and atypical attenuation effect in the ASC 
group generally, and provided more evidence of these early explicit differences by revealing an 
ASC difficulty in the SRT generation task and correspondingly less insightful subjective 
measures. This provision of additional evidence arose through the use of a shortened task which 
thereby provided additional measures of sequence learning earlier in the task. Moreover, Study 
IV resolved whether ASC differences in explicit processing stemmed from difficulties in 
explicitly learning about the sequence or difficulties in learning to apply that explicit sequence 
knowledge. Specifically, Study IV demonstrated that there was a difficulty in applying explicit 
sequence knowledge: when learning about the sequence was controlled, such that both groups 
demonstrated equivalent knowledge about the sequence, differences between the groups 
remained. This demonstrated that the difference in explicit processing was a consequence of an 
ASC difficulty in applying explicit sequence knowledge. In contrast, the fact that both groups 
took the same number of attempts to achieve the sequence knowledge in a pre-task phase, 
suggested that explicitly learning about a sequence is not impaired. 
The finding that ASC groups find it more difficult to apply explicit knowledge to task 
success may reconcile some of the discrepancies in previous studies. Specifically, this difficulty 
may be part of the reason why in the past ASC groups have performed worse on implicit tasks 
that encouraged explicit processing, in contrast with those tasks that did not encourage such 
processing. Further, it is possible that this difficulty might also account for other findings 
concerning differences in tasks requiring the quick application of recently acquired explicit 
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knowledge to achieve task success. For example, Study II reported an ASC difficulty in the 
explicit memorisation phase of the Artificial Grammar Learning task. This required participants 
to memorise and then reproduce apparently random letter strings, which had only been shown to 
them for a short period of time. The study found that ASC participants made more errors than the 
TD participants before correctly reproducing a letter string. Similarly in an explicit 
reinforcement learning task, Yechiam, Arshavsky, Shamay-Tsoory, Yaniv, & Aharon (2010) 
found ASC differences in the capacity for recently learnt choice-outcomes to affect behaviour, 
with ASC performance instead dominated by a cognitive style that placed value on exploratory 
choices. 
 This finding of difficulties in applying explicit learning in ASC is perhaps not surprising. 
Explicit processing requires flexibility and intentional processing (e.g., Cleeremans & Jiménez, 
2002) and the current findings resonate with a body of literature concerning impairments in 
executive functions involving flexibility and intentional processing in ASC (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
et al., 2000; Happé & Frith, 2006; Hill, 2004; Russell, 1997a). Furthermore, previous studies 
have documented an atypical propensity in ASC individuals to rely on explicit strategies when it 
is not typical to do so (e.g., on a Rotary Pursuit task, Gidley Larson & Mostofsky, 2008; on an 
Artificial Grammar Learning task, L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; and, on Theory of Mind tasks, 
Happé, 1995; Hill & Frith, 2003). Such a propensity, together with the kind of impairment 
documented in Studies III and IV, could amount to considerable impairment over a large range 
of learnt skills. It is worth noting that although the Studies III and IV have not documented any 
ASC propensity for explicit strategies, this is not surprising. These studies had minimal 
sensitivity to measure such propensity for explicit strategy use because the simplicity of the 
sequence learning task strongly encouraged all participants to use explicit strategies. 
In addition to detecting difficulties in applying explicit learning, both Studies III and IV 
provided further demonstrations of intact implicit learning in ASC (Study II, Barnes, et al., 2008; 
Kourkoulou, et al., 2010; Travers, et al., 2010). The contextual cueing observed in the ASC 
group in both studies was demonstrably implicit in that the improved RTs were accompanied by 
an inability to perform on the generation task, together with appropriately implicit accompanying 
subjective measures. The current replication of intact implicit learning, together with the 
previous demonstrations (Study II, Barnes, et al., 2008; Kourkoulou, et al., 2010; Travers, et al., 
2010), pose a challenge to the common assumption that it is deficits in implicit learning that 
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underpin the difficulties observed in ASC in those real-world domains associated with implicit 
acquisition, such as language, social and motor skills. The solution lies in the obvious fact that 
intact implicit learning is necessary to the implicit acquisition of real-world skills but it is not 
sufficient. There are many other processes that might be different in ASC, which would be 
sufficient to disrupt the implicit acquisition of those skills, in spite of otherwise intact implicit 
learning mechanisms.  
One mechanism that has already been suggested is that there is an ASC overuse of 
atypical explicit strategies. Another candidate is the well-documented unusual attention 
allocation in ASC. Unusual attention may disrupt the appropriate sampling of the relevant 
features of the real world situation for implicit learning to proceed (Courchesne, et al., 1994; 
Happé & Frith, 2006; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). Indeed, on an adapted 
version of the contextual cueing procedure, in which the local context was random and only the 
global context cued participants, ASC performance was found to be inferior to TD performance 
(M. R. Klinger, Klinger, Travers, & Mussey, 2008). This might be explained by an ASC 
attentional preference of the local over the global context (Happé & Frith, 2006) that obstructed 
the learning. Since this thesis documents preserved implicit learning in ASC, it predicts that there 
might be superior performance by individuals with ASC on implicit learning tasks in which the 
relevant features for learning are those to which individuals with ASCs have an attentional bias 
(Heaton & Wallace, 2004; Mottron, et al., 2006). In line with this speculation, Kourkoulou and 
colleagues (2010) demonstrated enhanced implicit learning of the local context in the contextual 
cueing paradigm. Further, in a more ecologically valid example, Grossman and Tager-Flusberg 
(2008) demonstrated enhanced performance on a task involving mouth expertise – an area of the 
face to which ASC individuals allocate an unusual amount of attention. 
Another possible explanation is that the knowledge derived from implicit learning is not 
applied successfully in the real world. This possibility cannot be assessed easily by the standard 
implicit procedures that demonstrate learning by indirect assessments or forced choices. In the 
real world the products of implicit learning must be utilised in ways above and beyond those 
demanded by these laboratory procedures. For example, according to a theory which understands 
implicit learning within a graded consciousness framework (Cleeremans, 2006; Cleeremans & 
Jiménez, 2002), there would be further utility from implicit learning when there is also potential 
for its products to emerge into awareness and under cognitive control. Equally, in line with ideas 
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and theorising on the role of implicit learning in intuition (Eraut, 2004; Hogarth, 2001), there 
would be further advantage from implicit learning if it exists in tandem with an ability to know 
when to act on the implicitly acquired knowledge. Thus, if individuals had difficulties with either 
of these related capacities, then they would present with difficulties in everyday abilities 
associated with implicit acquisitions, regardless of the learning mechanisms. Although, this is a 
unique hypothesis in relation to implicit learning in ASC, I am not the first author to allude to a 
relevant dissociation between capability and application in ASC (e.g., Minshew, Meyer, & 
Goldstein, 2002; Soulières, et al., 2007). Further, consistent with this discussion, ASC 
impairment in the successful application of implicitly acquired information would tessellate with 
“a recent shift toward understanding ASC in the context of dysfunctions in introspection or self-
referential processing” (Chiu, et al., 2008, p. 468; e.g., Ben Shalom, et al., 2006; Hill, Berthoz, 
& Frith, 2004; Iacoboni, 2006; Kennedy, Redcay, & Courchesne, 2006; Lind & Bowler, 2008; 
Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Kotronopoulou, 2007; Russell, 1997b; Toichi, 2008; Williams & 
Happé, 2009).  
Additionally, there might be impairments in the long-term consolidation of skills 
associated with an implicit acquisition in ASC. Studies have emphasised the crucial importance 
of consolidation, or off-line learning, to further improvement after implicit learning, and the role 
of sleep for determining the relative improvement of implicit and explicit learning contributions 
(for a review, see Song, 2009). In particular, sleep seems particularly relevant to the subsequent 
development of insight from implicit learning episodes (U. Wagner, Gais, Haider, Verleger, & 
Born, 2004). ASC is highly associated with sleep difficulties (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). Therefore, ASC differences in the consolidation of implicitly learnt information may 
account for some of the ASC deficits in everyday skills associated with implicit acquisition. 
Finally, I have already proposed that ASC attentional biases together with intact implicit 
learning predicts the possibility of ASC superiority in acquiring skills or information that appeals 
to those biases. Additionally, I propose that atypical explicit strategies can result in similar 
superiority. Indeed, Studies III and IV provide an empirical example of ASC superiority in what 
information is learnt implicitly about the context, but not as a consequence of characteristic 
attentional biases. Namely, the ASC group demonstrated contextual cueing, as a consequence of 
ASC differences in explicit use of sequence information and thus atypical attenuation of 
attention to the context. Clearly, the current finding can be regarded as an ASC superiority in the 
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implicit acquisition of contextual cueing compared to the TD group. By contrast, the TD group 
directed their attention towards the explicit component of the task, thereby preventing the TD 
group from acquiring implicit contextual cueing to the same degree as the ASC group. Rather 
than a deficit in implicit learning, it thus appears that there can be ASC superiority in what is 
learnt implicitly, as a consequence of differences in the information that is processed and 
attended. I can speculate further about the significance of a superior implicit acquisition of 
certain information: if it is the case that savant talent results, in part, from implicit learning 
(Mottron, et al., 2006), then it is clearly possible that the development of a savant skill results 
from the interaction between atypical explicit processing, attentional biases and typical, intact 
implicit processing. 
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V. General Discussion 
This thesis began with a review of the implicit learning literature, and concluded that an 
analysis of functional differences in implicit learning is a valid and important research topic. In 
particular, the evidence supporting the existence of functional differences is equivocal, and 
researchers argue that the issue could be resolved, or at least better understood, by further 
empirical exploration (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press; A. S. 
Reber, 1993; A. S. Reber & Allen, 2000). Therefore, this thesis analysed whether functional 
differences exist in two areas that have produced promising findings: individual differences in 
typical populations (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press) and group 
differences between Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC) and Typically Developing (TD) 
individuals (e.g., L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000). Overall, the results from 
four studies emphasised a lack of functional differences in implicit learning between individuals. 
In this final chapter, the key ideas and results already presented will be reiterated, and then 
discussed within a broader context.  
1. Final Summary 
The general aim of Study I was to test the claim that there are meaningful individual 
differences in implicit learning. In order to achieve that aim, it was first necessary to replicate the 
overlap between implicit learning tests identified by Gebauer and Mackintosh (2010). Similarly, 
it was necessary to re-establish the independence of implicit learning from IQ-mediated explicit 
processing (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press; A. S. Reber, et 
al., 1991), and investigate possible relationships between implicit learning and intuitive aspects 
of personality (Kaufman, et al., in press). Additionally, in order to establish whether implicit 
learning was related to meaningful differences in everyday performance other than second 
language acquisition (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press), the study 
investigated whether implicit learning was related to occupational achievement. It has been 
proposed that tacit knowledge may be the intermediary construct that mediates the influence of 
implicit learning influence on behaviour (Mackintosh, 1998). Therefore, the study also examined 
the relationship between occupational tacit knowledge and implicit learning. Finally, in order to 
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understand fully the implications of a tacit knowledge and implicit learning relationship, the 
study explored contentious issues in the tacit knowledge literature, such as the generality of tacit 
knowledge and its relationship with IQ, personality and practice (e.g., Gottfredson, 2003a, 
2003b; McDaniel & Nguyen, 2001; McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005; Sternberg, 2003). To address all 
these issues, data were collected from 103 academic psychologists, who completed three implicit 
learning tasks (SRT, AGL, IFL tasks), two IQ sub-tests (DAT verbal and analogical reasoning 
tests), one personality questionnaire (Big Five Inventory), three Tacit Knowledge Inventories 
(Academic Psychology, Business Management and CSQ) and one General Questionnaire 
pertaining to their educational and occupational histories.  
Critically, there was no evidence of inter-correlation between the implicit learning tasks, 
nor was there any evidence to relate performance on any of the implicit learning tasks to IQ, 
occupational achievement, personality or tacit knowledge. Therefore, the results implied that 
there are not substantial individual differences in implicit learning. The study did replicate a 
finding that is important to the distinction between implicit and explicit learning: indices of 
explicit processing, but not performance on implicit learning tasks, were correlated with IQ (e.g., 
Carroll, 1993; Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007, 2010; Kaufman, et al., in press; A. S. Reber, et al., 
1991). Finally, Academic Psychology and Business Management Tacit Knowledge Inventories 
were found to measure knowledge that predicted occupational achievement in academic 
psychology incrementally to IQ and personality, and was general to both occupations. 
Importantly, however, tacit knowledge appeared to be acquired primarily as a function of 
practice and experience, rather than individual differences in implicit learning. 
Overall, Study I represents one of four large-scale studies to explore the possibility of 
individual differences in implicit learning. All four studies dissociated implicit performance from 
explicit, IQ related performance, while two of the studies also found individual relationships 
between implicit learning tasks and real-world measures (second language acquisition and 
personality). However, critically, three of the four studies have now failed to find inter-
relationships between implicit learning tasks (Study I, Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Kaufman, 
2009). Gebauer and Mackintosh (2010) did find evidence of significant relationships between 
several implicit learning tasks, and related the general implicit component to second language 
acquisition. This represents the only evidence for the idea that implicit learning is a general 
ability in the typical population that underpins meaningful individual differences. Gebauer and 
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Mackintosh (2010) suggested that the shared variance was uniquely apparent in their study 
because of the large number of implicit learning measures employed; 15 different indices of 
implicit learning were inter-correlated. However, the authors still described the overlap between 
their tasks as “modest” (for example, only twenty-seven of the one-hundred and five correlations 
between the indices were significant) and noted that further replications were necessary to 
establish the result. Additionally, the relationship between the ability and second-language was 
small (r = .15). Thus, the evidence for important individual differences in implicit learning is 
weak. Instead, I assert that overall the evidence is consistent with A. S. Reber’s (1993) prediction 
that individual differences in implicit learning are minimal. 
Concurrently to the investigation in Study I, the issue of functional differences in implicit 
learning was explored using a group-differences approach, which compared implicit learning in 
ASC and TD children. The diagnosis of ASC is dependent on the presence of social, 
communicative and motor impairments, which are all areas of functioning considered to be 
acquired, at least in part, by implicit processes. Thus, if ASC individuals also demonstrated a 
general deficit on implicit learning tasks, then there would be evidence that general implicit 
learning differences have important, functional consequences for behaviour. In order to assess 
whether ASC individuals have a general deficit in implicit learning, it was necessary to compare 
groups of ASC and TD individuals on a range of implicit learning tasks. The range was 
important to control for variations in task demands and to allow conclusions about implicit 
learning in general. Additionally, it was important to compare the groups on an overtly explicit 
learning task. I argued that in several previous attempts to assess implicit learning in ASC 
explicit, rather than implicit, learning was unintentionally measured, and that in groups 
unmatched for IQ, it was the explicit processes that were responsible for the observed ASC 
performance deficits (e.g., Gordon & Stark, 2007; L. G. Klinger & Dawson, 2001; L. G. Klinger, 
et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et al., 2000). The validity of this alternative interpretation of previous 
studies’ results was tested by comparing the relative patterns of implicit and explicit learning 
performance in groups of children with ASC and TD children, both matched and unmatched for 
IQ. Lastly, in order to assess the possibility that any implicit learning deficit underpinned the 
poor social, communicative and motor abilities prominent in ASC, the study included a 
quantitative index of ASC symptomatology, which could have been correlated with any 
performance deficits. Therefore, in Study II data were collected from ASC and TD individuals, 
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who completed four implicit learning tasks (CC, SRT, AGL, and PCL tasks), one explicit 
learning task (PAL task), an IQ test (WASI) and an index of ASC symptomatology (SCQ). 
Most importantly, there was convincing evidence that implicit learning is intact in ASC: 
performance on each of the four implicit learning tasks was equivalent between the two groups. 
It was argued that deficits reported in previous studies must have resulted from the differences 
between their task procedures and those used here (e.g., L. G. Klinger, et al., 2007; Mostofsky, et 
al., 2000). In particular, I argued that those studies that had found deficits used procedures that 
encouraged explicit strategies, which specifically disadvantaged the ASC groups who had not 
been matched for IQ. Statistical comparisons of matched and unmatched groups from Study II 
supported this interpretation of previous studies. Specifically, performance on the explicit 
learning task was not significantly different between the ASC and TD groups as far as they were 
matched for IQ, but an ASC deficit in explicit learning performance was revealed when the full 
(non-IQ-matched) samples were considered. In direct contrast, the evidence of equivalent ASC 
and TD implicit learning performances remained. This contrast demonstrated that a lower IQ was 
a disadvantage to the ASC group on explicit but not implicit learning tasks.  
In order to determine whether the previous reports of implicit learning deficits in ASC 
resulted just from differences in IQ, or whether there was also a contribution from an ASC 
difficulty in explicit learning that was independent of IQ, Study III compared ASC individuals 
with IQ-matched TD individuals on an implicit learning task that encouraged explicit strategies. 
Specifically, the study used a simple sequence learning procedure that had been found to result in 
a considerable amount of explicit knowledge. This SRT procedure was combined with a 
contextual cueing task that provided an indirect, ongoing index of the extent to which sequence 
learning was explicit. Essentially, the contextual cueing effect is attenuated only when the 
learning and use of sequence information is explicit (Jiménez & Vázquez, in press). 
The two groups achieved a significant and similar final level of explicit sequence 
learning, and thereby implied that there were no differences between ASC and TD individuals in 
final explicit sequence learning when matched for IQ. However, there was also evidence that 
ASC individuals were slower to learn and/or apply the sequence explicitly, irrespective of IQ. 
Specifically, there was a suggestion that the ASC group were initially slower. This reduced 
explicit processing was corroborated by the atypical attenuation of implicit contextual cueing in 
the ASC group during the first two blocks of the task. In order to verify that the attenuation was 
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atypical, direct comparisons were made with the contextual cueing effects of the groups from 
Study II. Those analyses suggested that the presence of a sequence had inhibited contextual 
cueing in the initial, equivalent blocks in TD individuals. In contrast, there was no evidence that 
the sequence had any effect on the contextual cueing of ASC individuals during the initial, 
equivalent blocks. 
Overall, the findings of Study III indicated a difference in initial explicit sequence 
learning in ASC. However, the nature of the difference was not clear. It was possible that the 
reduced attenuation of contextual cueing in the ASC group was a consequence of either a 
difficulty in the initial acquisition of the actual sequence information or poorer initial application 
of that acquired sequence knowledge. Study IV attempted to tease apart whether the reduced 
effect of explicit processing on contextual cueing in the ASC group was due to slower explicit 
learning about a sequence or reduced ability to apply explicit sequence knowledge. In order to 
distinguish these possibilities, a similar procedure was used but with the critical inclusion of a 
pre-task learning phase, during which all participants memorised the sequence to the same 
criterion performance level. Having eliminated the possibility for differences in learning about 
the sequence with this manipulation, remaining performance differences would imply that ASC 
individuals are slower at explicitly learning to apply sequence information to sequence learning 
task success. Additionally, the differences between the groups had been identified early in the 
task in Study III. Thus, in Study IV, in order to provide additional measures of sequence learning 
earlier in the task, the task was shortened such that the third block was the test block, and the 
generation tasks were completed after the fourth block. 
Although the two groups did not differ in the degree to which their performance was 
disrupted by the control sequences in the test block, there were several measures that implied 
there was still an ASC difficulty. Study IV provided a general replication of the early RT 
slowness and atypical attenuation of the contextual cueing effect in the ASC group. Additionally, 
there was an ASC difficulty on the SRT generation task, and correspondingly less insightful 
subjective measures. Thus, several performance differences existed between the ASC and TD 
groups. The pre-task phase had controlled for any group differences in explicit learning about the 
sequence by enforcing a criterion performance level, which ensured that all participants had 
equivalent explicit sequence knowledge prior to beginning the task phase proper. Therefore, the 
performance differences during the task must have stemmed from an ASC difficulty in learning 
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to apply that explicit sequence knowledge. In contrast, the criterion performance level enforced 
in the pre-task phase was reached in a similar number of attempts by the two groups, which 
demonstrated that explicitly learning about sequence information was not impaired in ASC. 
Thus, Study IV had replicated the ASC difficulty identified in Study III, and elaborated the 
nature of that difficulty: ASC individuals were able to learn sequence information explicitly but 
they had a specific difficulty with learning to apply that explicit information. 
In addition to providing insight into explicit sequence learning in ASC, the contextual 
cueing effect in the ASC group in Studies III and IV also represented further evidence that 
implicit learning was intact. Therefore, Studies II, III and IV had all provided evidence of intact 
implicit learning in ASC. Some researchers have previously argued that ASC individuals use 
explicit, IQ-related strategies to compensate for their deficits in implicit learning (L. G. Klinger, 
et al., 2007), and thus might contend that the current demonstrations of intact implicit learning in 
ASC reflect explicit compensation. However, this argument is repudiated by three sets of results 
across the three studies. First, in two examples of intact implicit learning, the contextual cueing 
effects in Studies III and IV, the ASC individuals could not explicitly generate examples of the 
contexts on the CC generation task. Second in Study II, the introduction of additional 
participants into the analysis, which resulted in an ASC group with a lower IQ than the TD 
group, had a different effect on the group comparisons of the implicit and explicit learning 
performances. Insofar that the ASC implicit learning performance was actually underpinned by 
explicit strategies, this lack of IQ matching between the two groups should have resulted in 
poorer implicit and explicit task performance being observed in the ASC relative to the TD 
group. Instead, the ASC group were disadvantaged by a lower IQ on the explicit, but not 
implicit, learning tasks. Third, there are several pieces of evidence to suggest that explicit 
learning is actually worse in ASC, independently of IQ. For example, the IQ-matched ASC 
group was significantly worse than the typical group on the explicit memorisation phase of the 
AGL task. Moreover, in Studies III and IV the ASC groups had difficulty on the SRT task when 
the learning was more explicit, as a consequence of a difficulty with applying their explicit 
sequence knowledge. 
Thus, there is good evidence that implicit learning performance in ASC is not achieved 
by compensatory explicit strategies. Instead, implicit learning is intact in ASC and in fact ASC 
individuals appear to have some difficulties with explicit processing. At this point, it is worth 
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reflecting upon the ASC difficulty that was observed in applying explicit sequence knowledge in 
Studies III and IV. The fact that there was no evidence of this difficulty after 12 blocks of 
training in Study III shows that the initial difficulty was transient in this particular task. 
However, it clearly raises the possibility that in more complex contexts (e.g., on-going social 
interactions), subtle difficulties in applying explicit knowledge could have a much more 
detrimental effect on behaviour. Thus, this finding is relevant within a broader context because it 
insists that research attention should be shifted away from the possibility of difficulties in 
implicit learning and back towards how differences in more explicit, cognitive, executive 
strategies emerge and affect autistic behaviour. This idea that ASC individuals actually have 
more difficulty with explicit than implicit learning corresponds with ASC literature concerning 
impairments in executive functions, which require flexible and intentional processing (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Happé & Frith, 2006; Hill, 2004; Russell, 1997a) 
An additional consequence of establishing that implicit learning is intact in ASC is that 
ideas about the role implicit learning might play in savant skills can be more deeply explored 
(e.g., Mottron, et al., 2006). Intact implicit learning combined with attentional biases towards a 
subset of information, which happen to be critical for task success, and atypical explicit 
strategies (which may produce such attentional biases) certainly present a plausible explanation 
for the unusual acquisition of skill in one particular area, i.e. a savant skill. In line with that 
possibility, Studies III and IV have demonstrated superior contextual cueing in the first two 
blocks as a consequence of atypical explicit strategies. Similarly, Kourkoulou and colleagues 
(2010) demonstrated enhanced implicit learning of features appealing to an ASC attentional bias. 
Specifically, ASC individuals learnt more than TD individuals about the local context in a 
contextual cueing paradigm. 
Finally, the finding that implicit learning is intact in ASC might appear incongruous with 
the observation that ASC individuals have diagnostic impairment in skills associated with an 
implicit acquisition such as language, social and movement skills. The two findings are 
reconciled by the idea that the implicit acquisition of skills depends on more than just an intact 
implicit learning. A number of additional factors have been discussed that might be particularly 
relevant in ASC: interference due to abnormal attentional biases or the overuse of explicit 
strategies; difficulties with the application of implicitly acquired knowledge; and atypical 
consolidation following the learning. It is hoped that this discussion will promote further 
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research into whether those factors do play a specific role in ASC difficulties in social, language 
and movement skills. Such research might also springboard a deeper understanding of the 
broader relationship between what people can learn implicitly and what they actually do learn 
implicitly in the real world. 
In summary, the thesis provided no evidence for the proposal that there are functional 
differences between individuals in implicit learning. Instead, the thesis was consistent with the 
idea that individual differences in implicit learning are minimal. 
2. Discussion 
2.1. The Generality of Implicit Learning 
Within the psychometric tradition, ability must be defined in reference to performance 
(e.g., Carroll, 1993). Whenever performance on a task varies between individuals, it would be 
valid to conclude that those individuals differed in their specific ability to perform that particular 
task at that given point in time. However, talking about a specific ability to perform a specific 
task at a specific point in time is of little explanatory value. The theoretical utility arises when it 
is believed there is an ability that refers to reliable performance on a variety of similar tasks. 
Therefore, the psychometric foundation for demonstrating the existence of general abilities is the 
inter-correlation between performances on multiple different tasks; a positive manifold. The 
finding that implicit learning performances in Study I did not inter-correlate, and my assertion 
that the wider literature implies that such inter-correlation is minimal, indicates that, according to 
psychometric principles, there is no general ability underpinning implicit learning. 
At the end of Chapter II, I discussed how general, prerequisite processes might be always 
necessary for implicit learning, but without those processes determining the variation in how 
much was learnt implicitly. Specifically, I argued that providing the prerequisite processes 
remained intact, the performance variance would depend on differences in other processes and 
factors relating to the specifics of the situation. Within such a framework, the prerequisite 
processes would not constitute a psychometric ability but could be conceptualised as general 
implicit learning processes. Finally, I argued that in order to make an empirical case for this 
theoretical position, it would be necessary to identify an atypical population who consistently 
demonstrated profound deficits on all implicit learning tasks and skills associated with an 
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implicit acquisition. However, there is currently no convincing evidence that such a group exists 
(see review at end of Chapter I). At the beginning of Chapter III, I argued that ASC was a 
plausible candidate. The three studies presented in Chapters III and IV, together with other recent 
research, has now established that ASC individuals can learn implicitly. The ASC population has 
become the latest in a long line of atypical populations to have been shown to be capable of 
implicit learning performance on at least one implicit learning task. Consistent with such 
findings, A. S. Reber predicted that general, prerequisite implicit learning processes would be so 
fundamental to life that they would be highly robust to all neurological impairment (A. S. Reber, 
1993). While this idea of prerequisite and robust processes for implicit learning might be true, 
insofar that no population has been identified without such processes, the idea is unsupported. 
Taken together with the evidence to suggest implicit learning performance does not inter-
correlate, it is parsimonious to conclude that there is neither a general implicit learning ability, 
nor general, prerequisite implicit learning processes. 
This conclusion should force some researchers to re-evaluate what it is they mean, or at 
least take more care, when they invoke the term implicit learning. I assert that insofar that 
implicit learning does not refer to a general ability or general processes it can only be a 
descriptive label of the manner in which a wide variety of processes are differentially engaged 
depending on the circumstances. Moreover, the key aspect of the description must be defined by 
the absence, or minimal influence, of explicit processing. If not defined by an absence, 
researchers should have found evidence of an ability or prerequisite process. 
Finally, within the psychometric exploration of mental ability, this absence of generality 
in implicit learning means that there is still little evidence of general mental abilities that are 
completely independent of IQ, and reliably related to differences in intelligent behaviour. This 
continuing lack of evidence reinforces IQ tests as the best, and maybe only, indicators of general 
cognitive abilities, which can successfully predict some differences in intelligent behaviour. This 
does not rule out a variety of other important factors in intelligent behaviour, such as motivation, 
personality, tacit knowledge, experiential learning and so on. Instead, the implication is focused 
on the lack of evidence for the conception of other factors as general abilities. 
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2.2. The Validity of the Implicit-Explicit Distinction 
In Chapter I, the implicit learning literature was reviewed. This thesis asserted that there 
is a consensus that people can learn when they are not primarily engaged in trying to learn 
explicitly and deliberately, and are consequently unable to report verbally on how or what they 
learnt. The inability of participants to provide insightful descriptions of how or what they learnt 
during the implicit learning tasks they completed in Study I, II, III, and IV was consistent with 
those earlier assertions about the implicit-explicit distinction. Additionally, the results from the 
CC task in Studies III and IV provided demonstrations of implicit contextual cueing without 
evidence of successful explicit generation performance. The power of any generation task can be 
questioned, and it is acknowledged that a more powerful generation task might have provided 
evidence of generation performance (e.g., Smyth & Shanks, 2008). Nonetheless, I assert, as I did 
in the general introduction, that while the counter-evidence from a variety of methodologies, 
such as a highly powerful generation task, might question the definitive absence of 
consciousness during learning, such evidence is indicative of something less than the actual 
definition of consciousness that inspired the methodologies. For example, generation tasks are 
inspired by the idea that a conscious mental state is critically defined by the “availability for use 
in reasoning and for rationally guiding speech and action” (Block, 1995, p. 227). The detection 
of generation performance only when the task is extremely powerful does not suggest that the 
knowledge is readily available to influence behaviour rationally; instead the result suggests that 
the influence on behaviour is probabilistic and not fully conscious. 
In addition to these arguments, this thesis asserted that functional differences between 
implicit and explicit learning provide further reason for retaining the distinction between them. 
In particular, this thesis identified the existence of plausible comparative and evolutionary 
frameworks; the differences in computational models that explain much of the different types of 
learning; different neural sites associated with the different modes of learning; and contrasting 
relationships of implicit and explicit learning with durability, age and IQ. In the empirical 
chapters, the contrasting relationship with IQ was replicated: specifically, in Studies I and II 
explicit, but not implicit, learning was related to IQ. Additionally, Studies II, III and IV provided 
another functional distinction between implicit and explicit learning: ASC individuals have 
difficulties with aspects of explicit but not implicit learning. 
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In summary, this thesis provides evidence in favour of retaining the distinction between 
implicit and explicit learning. When evaluated together with previous literature, which was 
reviewed in Chapter I, there should be no doubt that a descriptive distinction between explicit 
and implicit learning is both valid and useful. This remains true even when this thesis has 
asserted that implicit learning is defined by the absence, or minimal influence, of explicit 
processing rather than the general presence of an implicit learning ability or processes. 
2.3. Disagreements on Implicit Learning 
At the outset of the thesis, it was acknowledged that there is fierce debate within the 
implicit learning literature on a number of issues such as the role of awareness in learning, the 
nature of consciousness and the modularity of learning systems. However, it was asserted that 
there were also areas of agreement, such as the existence of a conservative definition of implicit 
learning and some functional distinctions from explicit learning, which therefore legitimised the 
functional analysis of differences in implicit learning adopted by this thesis. Nonetheless, I 
correctly anticipated that my functional investigation might also indirectly contribute to some 
areas of fierce debate. 
For example, the conclusion that implicit learning does not reflect a general ability or 
general processes, in contrast to the well-established generality underpinning explicit, IQ-
mediated learning, informs debate on the modularity of learning systems. Specifically, this 
conclusion argues against the strong position that there are two distinct, general-purpose 
learning systems (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2010). However, the findings do not distinguish 
between several alternative ideas about the broad structures of learning systems. For example, 
the findings are consistent with the multifaceted proposal that learning occurs through 
connectionist-type networks; that explicit propositions can emerge from the basic operations of 
those networks; and that explicit propositions are capable of top-down influence on those 
networks (e.g., Shanks, 2009). In this scenario, whenever global, explicit propositions exert top-
down influence on a network, performance would correlate with other explicit performance and 
global characteristics, such as IQ. However, in scenarios in which explicit, top-down influences 
are relatively minimised, the relevant connectionist network would learn according to the 
specifics of the inputs into that system, and its basic pre-existing architecture, and would 
therefore vary substantially between different implicit learning tasks for the same individual. 
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Thus, the contrasting generality between implicit and explicit learning finding is consistent with 
this idea of a learning system: the idea retains distinctions between implicit and explicit learning 
but specifies only one source that causes similarities between performances. 
However, the finding of contrasting generality cannot rule out the possibility that learning 
could also occur according to reasoning/hypothesis-testing with explicit propositions, which 
could function independently of connectionist-type architectures (e.g., Scott & Dienes, in press). 
In this scenario there would still be only one source of generality: performance would inter-
correlate only when either the explicit-proposition based system was utilised or when there was a 
significant top-down influence from the explicit proposition based system onto connectionist 
architecture. 
Finally, another possibility that the finding of contrasting generality cannot completely 
dismiss is the primacy of a propositional learning system (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, et 
al., 2009). In this scenario, perhaps the complex information presented in implicit learning tasks 
is unsuited to reasoning with propositions, and that as a consequence learning is fragmentary and 
unsystematic. In combination with the lack of instruction about what, or even whether, to learn, 
the overall result is that performance is extremely idiosyncratic and noisy, and therefore 
uncorrelated across different implicit learning tasks. However, the success of connectionist 
models in simulating performance on implicit learning tasks argues against a framework that 
disregards the connectionist framework completely, such as this predominantly propositional 
approach to learning. 
In relation to the nature of consciousness, this thesis can only offer a modest contribution: 
the findings re-emphasised the global, pervasive nature of consciousness (e.g., Block, 1995). 
Specifically, in Study I of this thesis, when learning had been explicit and thus influenced by 
consciousness, performance had been related to other high-level, global characteristics such as 
IQ. Additionally, explicit learning was linked with ASC, which is associated with differences in 
global, cognitive functions. In contrast, when conscious input into learning was minimal, or 
absent, there seemed to be little relationship between performance and global characteristics. 
Thus, consciousness was emphasised as global and related to reliable, global characteristics, 
which are critical to mediating some important differences between people. 
Lastly, this thesis is unable to make a novel contribution to the debate about the role of 
awareness in learning. Instead, findings that have been cited as demonstrations of learning 
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without awareness were replicated. For example, performance on all the implicit learning tasks 
in this thesis demonstrated that people could learn when they were not primarily engaged in 
trying to learn, and that consequently they were unable to report verbally on how or what they 
learnt. Additionally, in Studies III and IV, individuals demonstrated contextual cueing effects but 
provided no evidence that they were able to perform above chance on the associated generation 
task. This result implied that the contextual cueing knowledge, which underpinned the contextual 
cueing effect, was learnt without awareness because it was not available to be used in another 
context. However, there is no novel evidence that might convince researchers who had been 
sceptical of such evidence in the past. In these particular cases, the argument still exists that tests 
more sensitive than verbal reports, and generation tasks more powerful than the task used in 
Studies III and IV, could provide evidence of some relevant knowledge. 
More generally, the broader arguments reviewed in Chapter I also persist. For example, 
what criteria should be used to evaluate whether a learning performance demonstrates the 
objective absence of consciousness; what is the definition of consciousness; and to what extent 
do methodologies actually embody those definitions? As a result of this thesis providing no new 
evidence to address these questions, I reiterate my earlier interpretation that a definitive 
demonstration of learning without awareness might be intractable until the field has a better idea 
and understanding of consciousness. However, I also reassert that this conclusion does not 
concede that all learning is fully conscious; I argue that all the counter-evidence, which questions 
the definitive absence of consciousness, demonstrates something less than the actual definitions 
of consciousness that inspired each of the related methodologies. This assessment implies that 
there is still a distinction between implicit and explicit learning; a position which is supported by 
the existence of functional differences between implicit and explicit learning. Perhaps, the idea 
of ‘fringe consciousness’ is useful to researchers willing to acknowledge a distinction but 
reluctant to classify implicit learning as completely unconscious (e.g., Norman, Price, & Duff, 
2006). 
2.4. Implications for Future Functional Investigations of Implicit Learning 
In the context of the limited importance of individual differences in general implicit 
learning, it is worth reflecting upon the value of further research into the possibility. This is a 
particularly relevant concern because of the large sample size and large number of tasks required 
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for this kind of investigation. If such research is pursued, then the use of subjective measures 
should be used to help provide a more accurate estimate of implicit learning (e.g., Dienes, 2008). 
These measures dissociate exactly which aspects of a performance reflect implicit knowledge by 
classifying answers according to subjective criteria of consciousness. However, this technique is 
only possible where performance and subjective measures can be provided simultaneously, such 
as the test phases of the AGL, PCL and IFL. 
Another important implication is that if implicit learning is investigated in atypical 
populations again, then researchers should be hesitant to talk about a general deficit in ‘implicit 
learning’. If there is a deficit in performance on one or two implicit learning tasks, there would 
be a strong possibility that the deficits were actually reflecting a difference in other cognitive 
processes, such as attention or perceptual processing. A conclusion relating to a general deficit in 
implicit learning would be justified only if performance on a large number of diverse implicit 
learning tasks was catastrophically impaired, and that the population were also associated with 
deficits in implicit skills. Additionally, such a finding would be sufficient to reconceptualise 
implicit learning. The finding would imply that a minimum number of prerequisite processes are 
always necessary for implicit learning, and are affected in the relevant patient group, but that 
once those prerequisite processes are intact, the variance in how much is learnt implicitly is 
dependent on a variety of other processes. 
However, these implications for both the individual- and group-differences approaches to 
implicit learning might be re-evaluated as new tasks are developed. Dienes, Baddeley and Jansari 
(2010) have argued that insofar that implicit learning does reflect any general parameters of a 
connectionist/neural network, such as learning rate, then implicit learning tasks are likely to 
provide poor estimations of such parameters. For example, neural network modelling has shown 
that different learning environments specify different optimal learning rates, and thus measuring 
and comparing overall performance across a number of different scenarios will not provide an 
estimation of parameters, such as learning rate, which might be more general. 
The authors have developed a task, and have argued that it measures learning rate, rather 
than overall performance. On the task participants have to make a series of binary predictions as 
to whether a stimuli will appear on the left or right. The stimuli actually appear randomly but 
where the stimuli have appeared on preceding trials affects participants’ predictions. A learning 
rate defines how much each trial changes the strength of prediction, and thus how much each 
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preceding trial influences the current prediction. The learning rate, rather than performance, is 
estimated by calculating the average correlations of the current prediction with where the 
stimulus was from one to ten trials backwards in time. If participants have a large learning rate, 
more distant trials have a relatively smaller influence. Correlations of the current prediction with 
recent trials would be relatively large and correlations of the current prediction with distant trials 
would be relatively small. In contrast, if a participant has a small learning rate each new trial has 
a small effect and distant trials (thus prior knowledge) have a relatively strong influence, and the 
pattern of correlation would be relatively reversed. 
The task was demonstrated to reflect implicit learning: on trials on which participants 
claimed to be guessing, there were correlations between the prediction and where the stimulus 
actually appeared ten trials previously. Additionally, differences in learning rate were argued to 
be important: both amnesia and negative mood were associated with large learning rates. 
However, it is important to note that learning rates themselves are unlikely to be completely 
general: people probably adjust learning rates to different situations (Dienes, et al., 2010). It is 
possible that there might be some meta-generality in which people have propensities to over- or 
under-estimate suitable learning rates, or have difficulties only in scenarios that optimally require 
high, middling or low learning rates. If this were true, then this would fit with my assertion that 
there are no individual differences in overall performance on implicit learning tasks: the different 
tasks are associated with a variety of optimal learning rates (Dienes, et al., 2010). 
Finally, in the event that there is little generality about implicit learning, even in 
parameters relating to learning rate, there would still be a case for understanding which real-
world skills are likely to have been learnt implicitly. Within that scenario, knowing about 
implicit skills could provide no general information about an individual’s ability to learn another 
skill implicitly. However, there would still be advantages: for example, it would be useful to 
know that low or high achievement in certain skills were unlikely to be related to differences in 
explicit, IQ-related potential. I only use the word ‘unlikely’ because information can be acquired 
implicitly but what and how much is learnt might actually be a function of differences in explicit 
strategy and attention. For example, Studies III and IV demonstrated that ASC individuals 
implicitly learnt more about the context as a consequence of initial difficulties in learning to 
apply explicit sequence knowledge. This idea resonates with Ackerman’s (1988) finding that the 
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initial stages of certain skill acquisitions correlated with IQ even when the advantage of a high 
IQ disappeared with continued practice. 
Generally, this type of approach, in which researchers try to establish whether a specific 
skill was learnt implicitly, has already been fruitfully exploited. For instance, researchers have 
established that ball-catching skills are learnt implicitly. When participants report how they 
know whether to move towards, or away, from a moving ball, they typically give an 
uninformative strategy, or one that would guarantee they would not catch the ball (Reed, 
McLeod, & Dienes, 2010). Additionally, when asked to consciously recognise a description of 
how their angle of gaze changed just after a catch, some participants confidently chose incorrect 
descriptions. 
3. Final Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis provided no evidence for the proposal that there are functional 
differences between individuals in implicit learning. I assert that taken together with equivocal 
evidence in the wider literature, it is parsimonious to conclude that there is neither a general 
implicit learning ability, nor general, prerequisite implicit learning processes. However, in line 
with previous literature, the thesis did support functional distinctions between implicit and 
explicit learning: explicit, but not implicit, learning was related to IQ; and ASC individuals have 
difficulties with explicit but not implicit learning. Therefore, I assert that a descriptive distinction 
between explicit and implicit learning is both useful and valid. This is true even though implicit 
learning seems to be defined by the absence, or minimal influence, of explicit processing rather 
than the general presence of an implicit learning ability or processes. Additionally, I argue that 
this thesis makes some modest, but not decisive, contributions to some of the fierce debates in 
the implicit learning literature. For example, the results suggested that there cannot be two 
distinct, completely general-purpose learning systems; re-emphasised the global, pervasive 
nature of consciousness; and replicated some findings that are cited as demonstrations of 
learning without awareness. In the latter case, I acknowledge that these replications do not 
represent definitive demonstrations of learning without awareness and would not convince 
researchers previously sceptical of such evidence. Finally, I identify some implications and make 
recommendations for future research into individual differences in implicit learning. First and 
foremost, I urge researchers to consider this research carefully given the required number of 
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tasks and sample sizes that would be required to identify any generality in implicit learning. 
Where possible, researchers should use subjective measures to help provide more accurate 
estimates of implicit learning performance (e.g., Dienes, 2008). Additionally, researchers should 
use a whole range of implicit learning tasks before identifying general differences in implicit 
learning. Otherwise, differences might reflect variation in other cognitive processes. Insofar that 
implicit learning reflects the operations of connectionist-type networks, new tasks, which 
measure learning rate directly rather than overall performance, might have much more success in 
estimating any truly general parameters or propensities relating to implicit learning (e.g., Dienes, 
et al., 2010). If there remains little that is truly general about implicit learning, in spite of new 
tasks, then approaches that identify which skills are learnt implicitly and investigate the specific 
details of the different acquisitions would still reveal much about human cognition and learning 
environments (e.g., Reed, et al., 2010). 
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Appendix A: Additional Materials Information 
1. General Questionnaire used in Study I 
 
 















Note: Dr Francesca Greenford is a fictional person, and is included to demonstrate where the 
name of each participant appeared during their completion of the General Questionnaire. 
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2. Letter Strings from the AGL Task Used in Studies I and II 
Learning Phase Strings  
PVV PVPXVPS  
TXS TSSXXVV  
TSXS TSXXTVV  
PTTVV TXXTVPS  
PTVPS PVPXTVPS  
PVPXVV TSSSXXVV  
TSSSXS TSSXXVPS  
TXTVPS TSXXTVPS  
PTTTVPS TXXTTTVV  
PTVPXVV TXXVPXVV  
 
Test Phase Strings  
Correct Answer: Grammatical  
PVV TXXVV TSXXVV PTTTTVPS PTTVPXVV 
 
TXS PTTTVV TXXTVPS TSXXTTVV TSXXTVPS 
 
TPVV PTTVPS TSXXVPS TSSXXTVV PVPXTVPS 
 
PVPS TXXTVV TXXTTVV PTTTTTVV PTVPXVPS 
 
TSSXS PVPXVV TSSSSXS PVPXTTVV TSSXXVPS 
 
Correct Answer: Ungrammatical  
TXV PTTPS PTTTVT PTVPPPS PTTTVPVS 
 
TTVV XXSVT TSXXPV SVPXTVV TSSXXVSS 
 
PSXS TXXVX SXXVPS PVTTTVV PVXPVXPX 
 
TXPV TXVPS PTVVVV VSTXVVS PTVPXVSP 
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3. Number Strings from the IFL Task Used in Studies I and II 
Learning Phase Strings   Test Phase Strings  
Correct Answer: 
Left Two Digits 
 Correct Answer: 
Right Two Digits 
  Correct Answer: 
Left String 
 Correct Answer: 
Right String 
 
1632  1232   2183 2717  2165 8361  
2823  1683   2391 5491  4819 6483  
3421  2137   2453 8419  5264 8375  
3541  2463   3641 8671  5419 3581  
3761  2838   3871 2461  5471 5735  
4723  3141   4736 9147  5487 6283  
5314  3158   5316 1581  5859 2351  
7434  4234   5463 4274  6561 7132  
8763  4329   5738 6814  7261 5783  
9643  7138   6394 2624  7421 5834  
     6513 5958  7494 7831  
     6863 4629  7691 9328  
     7583 5246  8721 2435  
     9234 7461  9242 2835  
     9536 5767  9412 1326  
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4. Tacit Knowledge Inventories Used in Study I 
4.1. Academic Psychology 
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4.2. Business Management 
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4.3. Common Sense Questionnaire 
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Appendix B: Additional Analyses 
1. Invariant Feature Learning task Analysis from Study II 
Learning was measured using the percentage of test phase number strings that had been 
correctly selected above the 50 % chance level. An answer that identified the string containing 
the invariant feature was deemed correct. Overall, the participants performed near chance and 
consistent with this, a one-sample t-test provided no evidence of learning (M = 0.51 %, SEM = 
1.15 %, t(51) = 0.44, p = .66, d = 0.06). Both groups performed near chance and there was no 
evidence of a significant difference between them (TD: M = 2.69 %; ASC: M = -1.67 %; SED = 
2.25 %; t(51) = 1.94, p = .06, d = 0.54). Although, the difference was not significant, there was a 
trend towards a larger score in the TD group. This trend difference might have masked a learning 
effect in the TD group. However, when considering just the TD-group, there was still no 
evidence of learning from a one-sample t-test (t(25) = 1.77, p = .09, d = 0.35). Thus, there was 
no evidence of learning on the IFL task. 
2. Full Equivalence Analyses of Learning Indices from Study II 
Equivalence analysis (Rogers, et al., 1993; Stegner, et al., 1996) necessitates the a priori 
specification of an equivalence threshold; this was specified as random within-subject variability 
in TD group. This threshold was chosen using the logic that an interesting between-group 
difference should be at least as large as the estimated random within-subject variability. To 
elaborate on the notion of random within-subject variability: if a test measures what it purports to 
measure perfectly, then the two split-half scores of that test would correlate perfectly with one 
another. Yet, in spite of no conceptual difference between two split-halves – they are randomly 
derived halves of the same test – usually such scores do not correlate perfectly. Consequently, 
the variability in one split half-score that cannot be explained by variability in the other split-half 
score is determined to be random within-subject variability. Therefore, the equivalence threshold 
= estimated random within-subject variability = [(1- r2) * Varx * (n - 1) / (n - 2)]
0.5; Varx = 
variance on one split-half, r = correlation between the split halves. The null hypothesis would 
then be tested that the difference between the groups is at least as large as the equivalence 
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threshold by conducting two one-tailed t-tests. For example, consider the CC equivalence 
analysis reported below. 
 CC 
t(50) = [ x TD – ( ASC ± E)] / S TD – ASC 
TD = 2.71 %; ASC = 3.05 %; Equivalence threshold (E) = random within-subject 
variability = [(1- 0.252 * 26.89 * (52 - 1) / (52 - 2)]0.5 = 5.13 % 
t(50) = [2.71 - (3.05 ± 5.13)] / [3.972 / 26 + 3.762 / 26)]0.5 
t(50) = 4.47 and t(50) = -5.10. 
Since an investigator is interested in whether the difference between the groups is at least 
as large, they just need to consider the t-test that yields the largest p-value (i.e. just need to test 
the possibility of finding the smallest difference between the actual difference and the threshold, 
given the null hypothesis that the difference is at least as large as the equivalence threshold). 
Therefore, equivalence analysis rejects the hypothesis of non-equivalence (CC: t(50) = 4.47, p < 
.001).7 The remaining four equivalent analyses are reported below. 
 SRT 
t(50) = [ TD – ( ASC ± E)] / S TD – ASC 
TD = 4.82 %; ASC = 4.63 %; E = [(1 - 0.38
2 * 31.05 * (52 - 1) / (52 - 2)]0.5 = 5.25 % 
                                                 
7 This analysis used a revised estimate of within-subject variability compared with Brown and colleagues 
(2010). This revised estimate did not change the pattern of results; however, this means that the exact figures differ 
somewhat for the CC and SRT analysis. After publication of Brown and colleagues (2010), it was made clear to me 
that the method used in Brown and colleagues (2010) for calculating the split-half scores for the CC and SRT was 
too liberal. Specifically, the same baselines were used to calculate the two difference scores for each of the two split-
halves. The original rationale was that learning is measured by the decreases in RTs to high-frequency (or probable), 
trials, and is effectively ‘normed’ by the use of the baseline (low-frequency or improbable trials). Given the non-
split, and thus more reliable, baseline is always available for an SRT, or CC, task of that length, the logic was that 
the variability for the baseline did not need to be estimated. However, it was realised that the baseline is, of course, 
not the same between experiments and so when estimating reliability it is necessary to estimate all sources of 
measurement error. Thus, split-halves were calculated for both high-frequency and low-frequency (and probable and 
improbable) trials. Each half was randomly paired together with a half of the other trial-type, which were then used 
to calculate two split-half average proportional increases in RT differences across blocks. 
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t(50) = [4.82 - (4.63 ± 5.25)] / [3.382 / 26 + 4.732 / 26)]0.5 
t(50) = 4.76 and t(50) = -4.44, p < .001. 
 
 AGL 
t(50) = [ x TD – ( x ASC ± E)] / S x TD – x ASC 
x TD = 3.35 %; x ASC = 3.20 %; E = [(1 - 0.33
2 * 114.07 * (52 - 1) / (52 - 2)]0.5 = 10.31 % 
t(50) = [3.35 - (3.20 ± 10.31)] / [7.942 / 26 + 8.362 / 26)]0.5 
t(50) = 4.63 and t(50) = -4.49, p < .001. 
 
 PCL 
t(50) = [ x TD – ( x ASC ± E)] / S x TD – x ASC 
x TD = 4.95 %; x ASC = 8.74 %; E = [(1 - 0.30
2 * 173.66 * (52 - 1) / (52 - 2)]0.5 = 12.85 % 
t(50) = [4.95 - (8.74 ± 12.85)] / [7.012 / 26 + 11.752 / 26)]0.5 
t(50) = 3.37 p < .001 and t(50) = -6.20. 
 
 PAL 
t(50) = [ x TD – ( x ASC ± E)] / S x TD – x ASC 
x TD = 46.03 %; x ASC = 39.74 %; E = [(1- 0.87
2 * 431.39 * (52 - 1) / (52 - 2)]0.5 = 10.48 % 
t(50) = [46.03 - (39.74 ± 10.48)] / [15.072 / 26 + 23.642 / 26)]0.5 
t(50) = 3.05 and t(50) = -0.76 p = .22. 
 
3. PCL Strategy Analysis from Study II 
The full details of this analysis were not presented in the main body of the thesis because 
it was not an express aim of Study II to provide such in depth analysis of each individual implicit 
learning task performance. Study II had been designed to investigate the generality of any 
implicit learning deficit in ASC, and to determine whether any intact performance could be 
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attributed to other factors such as explicit-IQ related compensation. The study provided evidence 
of intact implicit learning on a range of tasks, which could not be accounted for by compensatory 
explicit strategies. However, in discussions about the study, it was suggested that although the 
overall ASC performances had been implicit and equivalent to the TD group, perhaps there were 
general differences between the groups in how they achieved those equivalent, implicit 
performances. Although this possibility was considered unlikely, such differences might be 
theoretically interesting for a functional analysis of differences in implicit learning and 
potentially useful to ASC research. Thus, a review was conducted into what analyses might 
reveal such differences in how the groups achieved their equivalent overall performances. Given 
the particular designs used for each of the tasks, it was concluded that a strategy analysis of the 
PCL dataset was most suited to such investigation (Gluck, et al., 2002). 
The two groups achieved equivalent overall performance on the PCL task, as reported in 
Study II. Gluck and colleagues (2002) have identified a number of different ‘strategies’ that 
participants tend to use during the PCL task (see also Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 2006; 
Meeter, Myers, Shohamy, Hopkins, & Gluck, 2006; Price, 2009). Therefore, in order to 
determine whether the equivalent overall performance between the groups was achieved using 
similar learning strategies, a strategy analysis was conducted on the PCL data from both groups. 
Following the established method (e.g., Gluck, et al., 2002), response profiles were constructed 
that would be expected if a participant were reliably following a particular strategy and 
compared individually with each participant’s data. Gluck and colleagues’ (2002) Least Means 
Square procedure was used to determine the extent to which each strategy provided a fit for each 
participant’s dataset. A participant was classified as having utilised the strategy that provided the 
best fit for their data. In order to reflect the possibility that participants switched strategies, this 
process was conducted separately for each of the learning and test blocks. The different 
strategies that were modelled are described below and relate to the stimuli (A, B, C etc.) detailed 
in Table 17 (reproduced from Study III).  
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Table 17. The Stimuli and Probability Structure of the PCL Task 
Stimulus Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 P (stimulus) P (vanilla|stimulus) 
A 0 0 0 1 .136 .143 
B 0 0 1 0 .079 .375 
C 0 0 1 1 .089 .111 
D 0 1 0 0 .079 .625 
E 0 1 0 1 .061 .167 
F 0 1 1 0 .061 .667 
G 0 1 1 1 .042 .250 
H 1 0 0 0 .136 .857 
I 1 0 0 1 .061 .333 
J 1 0 1 0 .061 .833 
K 1 0 1 1 .033 .333 
L 1 1 0 0 .089 .889 
M 1 1 0 1 .033 .667 
N 1 1 1 0 .042 .750 
Note: Cue 1 = brown moustache, cue 2 = red hat, cue 3 = blue glasses, cue 4 = bow tie. Each 
cue could be present (1) or absent (0) for each stimulus. The all-present (1111) and all-absent 
(0000) stimuli were never used. On any trial during the learning phase, there was a given 
probability of each of the 14 stimuli appearing (P(stimulus)), and a dynamic stimulus-outcome 
probability for each of these 14 stimuli. During the test phase, when feedback is removed, the 
stimulus-outcome probability is static (P(vanilla|stimulus)). All stimuli appeared equally often 
during the test phase. The overall probability of the vanilla outcome across all stimuli is 50 %.  
In addition to the stimulus-outcome probabilities detailed in Table 17, the constituent 
cues of the stimuli necessarily had a probabilistic relationship with the outcomes. Specifically, 
the final cue-outcome probabilities can be calculated from the table: P(vanilla|cue 1) = .733; 
P(vanilla|cue 2) = .600; P(vanilla|cue 3) = .450; P(vanilla|cue 4) = .222. 
3.1. Strategy Models 
Singleton strategies. These strategies modelled participants who only learnt about 
stimuli that were composed of only one of the four possible cues. In particular, one model 
assumed participants learnt about all four singleton stimuli (A, B, D and H), while the second 
assumed participants only learnt about the two singleton stimuli with the strongest probability of 
APPENDICES  208   
 
 
an outcome (A &H). In both cases, it is assumed that participants guessed on the remaining 
trials. 
Single-Cue strategies. These strategies modelled participants who learnt about only one 
cue, and used that cue’s presence or absence to determine responding to all stimuli, regardless of 
the presence or absence of any of the other cues. This produced four models: one for each of the 
four cues. 
Intermediate strategies. These strategies modelled participants who learnt about and 
responded to stimuli on the basis of more than one cue, but in contrast to the integrative 
strategies described below, these participants did not learn about the relative likelihood of 
outcomes for cues, instead they learnt only about the direction of the outcome. Specifically, the 
singleton-prototype model assumed participants learnt the optimal response pattern for all four 
singleton stimuli, and generalised this responding to include the two stimuli with two singleton 
cues that were associated with the same outcome (C & L). The singleton-2vs1 model extended 
the prototype model and assumed responding was also generalised to stimuli where 3 singleton 
cues are present (G, K, M & N), with responding determined by the outcome associated with 2 of 
the 3 singleton cues present. 
Integrative strategies. These strategies modelled participants that learnt about and 
responded to stimuli on the basis of more than one cue and had to keep track of the relative 
strengths of associations of cues and/or stimuli. The optimal singleton model extended the 2vs1 
model such that responding was also generalised to stimuli where 2 singleton cues were present 
and each were associated with the opposite outcome but one more strongly than the other (E, J). 
The all-but-two-strong model was the same as the optimal singleton model except that it 
predicted guessing on the stimuli with 3 cues present including two cues strongly associated with 
opposite outcomes (M &K). The summing-all-single-cues model departed from the singleton 
assumption that participants learnt only about singleton stimuli, and instead assumed participants 
learnt the number of times each cue was associated with an outcome, and summed this 
probability for each of the 14 stimuli. The summing-two-strong-single-cues was the same as 
summing-all-single-cues except that it assumed participants only learnt about the two cues most 
strongly associated with an outcome, and therefore guessed on stimuli in which both cues were 
absent (B, D & F). The multi-cue model assumed that participants distinguished each of the 14 
stimuli, and learnt about each of the 14 stimuli’s association with an outcome. The multi-strong 
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model assumed that participants distinguished the stimuli holistically but only learnt about the 8 
stimuli that were associated strongly with one outcome (A, C, E, G, H, J, L, & N). 
Incorrect strategies. Participants that responded in a consistent but incorrect manner 
were modelled by incorrect strategies (Price, 2009). Three types of incorrect strategies were 
considered: (1) incorrect singleton strategies modelled participants that responded on singleton 
stimuli with the opposite response expected and then guessed on the remainder of stimuli; (2) 
incorrect one-cue strategies modelled participants that provided a response depending on the 
presence or absence of just one-cue but that the response was in opposition to the cue’s outcome-
association; (3) incorrect multi-cue strategies modelled participants that distinguished the 14 
stimuli but provided responses in opposition to each stimulus’s outcome-association. 
Random strategy. This strategy modelled participants that responded with the two 
outcomes equally often for each of the stimuli. 
In addition to the introduction of four novel strategies (described above as summing-all-
single-cues, summing-two-strong-singles-cues, multi-strong and incorrect multi-cue), three 
general improvements were applied to the modelling of all these strategies: 
1) The impact of the dynamic probabilities experienced throughout the task was 
modelled. The dynamic nature of the probabilities experienced by participants has been 
acknowledged previously, and addressed using other techniques such as rolling regression (e.g., 
Kelley & Friedman, 2002; Lagnado, et al., 2006; Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2009); however, it has 
not been previously addressed within a strategy analysis framework. In this strategy analysis, the 
impact of dynamic probabilities was modelled by generating response profiles for each block 
according to the outcomes a participant had cumulatively experienced up until that learning 
block. In contrast, previous strategy analyses appeared to use the same probabilities to model 
response profiles for each of the four learning blocks; probabilities that were only correct after 
the fourth learning block. Furthermore, Study II utilised a test block with feedback removed, and 
thereby provided responses that could be modelled according to static probabilities.  
2) Both maximising and matching behaviour were modelled for all strategies. Once a 
participant has learnt an outcome probability according to a given strategy, they might always 
select the more probable outcome (maximising) or they might distribute their responses in order 
to match the probability of the outcomes (matching). Lagnado and colleagues (2006) noted this 
distinction and implemented alternative profiles for the multi-cue model according to both 
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maximising and matching. Lagnado and colleagues (2006) found that the multi-matching model 
seemed to provide the best-fit of all the strategies. Surprisingly, however, matching behaviour 
was not applied to all the other possible strategies. In Study II, two sets of response profiles were 
generated for all of the strategies based on either maximising or matching behaviour. The 
maximising models were retained, in spite of the finding by Lagnado and colleagues (2006) that 
a matching model provided the best-fit, because the literature is divided: other researchers have 
reported the prominence of maximising behaviour (e.g., White & Koehler, 2007). 
3) The possibility of forgetting or disregarding old information was modelled for all 
strategies. Finally, another possibility relating to the dynamic experience of learning was 
acknowledged: participants may have utilised their strategies according to the most recent 
outcomes that they experienced, disregarding or forgetting earlier experiences. Therefore, two 
sets of response profiles were generated for all the strategies based on either a cumulative or 
recent use of information. The recent use of information assumed participants only used 
outcomes experienced within the current block. 
Together, these improvements combat some of the key criticisms aimed at previous 
strategy analyses, including the unrealistic assumptions of global, static probabilities (e.g., 
Lagnado, et al., 2006). In light of such improvement, strategy analysis is preferable to an 
alternative rolling regression analysis (e.g., Kelley & Friedman, 2002; Lagnado, et al., 2006; 
Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2008). Strategy analysis is preferable because it allows an assessment 
of a wide range of strategies, which is particularly important when analysing TD and ASC 
participants who may have attended to different aspects of the stimuli. In contrast, rolling 
regression analysis only assesses the strength with which individual cue weights were learnt, and 
thereby assumes that all participants learn only about the individual cue weights. This 
assumption does not allow for participants who learnt more holistically about the stimuli, which 
was particularly inappropriate presently because the MrPotatoHead stimuli used in Study II were 
expressly designed to be evaluated as integrated customers rather than a set of individual cues. 
Additionally, a great benefit of rolling regression analysis was not applicable in Study II. 
Specifically, a rolling regression analysis analyses a participant’s responses and predicts what 
cue-weights would produce those responses (under the assumption that the learner was learning 
and responding only on the basis of cue-weights), and thereby quantitatively estimates the cue-
weights of the learner. The great benefit arises from a comparison of those weights with the 
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participant’s ratings of the cue weights/cue usage, which thereby reveals whether their 
performance reflected their explicit judgement. However, such ongoing assessment was not 
included in this task in case its inclusion encouraged explicit processes (e.g., Gebauer & 
Mackintosh, 2007).8 
3.2. Strategy Use 
Figure 13 depicted the number of participants using each category of strategy between 
the two groups across the different phases of the PCL task. This figure demonstrated that the 
distribution of strategies was similar between the two groups. Accordingly, chi-square 
contingency table analyses provided no evidence that Group impacted upon the distribution of 
strategies in any of the blocks (for all blocks: χ2 ≤ 5.53, ps ≥ .27 and Φ2 ≤ .11). There were no 
obvious trends in the use of individual strategies, and further analyses of all six categories were 
inappropriate given the small number of participants in several of the categories. 
                                                 
8 Lagnado and colleagues (2006) found that the inclusion of ratings did not make the performance more 
explicit on their task. However, this may have resulted from the performance already being explicit prior to their 
inclusion of the ratings. Thus, there was still a risk associated with including ratings in Study II, and the ratings were 
omitted. The risk seemed particularly relevant given there is reason to suspect that the version of the PCL task used 
by Lagnado and colleagues encouraged explicit performance. Specifically, the stimuli in their Weather Prediction 
task are composed of particularly discrete cues (symbols on a Tarot Card), which is known to encourage explicit 
learning (Maddox & Ashby, 2004). Additionally, the PCL procedure used in Study II was designed to encourage 
implicit performance. Study II used holistic MrPotatoHead stimuli. Also, the feedback conditions were selected to 
minimise explicit learning: feedback was displayed immediately after the response and feedback processing time 
was minimised by allowing only 600ms between first receiving the feedback and beginning the next trial (Maddox 
& Ashby, 2004). The equivalent procedural details were not reported by Lagnado and colleagues (2006). 





Figure 13. There was a similar distribution of strategy use between the TD (top panel) and the 
ASC group (bottom panel). Depicted are the numbers of participants selecting a particular 
strategy across the different stages of the PCL task for both groups. 
In line with Price (2009) and Shohamy and colleagues (2004), important comparisons 
were considered more sensitively by collapsing across some of the categories. Therefore, the 
categories of strategies were classified as either ‘incorrect’ or ‘correct’ (all strategies except 
incorrect strategies), and ‘integrated’ or ‘non-integrated’ (all strategies except integrated 
strategies). The number of incorrect and correct strategies appeared similar between the groups, 
see Figure 14. Chi-square contingency table analyses provided no evidence that Group impacted 
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1.56, ps ≥ .35 and Φ2 ≤ .03). It was also evident from Figure 14 that the total number of 
participants using a correct or incorrect strategy appeared stable over the course of the task, and 
that the two groups were similar in this stability. In line with this interpretation, a Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs, signed ranks test provided no evidence of an increased use of correct strategies in 
the Test block relative to Block 1 (z = .69, p = .65, d = .09), and a Mann-Whitney U-test gave no 
evidence of a difference between the groups in this change across the blocks (z = .27, p = .72, d = 
.06). 
 





Figure 14. There was a similar distribution in the use of correct and incorrect strategies 
between the TD (top panel) and the ASC group (bottom panel). Depicted are the numbers of 
participants selecting a correct or incorrect strategy across the different stages of the PCL task 
for both groups.  
The number of participants using integrated strategies appeared similar between the two 
groups, see Figure 15. Consistent with this interpretation, there was no evidence that Group 
affected the distribution of integrated and non-integrated strategy use from chi-square 
contingency table analyses (for all blocks: χ2 ≤ 2.56, ps ≥ .20 and Φ2 ≤ .05). Figure 15 also 
indicated that the total number of participants using an integrated or non-integrated strategy 
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this interpretation, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs, signed ranks tests provided no evidence of an 
increased use of integrated strategies in the Test block relative to Block 1 (z = 1.81, p = .12, d = 
.26), while a Mann-Whitney U-test supplied no evidence of a difference between the groups (z = 
0.83, p = .41, d = .22). 
 
 
Figure 15. There was a similar distribution in the use of integrated and non-integrated 
strategies between the TD (top panel) and the ASC group (bottom panel). Depicted are the 
numbers of participants selecting integrated or non-integrated strategies across the different 
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3.3. Consistency of Strategy Use 
The general consistency of individual participants’ strategy use was considered using two 
novel indices. First, for each individual, the frequency with which each strategy fitted their 
responses across the 5 blocks of the PCL was calculated (0-5 was possible for any strategy). The 
strategy that fitted an individual most frequently was used as the individual’s score (1-5 was 
possible for each individual), and the mean score was calculated for each group. Both groups 
seemed to use their most-frequently-fit strategy relatively regularly across the blocks with the 
TD group using the same strategy 2.88 times (SD = 0.43), and the ASC group 2.76 times (SD = 
0.81). There was no evidence of a difference between the groups (t(38) = 0.64, p = .53, d = .18).  
Second, for each individual, the 4 transitions from each block of the PCL were scored: if 
the same strategy was used consecutively, the transition scored 1, if a different strategy was used, 
the transition scored 0 (0-4 was possible for each individual). The TD group used a strategy 
consecutively a mean number of 1.38 times (SD = 0.90), while the ASC group was 1.46 times 
(SD = 0.95), with no evidence of a difference between the groups (t(50) = 0.30, p = .77, d = .08). 
Insofar that both groups scored above 0, there was some consistency in their use of strategy. 
However, participants were clearly not completely consistent: on average, the most frequent 
strategy was used approximately 3 times during the task, but the consecutive strategy score was 
below 3. Thus, this difference between most-frequent and consecutive scores implied that 
individuals did not persist with their most-frequent strategy once it was identified. Instead, 
participants continued to show strategy-exploration, probably returning to their most-used 
strategy upon finding the new strategy inappropriate. Such individual behaviour was consistent 
with the earlier conclusion from the Group level analyses that there were no coherent trends 
towards the use of particular strategies over the course of the task.  
The consistency of an individual’s strategy use was further analysed by collapsing across 
categories to consider the most interesting comparisons with greater power. The mean frequency 
with which a correct or incorrect strategy was used (out of 5) was 4.00 times (SD = 0.89) for the 
TD group and 3.92 times (SD = 0.80) for the ASC group (t(50) = 0.33, p = .75, d = .08), while 
the mean frequency of either correct or incorrect consecutive strategy use (out of 4) was 2.65 
times (SD = 1.20) for the TD group and 2.62 times (SD = 1.17) for the ASC group (t(50) = 0.12, 
p = .91, d = .03). These analyses implied that the use of correct or incorrect strategies was 
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consistent. Again, such individual consistency fitted with the earlier finding that there were no 
trends towards using correct strategies over the blocks at the Group-level. 
The mean frequency with which an integrated or non-integrated strategy was used (out of 
5) was 4.23 times (SD = 0.82) for the TD group and 4.12 times (SD = 0.86) for the ASC group 
(t(50) = 0.50, p = .62, d = .14), while the frequency of either integrated or non-integrated 
consecutive strategy use (out of 4) was 3.08 times (SD = 0.98) for the TD group and 3.19 times 
(SD = 0.80) for the ASC group (t(50) = 0.47, p = .64, d = .13). These analyses implied individual 
consistency in the use of integrated or non-integrated strategies, and were therefore coherent with 
the earlier conclusion that there were no Group-level trends towards the use integrated strategies 
across the blocks. 
3.4. Impact of Strategy on Performance 
In order to assess the impact of strategy use on performance, and in particular differences 
between the groups in their capacity to utilise different strategies, percentage correct during the 
PCL was compared between different categories of strategies. It was not possible to conduct 
analyses using all six categories because the data was not sufficiently distributed among those 
categories. Therefore, the integrated-non-integrated and correct-incorrect categorisations were 
analysed. An inspection of Figure 16 showed that the use of correct strategies resulted in superior 
task performance. ANOVAs with two between-subject factors Categorisation (Correct vs. 
Incorrect) and Group (TD vs. ASC) were conducted separately within each level of block, and 
revealed that the use of correct strategies led to superior task performance in every block (all Fs 
≥ 9.00, ps ≤ .01 and η2p ≥ .16). There was no evidence of any group differences or interactions 
(all Fs ≤ 1.20, ps ≥ .28 and η2p ≤ .02). 





Figure 16. In both the TD (top panel) and the ASC group (bottom panel), there was a similarly 
superior performance by participants using correct rather than incorrect strategies. Depicted 
are the mean accuracies of participants selecting correct or incorrect strategies across the 
different stages of the PCL task for both groups. The error bars show twice the standard error of 
differences between categorisation means separately for each of the two groups. 
Figure 17 demonstrated that the use of integrated strategies resulted in superior task 
performance. ANOVAs with two between-subject factors Categorisation (Integrated vs. Non-
Integrated) and Group (TD vs. ASC) were conducted separately within each level of block, and 
revealed that the use of integrated strategies led to superior task performance in every block 
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.001 and η2p ≥ .28). While there was a numerical trend for the ASC group to have utilised 
integrated strategies to achieve better PCL performance, there was no statistical evidence of such 
interactions (all Fs ≤ 3.81, ps ≥ .06 and η2p ≤ .07). There was no evidence of overall Group 
differences (all Fs ≤ 2.96, ps ≥ .09 and η2p ≤ .06). 
 
 
Figure 17. In both the TD (top panel) and the ASC group (bottom panel), there was a similarly 
superior performance by participants using integrated rather than non-integrated strategies. 
Depicted are mean accuracies of participants selecting integrated or non-integrated strategies 
across the different stages of the PCL task for both groups. The error bars show twice the 
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3.5. Implicitness of Strategies 
There is debate as to whether strategies reflect implicit or explicit learning (e.g., 
Lagnado, et al., 2006; Meeter, Radics, Myers, Gluck, & Hopkins, 2008; Price, 2009; cf, Gluck, et 
al., 2002; Shohamy, Myers, Kalanithi, & Gluck, 2008). For example, in two studies researchers 
have found correspondence between the estimates of cue weights and actual cue weights 
(Lagnado, et al., 2006; Price, 2009). However, Gluck and colleagues have found no 
correspondence between reported strategies and best-fit strategies (e.g., Gluck, et al., 2002). 
Therefore, it seems possible that whether strategies are used explicitly will depend upon the 
particulars of the task. The PCL task procedure used in Study II was designed to minimise 
explicit learning by following the recommendations of previous research, which has detailed the 
factors affecting the explicit contributions to categorisation performance. Therefore, Study II 
used configural, holistic stimuli, rather than stimuli with particularly discrete cues (Maddox & 
Ashby, 2004). Additionally, Study II used feedback conditions found to minimise explicit 
processing: feedback was displayed immediately after a response and feedback processing time 
was minimised by allowing only 600 ms between first receiving the feedback and beginning the 
next trial (Maddox & Ashby, 2004). 
Accordingly, there was evidence from the explicit interviews that implied the task 
procedures had been successful in minimising explicit processing. In particular, the verbal 
reports were blindly evaluated in order to determine which strategy each report resembled. Each 
report was classified as most-resembling either integrated/ intermediate (these two strategy 
categories could not be distinguished from the reports); single-cue; singleton; incorrect; or 
random. The number of times a reported strategy matched the best-fit strategy was calculated. 
This calculation was only carried out for the Test Block because participants were only asked 
about their final strategies. The number of participants who provided strategies that corresponded 
to their best-fit strategy was small (n = 14), and a two-tailed binomial test demonstrated that the 
number was not significantly above the chance level of 20 % (p = .28; a chance level of 20 % 
was used because 5 category classifications were possible). The number of matches was similar 
for both the TD (n = 6) and ASC groups (n = 8), and a chi-square contingency table analysis did 
not provide any evidence of an association between the number of matches and Group (χ2 = 0.39, 
p = .76, Φ2= .01).  
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Additionally, the verbal reports were blindly evaluated and rated on a 3-point scale of 
‘explicitness’ (1 = reported no knowledge of the relationships in the task; 2 = reported 
knowledge about the existence of relationships in the task but provided no details as to what they 
were and/or expressed doubt about their existence; 3 = reported knowledge about at least one 
relationship they believed to be present in the task). The reports received a variety of ratings (1-
rating, n =13; 2-rating, n =14; 3-rating, n =25), and while more participants appeared to have 
provided 3-ratings than anything else, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that all ratings were chosen equally often (χ2 = 5.12, p = .08, w = .31). A chi-square 
contingency table analysis failed to provide any evidence of an association between Group and 
the Explicitness rating (TD: 1-rating, n =4; 2-rating, n = 8; 3-rating, n =14; ASC: 1-rating, n = 9; 
2-rating, n = 6; 3-rating, n = 11; χ2 = 2.57, p = .30, Φ2= .05). More important than this analysis of 
the distribution of the absolute ratings was whether the insight was related to performance. 
Therefore, the relationship between explicitness and performance was examined. If performance 
had been mediated explicitly, then those participants who were able to report explicitly the most 
information should have also performed the best. However, Figure 18 and a two-way ANOVA, 
with two between-subject factors of Group and Explicitness-rating, provided no evidence of an 
effect of Explicitness-rating on performance (F(2, 46) = 0.17, p = .85, η2p = .01), nor of an 
interaction between Group and Explicitness-rating (F(2, 46) = 0.31, p = .74, η2p = .01). This same 
pattern of results remained even after excluding the 12 participants who provided at least one 
incorrect piece of information about the relationships in the task (Explicitness-rating: F(2, 34) = 
0.39, p = .68, η2p = .02; Group and Explicitness-rating F(2, 34) = 0.03, p = .97, η
2
p > .01). 




Figure 18. In both groups, PCL performance was not determined by the explicit knowledge 
participants had gained about the task. Presented are mean percentage of correct guesses that 
were provided above chance on the PCL test phase. This score is presented for the two groups 
depending upon the „explicitness‟ rating given to the post-task interviews. The error bars show 
twice the standard error of differences between group means at different levels of explicitness 
ratings. 
3.6. Modelling Improvements 
3.6.1. Modelling Maximising and Matching Behaviour 
Figure 19 demonstrated the importance of modelling probability-matching behaviour: 
maximising models rarely provided a better fit for the data when in competition with matching 
models. This seemed equally true for both groups and appeared to have remained stable across 
































Figure 19. In both the TD (top panel) and the ASC group (bottom panel), matching models 
provided a better fit for most participants. Depicted are the numbers of participants best 
modelled by matching or maximising choices across the different stages of the PCL task for both 
groups. 
3.6.2. Cumulative and Recent Use of Information 
Figure 20 depicted the number of participants best modelled by the recent or cumulative 
use of information models. The figure demonstrated that there were several instances in which 
the recent use of information models provided a better fit than the standard cumulative models. 
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Additionally, Figure 20 illustrated the similarity of the two groups in their use of cumulative and 
recent information. Chi-square contingency table analyses comparing the proportion of each 
group better modelled by recent or cumulative information in each block were consistent with 
this interpretation (for all blocks: χ2 ≤ 1.24, ps ≥ .40 and Φ2 ≤ .02). Figure 20 also showed that 
fewer participants relied on recent information as the task progressed. A Wilcoxon matched-
pairs, signed ranks test was consistent with the decreased use of recent information in the Test 
block relative to Block 2 (z = 2.94, p < .01, d = .50). It was also evident from Figure 20 that the 
decrease across the blocks in the use of recent information was similar in both groups. A Mann-
Whitney U-test was consistent with this interpretation, insofar that it provided no evidence of 
group differences in the number of participants changing to cumulative strategies in the Test 
block relative to Block 2 (z = 1.28, p = .24, d = .35). 





Figure 20. In both the TD (top panel) and the ASC group (bottom panel), the recent use of 
information models provided a better fit for some participants. Depicted are numbers of 
participants best modelled by the recent or cumulative use of information across the different 
stages of the PCL task for both groups. There were no results for Block 1 because the two 
models made the same predictions and thus the models were indistinguishable. 
3.7. Discussion 
In Study II, analyses had indicated that the TD and ASC groups were equivalent in their 
overall performance on the PCL task. However, there was a possibility that the overall 
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this appendix emphasised the similarity between the TD and ASC groups in their use of implicit 
learning strategies on the PCL task. Specifically, there was no evidence of differences between 
the groups using fine-grained analyses, which considered nuanced variations in strategy, such as 
which strategies were used, the consistency with which strategies were used and the success with 
which strategies were used. Additionally, there was evidence that the strategies were largely 
implicit: strategy insight appeared unrelated to both the strategies that the participants actually 
used and how successfully the participants performed. Thus, this strategy analysis has 
demonstrated that the equivalent overall PCL performance was underpinned by a similarity in 
the implicit learning strategies used by the groups. Additionally, this similarity on the PCL task 
implies that there cannot be general differences between the groups in how they achieve 
equivalent performances on implicit learning tasks. 
 More generally, this analysis described and demonstrated the benefits of two 
improvements to strategy analysis, specifically the inclusion of models to reflect both 
participants who preferred maximising to matching behaviour, and participants who preferred the 
recent use of information to the cumulative use. Additionally, it is proposed that the strategy 
analysis was improved both by the inclusion of new analyses, such as the analysis of the 
consistency with which strategies were used, and the avoidance of the unrealistic assumption that 
static probabilities were experienced by participants throughout the task. 
4. Accuracy Analysis of SRT from Studies III and IV 
4.1. Study III 
4.1.1. Training: Block 1-10 
Unlike RTs, accuracy did not appear to improve as a consequence of training. For 
example, mean accuracy between the first five and last five blocks was similar, and this appeared 
equally true of both groups (TD: Mean difference (M) = 0.07 %; ASC: M = - 0.71 %; SED = 0.87 
%). Consistent with this interpretation, a mixed analysis of variance with factors of Group and 
Block revealed no significant effect of Block (F(5, 137) = 1.22, p = .30, η2p = .04) nor interaction 
with Group (F(5, 137) = 1.63, p = .16, η2p = .05). There was also no evidence of an overall effect 
of Group (F(1, 30) = 0.15, p = .70, η2p = .01). The failure of accuracy to index learning during 
the training stage of the task was a consequence of a ceiling effect – accuracy was high from the 
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beginning. This was consistent with findings from Study II: Study II demonstrated that accuracy 
indexes learning by measuring the deterioration of performance on relatively unexpected 
(irregular) trials rather than improvement on the sequenced trials. The deterministic version of 
the SRT used in this study had no unexpected trials until the test block. 
4.1.2. Test: Block 10-12 
The introduction of the control sequence during the test block made the task more 
difficult to the extent that accuracy became an index of learning. Specifically, accuracy was 
worse on the control sequences in block 11 as compared with the training sequences averaged 
between blocks 10 and 12, and this decrease was similar between the groups (TD: Mean 
difference (M) = 9.08 %; ASC: M = 9.52 %; SED = 2.68 %). A mixed ANOVA with factors of 
Group and Block (Control Sequences Block 11 vs. Block 10&12) produced a pattern of results 
equivalent to the RT analysis: there was an effect of Block indicative of sequence learning (F(1, 
30) = 48.12, p < .001, η2p = .62) but no interaction with Group (F(1, 30) = 0.03 p = .87, η
2
p < 
.01). There was no overall difference between the groups in accuracy (F(1, 30) = 0.01 p = .91, 
η2p < .01). 
4.1.3. Sequence validity: Block 10-12 
As an indirect measure of whether the application of the sequence was explicit, mean 
accuracy on training sequences in test block 11 (during which the global validity of the sequence 
was disrupted) were compared with mean accuracy on training sequences in neighbouring blocks 
10 & 12. Both groups were more inaccurate on the training sequence in Block 11 than in Block 
10 and 12 (TD: Mean difference (M) = 4.09 %; ASC: M = 0.85 %; SED = 1.96 %). A mixed 
ANOVA with factors of Group and Block (Training Sequences Block 11 vs. Block 10&12) 
revealed a main effect of Block (F(1, 30) = 6.37, p = .02, η2p = .18), which indicated that the 
sequence learning had been explicit to the extent that performance had been more inaccurate 
when there had been a global disruption to the validity of the sequence knowledge. There was no 
significant effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 0.53, p = .47, η2p = .02) nor interaction between Group 
and Block (F(1, 30) = 2.74, p = .11, η2p = .08). 
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4.2. Study IV 
4.2.1. Training: Block 1-2 
As in Study III, accuracy did not appear to improve as a consequence of training due to a 
ceiling effect. In both groups, mean accuracy was similar in the first and second block (TD: M = 
0.99 %; ASC: M = -2.83 %; SED = 2.51 %). Consistent with this, a mixed analysis of variance 
with factors of Group and Block revealed no significant effect of Block (F(1, 30) = 0.54, p = .47, 
η2p = .02) nor interaction between Group and Block (F(1, 30) = 2.32, p = .14, η
2
p = .07). There 
was no overall effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 1.92, p = .18, η2p = .06). 
4.2.2. Test: Block 10-12 
Once again accuracy became sufficiently sensitive across the test block to index sequence 
learning. Accuracy was worse on the control sequences in block 11 as compared with the 
training sequences averaged between blocks 10 and 12, and this decrease was similar between 
the groups (TD: Mean difference (M) = 7.81 %; ASC: M = 8.52 %; SED = 2.24 %). A mixed 
ANOVA with factors of Group and Block (Control Sequences Block 11 vs. Block 10&12) 
produced a pattern of results equivalent to the RT analysis: there was effect of Block that 
indicated sequence learning (F(1, 30) = 53.35, p < .001, η2p = .64) but there was no evidence of 
an interaction with Group (F(1, 30) = 0.10 p = .75, η2p < .01). There was no overall difference 
between the groups in accuracy (F(1, 30) = 1.86 p = .18, η2p = .06). 
4.2.3. Sequence validity: Block 10-12 
As an indirect measure of whether the application of the sequence was explicit, mean 
accuracy on training sequences in test block 11 were compared with mean accuracy on training 
sequences in neighbouring blocks 10 & 12. In both groups, there was a decrease in accuracy on 
the training sequences in Block 11 compared with Block 10 and 12 (TD: Mean difference (M) = 
3.48 %; ASC: M = 0.53 %; SED = 1.86 %). A mixed ANOVA with factors of Group and Block 
(Training Sequences Block 11 vs. Block 10&12) revealed a main effect of Block (F(1, 30) = 
4.66, p = .04, η2p = .13), which was another indication that the sequence learning was explicit. 
There was no significant effect of Group (F(1, 30) = 0.52, p = .48, η2p = .02) nor interaction 
between Group and Block (F(1, 30) = 2.53, p = .12, η2p = .08). 
